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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: CRIMINAL VIOLENCE IN POST-TRANSITION SOCIETIES 
 
Why are citizens in some new democracies more likely to be murdered more than in 
others? Around two-thirds of deaths associated with armed violence in the world occur 
outside war zones every year and are attributed to common crime (Geneva Declaration 
Secretariat 2008). A significant share of this violence takes place in Central America, 
Brazil, the Caribbean, Central Africa, and Eastern Europe. Perhaps coincidentally, but 
this thesis will argue that the link is not by chance, these are also  regions that have 
undergone political transitions over the past twenty years and where the prospects for 
long-term democratic consolidation are still very uncertain in many of them.  
Hence, in many of these countries fragile democracy coexists with high levels of 
violent crime and generalized public insecurity. On the other hand, not all countries 
around the world that have experienced political transitions have ended up with high 
levels of violent crime. In the former Communist bloc, for instance, Poland and Slovakia 
stand out as peaceful countries, whereas neighboring Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia face 
high levels of criminal violence. In Central America, where most of the region has 
reached world-class levels of violence, Nicaragua stands as an exceptional case, with low 
levels of violence far closer to that of the longstanding Costa Rican democracy than to 
the other post-transition countries. Costa Rica, however, has been the most stable 
democracy in Latin America for decades, and its success in keeping contemporary 
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criminal violence at bay seems to be explained by its longstanding and deeply entrenched 
history of political stability.   
This research project aims to answer the question as to why some new 
democracies develop astronomically high levels of criminal violence, whereas in others 
violence is far more limited. This inquiry is related to a more general question: does 
democratization—or democracy for that matter— itself provoke violence? Most of the 
academic literature that has tried to answer this question has focused on political 
violence, and pursued answers from the international relations perspective (Collier 2009; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Licklider 2000).  
However, with the exception of the African countries, where political and ethnic violence 
is rampant; in the rest of the transitional world violence seems to be criminally motivated. 
Countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa, which have all succeeded in 
establishing at least the minimal Schumpeterian criteria of electoral competitiveness, are 
being riven by common and criminal violence, not by political violence. To be sure, some 
of the murders occurring in Russia, Mexico, and South Africa, are politically motivated; 
but they are not expressions of civil wars or large-scale political conflicts. The bulk of the 
violence in these countries is to be found in criminal activities perpetrated by criminals, 
drug-traffickers, and common citizens.  
Thus, rather than studying civil war or political conflict in this dissertation, I 
address the issue of the possible link between the process of democratization and criminal 
violence. In the literature, only the recent monographic edition of the ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science (Karstedt and Lafree 2006; LaFree 
and Tseloni 2006) and some scattered contributions (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lin 
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2007), have directly tackled this issue. They all found evidence that over the long term 
democracy reduces crime; but they also have found evidence that recently launched 
democracies may, in fact, suffer from increased levels of violent crime. These findings, 
although inconclusive, make our questions about the democratization/crime link even 
more pressing.  
The wave of democratization that has flowed over the world in the last three 
decades raised significant expectations that these new regimes not only would end the 
violence associated with authoritarian repression, but also that they would develop 
accountable institutions, establish the rule of law, and would establish  the conditions for 
the prevalence of non-violent mechanisms of conflict resolution and governance 
(Koonings and Kruijt 2004a). The failure of some new regimes to deliver peaceful 
societies that abide by the law greatly weakened those expectations. Yet, despite this 
grim reality, it is hardly the case that all post-transition countries have become human 
abattoirs. One region of the world is particularly illustrative: Central America. A general 
overview of the violence rates in this region shows that Nicaragua, which in the early 
1990s underwent a democratic transition through an extremely violent revolution and 
subsequent civil war, has far lower homicide rates in the post-transition than their 
northern neighboring countries: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which 
experienced very different and in some cases far less violent paths of democratization 
(UNODC 2007). 
Such facts contradict the generalized view that all post-transition Latin American 
countries, for example, have descended into social disarray and high levels of criminal 
violence (Koonings and Kruijt 1998; Rotker 2002).The truth is that criminal violence has 
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not necessarily been characteristic of  all democratizing societies. Hence, it is important 
to know why. What mechanisms remain behind the differences between one country and 
another? Central America offers an ideal set of cases to study, as in this small strip of 
land that connects the two Americas it is possible to find some of the most violent places 
in the world and also some of the most peaceful sites in the Americas. 
Therefore, in order to answer the question about the relationship between 
democratization and crime, and also to explore the mechanisms through which some 
countries end up with higher levels of violence than others, I have conducted a two-fold 
research project linking transitions to democracy and violent crime. On the one hand, I 
conducted a cross-country longitudinal analysis on the determinants of violence in Latin 
America using indicators of political regime as independent variables. Using a dataset on 
Latin American countries I developed from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Mortality Database, which collects data on homicides per country around the world since 
1950, I attempted to determine if new democratic regimes have lower levels of homicidal 
violence than transitional regimes or authoritarian regimes. Hence, I fitted a multi-level 
statistical model that treats years as level-1 cases and countries as level-2 cases, or 
clusters. Specifically I developed a random-coefficient growth model that allowed me to 
control the impact of the changes in the political regime of each country across time on 
the levels of violence.  
Such approach addresses the general question about the relationship between 
democratization and crime; but this analysis does not respond to the inquiry about the 
mechanisms that operate behind the differences in the levels of violence from one 
country to another. In order to approach the central question as to why some new 
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democracies have more violence than others, I also conducted a qualitatively-oriented 
research design focused on the Central American countries. In particular, I compared the 
northern Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras), which 
face high levels of violence, with Nicaragua. Drawing on the similarities of the Central 
American countries, that is, their similar political history, their culture, and economic 
characteristics, I followed a “most similar systems design” (Przeworski and Teune 1970) 
that singles out the particular mode of transition that Nicaragua had in comparison with 
its northern neighbors as the main explanatory variable of the different levels of violence 
experienced in these countries. Although I took into consideration the four post-transition 
Central American countries, I focused more on the comparison between El Salvador and 
Nicaragua as the former is considered the most violent country in the Western 
Hemisphere while the latter is one of the less violent countries in Latin America 
(UNODC 2007). Table 1.1 summarizes the variables at play in the comparison.  
 
Table 1.1. Most Similar Systems Design: Explaining Post-Transition Violence  
      in Central America 
 Spanish 
Colonization 
History of 
Authoritarian 
Regime 
Civil War Economic 
Under 
development 
Transition that 
Does Not 
Constrain 
Former Violence 
Specialists 
Levels of 
violence 
       
Guatemala √ √ √ √ √ High 
El Salvador √ √ √ √ √ High 
Honduras √ √  √ √ High 
Nicaragua √ √ √ √  Medium 
       
  
The table shows that I view transitions as the critical variable in the explanations of post-
transition violence in Central America. In contrast, shared factors such as culture 
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(Spanish colonization), authoritarian past, civil war, and economic underdevelopment do 
not account for the differences in the levels of violence in Central America. Thus, I 
conducted a comparative historical analysis on Central America (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003): I compared the historical trajectories of these countries paying 
special attention to the transition period.  
  The fundamental argument that emerges from this analysis is that criminal 
violence in post-transition societies is a function of the mode in which political 
transitions were carried out. Specifically, I believe that where the transitions were able to 
wipe out the fundamental traits of authoritarian domination of the old regime, that is, the 
utilization of violent specialists as informal collaborators of the state, the likelihood of 
high levels of post-transition violence is lower than in countries where transitions did not 
separate violence specialists acting informally on behalf of the state. In other words, I 
argue that criminal violence in the post-transition setting is the result of the way in which 
security institutions were reconstructed during the period of regime change regarding the 
violent actors of the past. This approach entails examining not only whether a reform of 
the security apparatus took place. More importantly, it entails exploring the role played 
by what Charles Tilly (2003) calls the “political entrepreneurs” and the “specialists in 
violence” during such reforms, and whether the latter continued acting as informal 
collaborators of the state in the management of security and the use of violence. 
Therefore, I view the state, its formal and informal institutions, as the key determinants of 
the level and nature of post-transition violence. In stating that, I am not saying that the 
state and its collaborators are the major perpetrators of criminal violence; rather I am 
highlighting the importance of the state and its institutions in the emergence and 
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reproduction of criminal violence. Following a rich tradition in political sociology 
(Centeno 2002; Evans et al. 1985; Mann 1984; Tilly 1985; Tilly 1990), I am bringing the 
state back in the analysis of criminal violence.  
 By doing this, I am also assuming a path dependent perspective (Mahoney 2001). 
That is, I believe that criminal violence is the result of a critical juncture —or series of 
critical events— (Collier and Collier 2002) that determined the sociopolitical path 
leading to my dependent variable, namely post-transition criminal violence. As I have 
pointed out, this critical juncture is the political transition.  
 In developing the qualitative side of my project, I have relieved completely on 
documental research. I have reviewed the work of historians, sociologists, 
anthropologists, and political scientists that have studied the political history in Central 
America. I have also used reports, public records, and government files that provide 
information about the activities of state institutions or individuals acting on behalf of the 
state. In that sense, I reviewed some of the CIA declassified files used by the Salvadoran 
Truth Commission, which are stored at the library of the University of Central America 
in San Salvador. The historical archives of the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua at the 
University of Central America in Managua were also extremely helpful to understand 
how authoritarian security institutions operated in the past. Reports from human rights 
organizations and research reports from local universities were also heavily used.  I 
collected all this information in a series of visits I did to Nicaragua and El Salvador 
between May 2009 and January 2010. Finally, I also reviewed some of the files on El 
Salvador and Nicaragua that are available from the National Security Archives at George 
Washington University. As it turns out, I collected much more information on the 
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fascinating Central American transitions than the information I have been able to use 
here, but which I intend to use in subsequent projects. 
 This manuscript, which summarizes the main findings of my research project, is 
divided into five chapters plus a conclusion. Those five chapters form two different but 
complementary parts. The first part tackles the general issue of the relationship between 
democratization and criminal violence. It consists of Chapter II and Chapter III. Chapter 
II, “To Understand Post-Transition Violence in Latin America,” presents a critical review 
of the literature of criminal violence. It is critical because it aims to show how the 
traditional theoretical perspectives on violence stemming from criminology fall short in 
providing working explanations on the relationships between political regime and 
criminal violence; they also fall short in the very notion of comparative inquiry: they are 
not helpful in explaining why societies that share the same social, cultural, and political 
traits yield such different levels of violence. Then, in Chapter III (An Empirical 
Examination of Regimes, Transitions, and Violence in Latin America) I present one of 
the main empirical sections of this research project. The chapter details the method and 
results of the cross-national longitudinal empirical analysis. Hence, this chapter provides 
a first approach to the comparative study of violence and democratization, as it shows the 
political and social variables under which violence increases in Latin America.  
 The second part of this manuscript moves to the specific case of Central America 
and focuses on the historical comparison between Nicaragua and the rest of post-
transition countries. In Chapter IV, entitled “Violence in Central America: From Political 
Violence to Common Violence,” I present the main characteristics of contemporary 
criminal violence in El Salvador and Nicaragua. I also address the literature that tries to 
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explain violence in Central America and I show why this literature misses the 
fundamental differences between these two countries. Then, in Chapter V (The Roots of 
Violence in Central America), I conduct the major comparative historical analysis that 
supports my argument. This is the key chapter of the whole project, and therefore it is the 
longest and the most complex to deal with. In it, I present the fundamental theory behind 
my own comparison; then, I review what I consider the critical historical roots of 
violence in the region, namely the existence of structures of civilian collaboration with 
the authoritarian state; next I review the transitions in Central America and show how 
they failed to erase those structures in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; but 
succeeded in Nicaragua.  Finally in the chapter entitled “State Violence in the Post-
Transition,” I present some support for my argument by reviewing and proposing a 
typology of the manifestations of contemporary state violence in Latin America.  
 In the conclusions, I attempt a summary of the main findings of the research 
project and I present a model to understand the causes of post-transition criminal violence 
in Latin America. I show that the main findings of this research are helpful to build a 
theory about post-transition violence that can be applied to other countries and regions of 
the world as well.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
TO UNDERSTAND POST-TRANSITION VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
How do we explain post-transition violence in Latin America, particularly in the Central 
American countries?  What do we need to know in order to understand why this sub 
region of the world has reached extraordinarily high levels of violence when compared to 
other regions, even to those riven by war and internal conflict? There is a long tradition 
of studying violence in the social sciences and the literature on violence is a large and 
fascinating corpus of theories and debates that go back to Aristotle. But I do not want to 
pursue an historical review of the literature on crime and violence here. Rather, what I 
want to do is to review the theories, explanations and literatures relevant to our endeavor, 
namely, why some post-transition countries face more violence than others. In doing this, 
and having Latin America in mind, I will critically review the major theories developed 
from criminology with my intention being expect to show the limitations of these 
perspectives to our understanding of contemporary violence in the region.  Violence, 
however, encompasses several meanings and it might seem that by starting with the 
criminology field, I am conflating violence into crime.  
 In some sense, I am. But this apparent fusion does not stem from a theoretical 
confusion or a claim that all violence in Latin America and other parts of the world is 
criminal in nature. In fact, an important share of the violence that affects countries not at 
war nowadays is not criminal; as political and social forms of violence remain an 
important source of population victimization.  Yet, by blending violence with crime in 
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this early stage of my exposition, I am briefly joining the generalized sense found in the 
contemporary literature (Ayres 1998; Fajnzylber et al. 2001; Fruhling et al. 2003; 
Londoño et al. 2000; Morrison et al. 2003) that crime and common violence have become 
established as the predominant forms of violence in Latin America. This has happened 
after most of the region has undergone political transitions, and electoral democracy has 
established itself as the predominant political regime in the Americas. Thus, most of the 
literature addressing the problem of violence in the region so far has attempted to use the 
analytical tools provided by criminal justice research projects to enlighten the apparent 
rise of violence during the democratic era. The recent Central American Human 
Development report, published by the UNDP, is an example of this effort. 
 Important contributors to the debate on post-transition violence notwithstanding, 
these approaches have proven insufficient to explain why some countries have reached 
nearly genocidal levels in the democratic era while others have managed to keep crime 
and violence at bay. Even as some regions and municipalities in countries such as 
Colombia, Brazil, and El Salvador experience hyper-levels of  murder, exceeding more 
than 150 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (Cubides et al. 1998; Molina Vaquerano 2007),  
compared to murder rates of 1 per 100,000 in Norway, for example, other countries and 
provinces experience levels of violence resembling those of Western Europe and Canada 
(PNUD 2009). The explanations, however, fall short in explaining not only the huge 
outbreak of violence in some countries, but also the gap within regions and/or countries 
that maintain the same societal and economic characteristics.     
 Following this review of the relevant literature in criminology, I will turn to 
contributions from political science and will show the importance of taking into account 
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other sets of variables in addition to those usually considered from other social sciences. 
These variables refer to the role of the modern state in managing security, order, and 
violence. This task entails an analysis of the power relationships in which the state is 
embedded, the regime’s effectiveness in monopolizing the means of violence, and the 
limits established in its exercise of legitimate force.   
In other words, the main idea here is that it is impossible to understand the 
strikingly different levels of violence that are vexing Latin America, as well as other 
regions of the world, without looking at the state, its role and its contribution in the 
reproduction of common violence.  Charles Tilly has said that “with collective violence 
we enter the terrain of contentious politics” (2003: 26)  Although contentious politics is 
not precisely the subject of this research project, such perspective sheds light on the 
nature of the violence we are about to study here. Some analysts will be reluctant to see 
contemporary violence in Latin America characterized as collective, given the share of 
individually motivated acts, the murders committed in private settings, and the vast array 
of felonies perpetrated by single actors. But as Chapter IV will show, in the case of 
Central America, much of the violence and crime taking place in those societies is carried 
out by actors who deploy violent activities in coordination with other actors and 
institutions. The criminal who is singled out by the criminal justice systems is often the 
last link in a long chain of violent entrepreneurs who sustain relationships based on 
violence. The large toll of killings, assaults, and rapes affecting some of the post-
transitional countries nowadays can only be explained if we analytically disentangle the 
complex relationships between the state and those violent actors.  
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A Review from Criminology 
 
The individual-centered approach 
A first cut of theories from the criminology field can be made by separating those that 
focus on the individual and those that study society, its structures and social processes. 
Within the individual realm, perhaps one of the most successful theoretical strings is 
anchored in what is known by criminologists as the “classical school.” These theories 
assert the preeminence of rationality in individuals whose nature is intrinsically 
hedonistic: criminals and violent individuals would choose violence because of the 
benefits that violent acts would bring to them. In other words, they choose criminal 
actions because of the benefits. Starting with the contributions of Cesare Beccaria and 
Jeremy Bentham in the eighteenth century, the theories stipulate that people would 
pursue behaviors that bring rewards and avoid those that bring negative consequences to 
them. In that sense, they underscore the role of systems of punishment in the deterrence 
of crime and have had an enormous impact on the organization of the modern notion of 
criminal justice systems. In fact, the theories of deterrence stipulate that in order to 
decrease delinquency and violence it is necessary to increase the severity of the 
punishment for the crimes committed (Vito et al. 2007). Such a viewpoint has dominated 
much of the legislation on crime either in the developed or developing countries, 
especially following the 1980s (Blumstein and Wallman 2006). In Latin America, 
although the academic community studying this issue has produced little empirical 
evidence, governments have rushed to implement tougher crime legislation in order to 
counter the increase of violence during the post-transition period. Such hardening has 
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yielded the now famous “zero tolerance” or “mano dura” approaches across the region 
(Arana 2005; Cruz 2010; Davis 2007). These plans have entailed severe laws and 
programs against crime, which included an increase in sentences as well as the 
criminalization of some behaviors (Ungar 2009). 
 Yet, one of the most popular offsprings of this line of thinking is what is called 
the rational choice theory. This model suggests that people would rationally choose 
whether to engage in crime, and the circumstances under which they would do it (Clarke 
1992). In the contemporary era, the insight into criminal activity as a rational action 
which comes about after an analysis the specific costs and benefits of engaging in illegal 
activities comes from the work of economist Gary Becker. Becker, writing about the 
“optimal” policies to combat illegal behavior, argued that effective policies of combating 
crime are those that increase the costs of committing a crime by rising the probabilities of 
apprehension and punishment of the criminals, while at the same time reducing the 
opportunities to commit the crime, the latter being related to surveillance. Thus, “optimal 
policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources”  
concerning surveillance and punishment (Becker 1968: 209).  
 This perspective has illuminated some of the most ambitious empirical research 
projects in the region of Latin America, which happened to be associated with 
multilateral finance agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Fajnzylber et al. 1998; Gaviria 2000). For example, studying the 
determinants of crime in Latin America and the world, economists Fajnzylber, Lederman, 
and Loayza (2000) found that deterrence factors, such as police presence and the death 
penalty have a significantly negative relationship with homicide rates in some countries 
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of the world. In general, given its usefulness for policy implications beyond the zero 
tolerance approach, these perspectives of deterrence theory and rational choice have also 
influenced an important part of the discussion about the role of the criminal justice 
institutions in Latin America. In these contributions, a key argument is that violence in 
Latin America is the product of weak, inefficient, and corrupt institutions of law 
enforcement and justice in the region (Londoño et al. 2000).  Such faulty institutions 
prevent Latin American societies from enforcing the law, so criminals find big returns 
and face very low costs in engaging in criminal activities associated with drug-
trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling networks across the region.  
 Rational choice theory and its policy implications have contributed to our 
understanding of some of the situational variables that lie behind violence in post-
transition Latin American countries and, despite the actual limited number of empirical 
studies considering these type of variables, they have helped to turn our attention to the 
importance of law enforcement in the prevention of crime. However, in addition to the 
common criticisms that have been made toward this theory, which neglects the fact that 
not all people behave “rationally” all the time (Shelden et al. 2001) , the theory falls short 
in explaining some of the most distinctive expressions of violence in the region. That is, 
the presence and development of youth gangs and drug-trafficking organizations. Indeed, 
any analysis of this phenomenon would suggest that gangs and criminal mobs have just 
burst into countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and those of Central America because of 
the high returns of drug-related activities. It would seem that profits and rewards 
generated by drug trafficking, hit-men raids, and human smuggling far outweigh any 
costs generated by the (low) probability of apprehension and incarceration in these 
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countries. Nevertheless, that is just part of the story. In the consideration of the costs of 
illegal activities related to the association to criminal organizations, we also must 
consider the intrinsic costs of building a criminal organization. Costs of illegal activities 
in organized crime settings also entail the probability of being killed or abused within the 
same criminal organization. As many studies on gangs and criminal organizations have 
shown,  a gang or criminal organization increases the probability of becoming a victim of 
violence (Klein and Maxson 2006; Spergel 1990). Internal predation and inter-group 
conflicts represent higher costs for criminal involvement (Skarbek 2008).  In the case of 
Central American gangs or Mexican drug cartels, these are not just remote possibilities, 
but very clear prospects. Mobsters join gangs and cartels knowing that they will most 
likely become victims of death, torture, or prison.1 So, why do they join those groups in 
the first place? Being gang members, they face even higher costs for their behavior than 
not being a member of a criminal organization.  
 Classical school theories do not provide satisfactory answers to these questions. 
Although some recent inputs have pointed out the importance of some other factors that 
go beyond pure rationality such as social contexts, information, and group processes 
(Arsovska and Kostakos 2008), none of them seem to explain why so many young males 
in the Americas join criminal organizations where the only certainty is imprisonment, 
abuse, or death. In addition, as some authors working on Central American street gangs 
have pointed out, the integration of some youngsters to this kind of group seems to be 
motivated not only by their search for some social values —such as respect and power—, 
                                                 
1 A Salvadoran gang member once told me that he knew that his life in the gang will end in either 
“encierro, entierro o destierro” (locked-up, burial, or banishment) 
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but also by the apparent absence of other life alternatives (Cruz and Portillo Peña 1998; 
Rodgers 2006b; Smutt and Miranda 1998). 
Other individual-centered theories of crime seem less suitable for explaining the 
high levels of collective violence affecting some Latin American countries. One line of 
these postulates focuses in the biological variables that determine violent behavior and 
crime. Nineteenth century Cesare Lombroso’s idea that some individuals are biologically 
predisposed to be criminals is perhaps the most well-known claim from this outdated 
school of thought. Although no modern scholar would accept this assertion as a serious 
thesis to explain collective violence in Latin America, contemporary medical research has 
shown that some violent behavior in specific individuals is related to neurological and 
hormonal disorders, as well as genetic irregularities, such as the XYY chromosomal 
abnormality (Jacobs 1965). Yet, very few view this field with the potential to contribute 
to the treatment of crime (Powledge 1996), and most of the scholarship focuses on the 
interaction of these factors with the environment (Fishbein 2001). Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to see that in some countries of Latin America, some opinion leaders, pundits, 
and even institutions still wield the argument of the biological predisposition to violence 
in order to explain crime, especially associated with race. Not long ago, the Salvadoran 
National Civilian Police published on its website that hereditary traits from indigenous 
citizens could partly explain the “propensity” of Salvadorans to violence (Cruz 2003a).2 
Such arguments reproduce an early twentieth-century liberal-creole view that indigenous 
people and certain races were violent and “backward” (Graham 2004; Urías Horcasitas 
2000). However, in another sense, Latin American elites have also recurrently used the 
                                                 
2 The page was quickly removed from the website after raising a dust-up  within government and 
international agencies working in El Salvador, for suggesting that “violence was inherent to indigenous 
blood.” 
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argument of a race-related propensity toward violent behavior with the purpose of 
generating political identities of resistance and courage. These arguments certainly do not 
help to shed light on crime in the region, but their formulation and utilization by political 
actors have been important for the configuration of ideologies that justify power 
relationships and violence.  
The last strand of theories based on the individual briefly considered here are 
those that revolve around the behavioral school of psychology.  Put simply, the 
fundamental idea of this school of thought is that crime and violence stem from learning 
processes: people “learn” to be violent and to carry out criminal behaviors.  Personal 
experiences and direct observation drive the learning processes of violent behavior. In the 
first case, people are rewarded for acting aggressively or punished for not doing so; in the 
second case, people learn from observing others’ behavior and the consequences, 
rewards, and costs that such acts bring to them (Bandura 1977). Hence, for instance, 
young people would become gang members and criminals by following the same type of 
behavior performed by their peers and role models. The rise of television and mass media 
has played a moderate but important role in the exposure to violent behavior and the 
learning of violence (see: Anderson and Bushman 2002) 
This school of thought, which is also known as the social learning theory despite 
its individual scope (Shelden et al. 2001), has indeed influenced the scholarship on 
violence and crime in Latin America. The major arguments in this line of reasoning are 
the following. First, violence has reproduced in the region because of immediate 
household environments, characterized by dysfunctional families, domestic violence and 
child abuse; these environments have fashioned violent patterns of behavior in family 
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members (Buvinic 2000; Larraín 2002). Second, in addition to problematic families, 
many youngsters and teenagers are being “socialized” in urban violent environments 
where gangs, drug-traffickers and organized crime operatives are taken as role models by 
the youth (Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and Winton 2002). And third, in some 
countries, civil wars and internal political conflicts have trained vast generations of 
citizens in the use and practice of violence (CRIES 1999).  
 Policy oriented-scholarship funded by international agencies in the region has 
carried out many studies that point to the importance of violence learning at the 
household level. All this research claims that children and teenagers who have been 
victims of child abuse and neglect in their own family environments have higher 
probabilities  of becoming domestic abusers, joining street gangs or committing criminal 
acts in the future (Arriagada and Godoy 2000; Larraín 2002; Salas Bahamón 2005). 
Furthermore, nearly all research conducted on gangs in the region has pointed out that 
gang members come from poor families where domestic violence is frequent and 
widespread (Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes de Honduras and Save the Children-UK 
2002; Santacruz and Concha-Eastman 2001). Although some of these contributions tend 
to underscore the normative aspects of domestic violence and the structural determinants 
of violence, such as rampant poverty and unemployment, the underlying argument is that 
some young people end up engaging in criminal activity because of the abusive 
environment in which they were raised. Similarly, some of these studies, especially those 
focused on street gangs, extend the process of violence learning to the streets.  Gang 
members become the models of young wannabes, who adopt the styles and behaviors of 
mobsters (Jutersonke et al. 2009; Rocha 2006). An empirical study conducted by 
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Alejandro Gaviria in Colombia, for instance, found that “the interaction of career 
criminals and local crooks speeds up the diffusion of criminal know-how and criminal 
technology” (Gaviria 2000: 3). 
 The legacies of civil wars and internal conflicts in Central America and Colombia 
have also been included under the perspective of social learning theory.  According to 
this interpretation, internal wars led societies and governments to train thousands of men 
in the technologies and skills of violence (Cruz 1997). In a study sponsored by the World 
Bank, Cruz, Trigueros, and Gonzalez found that more than thirty percent of inmates 
serving sentences in Salvadoran jails in1999  directly participated in the civil war, either 
as soldiers or as guerrilla combatants (Cruz et al. 2000). Despite other factors behind the 
evolution of former combatants into criminal careers, such as the paucity of employment 
opportunities and reintegration programs or the psychological traumas of the war, the 
social learning perspective underscores the behavioral skills of aggression gained during 
the long periods of warfare that have characterized Colombia and Central America.  
 In sum, the research on crime and violence in Latin America using theories 
underscoring individual traits has informed our understanding of violence in the region. 
However, since these theories focus on the individual, they have limited potential of 
explaining processes of collective aggression that seem to be behind the skyrocketing 
levels of violence in the region. The classical school of rational choice, for example, has 
been more instrumental in providing insights into the importance of institutional efficacy 
than in the explanation as to why some people in Latin America choose a criminal career 
in the first place. Biologically based theories have practically no relevance in the 
scholarship of Latin American violence, but an historical review of their utilization in 
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some Latin American countries provides an interesting window to understand how it has 
been employed to support ideologies of domination and exclusion. Finally, in the 
research on violence, behavioral approaches have stressed the processes of learning in the 
reproduction of crime. Although these theories are, nowadays, less “individually” 
oriented as every learning process involves social interaction, I have chosen to include 
them among the individual-level theories in order to leave space to discuss other 
approaches in the socially-oriented group of theories.  
 
Society as the key variable 
Among the theories focused on society, there are three major schools of thought making 
inroads in the literature on Latin American violence and crime: the social structural 
school, the social process theories, and the critical or social conflict school.  The 
fundamental line of reasoning of the social structural line of theories is that the society 
structure determines crime, so economic and social factors are the key variables in the 
explanation of violent behavior. In its simplest form, this school claims that poverty 
produces crime (Siegel 2006), but since poverty long has been a world-wide phenomenon 
time and extreme violence has been a special feature in the cases I am studying, we need 
to refine this theory a bite Different theories within this model explain the relationship in 
different ways. Social disorganization theory, for instance, claims that poverty affects the 
ecology of neighborhoods and communities, affecting the key social institutions and 
eroding the formal and informal mechanisms of social control (Shelden et al. 2001). Poor 
communities are deprived of efficient schools, social service agencies, adequate housing, 
employment opportunities, and effective policing. As a result, people attempt to leave 
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those neighborhoods as soon as possible, weakening interpersonal bonds, thwarting any 
collective effort to tackle community problems, and generating subcultures of violence 
(Shaw and McKay 1972).  
 This theoretical approach has informed a significant amount of scholarship of 
crime and violence in Latin America, as it has influenced many of the policy-oriented 
research programs run by international cooperation agencies in the region. Regional 
reports by the United Nations, USAID, the World Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank have all tapped the effects of economic factors in the growth of crime 
within the region (Ayres 1998; Londoño et al. 2000; PNUD 2009; USAID 2006). But in 
many inquiries, poverty remains an unsatisfactory factor. Rather than poverty per se, 
studies conducted by Fajnzylber and colleagues (1998), and Bourguignon (1999) have 
showed that inequality is more important in the explanation of violence in the region. In 
addition to that research and working from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, 
different authors (Dammert 2005; Gaviria and Pagés 1999; Rodgers 2008; Smutt and 
Miranda 1998) point out the importance of urbanization processes in social 
disorganization in communities; the underlying argument of these papers is that rapid and 
unplanned urbanization worsens the problems of poverty and inequality. The recent surge 
in literature about social capital and violence in the region can also be understood as part 
of the social disorganization theoretical stream. Communities affected by high levels of 
violence are those where interpersonal distrust, low levels of citizen participation, and 
lack of mediation mechanisms between people and institutions are widespread (ERIC 
2004a; Lederman et al. 2002; Moser and Holland 1997).  The idea that social 
disorganization and the absence of social capital lead to crime has been used to support 
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projects to reduce violence in different Latin American cities. According to Moser, 
Winton, and Moser (2005), projects financed by the Inter-American Development Bank 
in the last decade or so totaled nearly 100 million dollars, most of which (52 percent) 
went to community action programs to prevent youth violence. The collection of policies 
to transform neighborhood ecologies and social capital in Bogotá, Colombia is, perhaps, 
one of the most well-known large scale city efforts to curb violence using an approach 
that taps into social disorganization theory. These policies, which were implemented by 
three different but consecutive city governments, entailed, among other things, a 
sweeping renovation of the public spaces in the neighborhoods affected by violence, the 
upgrading of the city school system, and a massive boost to programs of civic 
participation in public security and coexistence (“convivencia”) issues (Mockus and 
Acero Velásquez no date). After these community-centered programs, Bogotá went from 
having a homicide rate of 80 murders per 100,000 thousand inhabitants in 1993, to a rate 
of 23/100,000 in the early 2000s. However, causal attribution is not really possible since 
no controlled analysis was done. For example, we do not know if violence would have 
been reduced without these programs because of other factors, such as a get-tough policy 
of the national government. 
 The second theoretical line within the structural school of criminology stems 
directly from the ideas of Durkheim. Working on an explanation to suicide, Durkheim 
coined the notion of “anomie,” namely a condition in which social norms and values 
weaken and are unable to control behavior. This term was later adopted by Robert 
Merton, who used it to explain crime, giving way to what is called “strain theory.”  
According to Merton, crime emerges from the contradiction between cultural norms, 
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which stress economic success, and social structures (Merton 1968). While social 
institutions and structures are responsible for granting access to legitimate means of life 
goals, they do not provide such means to underclass populations, neither do they to larger 
population groups in periods of drastic social change. People may see themselves 
excluded from opportunities and, as a result, may follow violent and criminal strategies 
and behaviors in order to reach those goals. In other words, the lack of opportunities 
leads people to experience strain and frustration, who respond with social deviance, crime 
and violence. Merton’s postulate has yielded many theoretical interpretations that 
emphasize social class, community inequalities, and individual processes; but his basic 
idea of disparities between the social goals and the means to reach them has indeed 
inspired noteworthy scholarship on violence in Latin America.  
 For instance, the influential UNDP Human Development Report on Central 
America for the years 2009-2010, which focuses on the challenges posed by public 
insecurity and violence in contemporary Central America, was developed from the 
assumption that crime in the region is the result of “desajustes sociales.” That is, people 
fail to adjust to their social environment, causing anomie, which in turn results in the 
corrosion of social solidarity and cohesion (PNUD 2009: 45-48). According to the report, 
those imbalances (“desajustes”) are essentially produced by globalization, in its 
economic, political, and cultural forms, as well as by internal imbalances engendered by 
economic exclusion, urbanization, migration, and political conflicts.  
The UNDP report is not alone in its interpretation of contemporary Central 
American violence. The argument that crime in Latin America is the result of normative 
imbalances with social structures shaped by economic liberalization and globalization has 
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gained some momentum in the literature on violence in the region. In its core argument, 
this treatment of strain theory postulates that the current wave of criminal violence in 
Latin America can be explained by the impact of economic reforms implemented 
following the Washington consensus in the 1980s. Such reforms aggravated the problems 
of exclusion and marginalization that were already endemic in the region by dismantling 
the incipient networks of social welfare and weakening the regulatory and redistributive 
faculties of the Latin American state (Arias and Goldstein 2010a; Buvinic et al. 2002; 
Koonings and Kruijt 2004b; Méndez 1999). In some cases, alternative cultural systems 
provided by the growing networks of transnational crime have stepped in to fill out the 
normative vacuum created by the accelerated transformations of economic reforms 
(Savenije and van der Borgh 2006). But economic liberalization has also presupposed the 
introduction of cultural values that support the new globalized economic order (Fournier 
2000).  
Globalization, in this sense, has also had an important role, not only because 
global markets and transnational economic actors are the key players in the new 
economic order; but more importantly, because, globalization has also expanded a system 
of norms and values that stress wealth, success, and power through individual 
achievement (Benson et al. 2008). According to this view, globalization has contributed 
to the rise of crime throughout the region through two mechanisms that create the 
“perfect strain storm.” First, it exacerbates the structural problems of poverty and 
marginalization; and second, it spreads cultural norms that praise effortless wealth, greed, 
and consumerism. Faced with the impossibility of achieving these forms of success in an 
increasingly marginalizing environment, many people in developing countries opt for 
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delinquent lives and join gangs and even the transnational networks of crime. This line of 
arguments about violence is developed from research projects that hinge on ethnographic 
work and anthropological analysis (Benson et al. 2008; Rodgers 2009). It is also very 
popular among sociological and political essays where it is framed along other arguments 
on the upsurge of violence. The difficulty with this theory, of course, is that not all 
countries that have undergone structural adjustment policies have also undergone 
increases in violence. 
 Social structure theories are not the only ones making inroads into the literature 
on criminal violence in the Americas.  A significant amount of scholarship taps the 
problem of violence from the perspective of social process. In addition to focusing on 
social structure, this line of research explores the interplay between person and society in 
the generation of crime (Alda and Béliz 2007). The fundamental argument here is that in 
order to understand violence it is important to study the interactions people have with 
their peers, institutions, and processes through their life (Buvinic et al. 2002) . Hence, a 
key variable is socialization, that is, the process of cultural learning that guides personal 
behavior. So, violence and crime stems from the way institutions such as family, school, 
religion, and state institutions shape people’s behavior throughout their lives. 
 Perhaps the best-known and cultivated line of inquiry within this theoretical 
stream is the social learning theory. This theory and the psychological school of 
behaviorism— depicted above— have many overlapping areas; therefore, I will not 
expand further on its arguments and its utilization in the literature on violence in Latin 
America. However, it is important to note that for the social learning theorists, it is 
critical to understand the mechanisms through which people learn “bad” or incorrect 
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behaviors and norms. The contributions, for instance, of Smutt and Miranda (1998), 
Demoscopia (2007), and the “Maras y pandillas en Centroamérica” research project 
(ERIC et al. 2001; ERIC 2004b) —all of them focusing on gangs in the Central American 
region— stress the importance of gang socialization in the reproduction of the so-called 
“maras” in the region. 
 However, there is another line of inquiry concerning socialization that tends to 
interpret crime as the outcome of incomplete or failed socialization processes. In this 
sense, people would turn to criminal life because social institutions failed to produce the 
appropriate values and norms to prevent criminal behavior. This approach has not really 
had much traction in the academic community working on violence in Latin America. 
Nevertheless, in an analogous line of thought, a handful of scholars studying democratic 
citizenship and the rule of law have raised the question as to whether social institutions 
which emerged from the political transitions in the last two decades are suitable to instill 
or reproduce the essential norms, values, and patterns of behavior that will render law-
abiding citizens (Caldeira 2001; Caldeira and Holston 1999; O'Donnell 1999). Many of 
these works concentrate on the way institutions, especially those in the criminal justice 
system, should be strengthened in order to make them fully democratic. However, the 
assumptions behind those contributions are that it is not possible to have a society that 
abides by the rule of law, while its institutions continue to deny rights to the 
underprivileged (Pinheiro 2003; 2007) while at the same time it educates them in the non-
observance of law.  
 In addition to the scholarship that focuses on the social learning process, there is a 
corpus of literature studying violence in Latin America from a dynamic perspective 
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which integrates much of what different schools of thought have postulated so far. It 
assumes that violence is the result of continuous interaction of the individual with 
different levels of social environments starting with the family and ending with economic 
structures. Actually, this perspective does not originate from the criminology tradition, 
but from the epidemiology discipline in public health. Its key promoters are the group of 
epidemiologists working at the World Health Organization (WHO) (Krug et al. 2002), 
who published the World Report on Violence and Health in the early 2000s. One of the 
main contributions of this health-centered framework, also called the “ecological model” 
by its subscribers, is that it sees the variables associated with violence as risks factors, 
rather than single determinants (Concha-Eastman 2005; Guerrero 2002). Hence, it 
incorporates a multitude of factors in the understanding of violence and classifies them 
according to its immediate impact on the occurrence of violence. It also assumes that the 
higher the number of factors lurking, the higher the likelihood that violence and crime 
will emerge. This is an additive but simple model.  
Structural variables such as inequality and poverty are important risk factors in 
the emergence of violence, but they may not lead to violence if other mediating and 
situational factors are not present. Poverty does not yield violence in the straightforward 
way that situational factors, such as weapons availability and alcohol consumption, lead 
to violent behavior. In the always-pressing world of violence prevention, dealing with 
arms and alcohol may be more effective in the short term than dealing with the economic 
order. This dynamic highlights the essential policy-oriented character of the approach, as 
it has influenced a great deal of scholarship in Latin America (Rau 2007). Research 
projects carried out from this perspective, which also have received a significant support 
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from multilateral agencies in the region, (especially from the Pan-American Health 
Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank) have been instrumental in 
mapping the violence and crime phenomenon in the region. According to this approach, 
the presence and interplay of very diverse factors can explain the uneven frequency of 
violence in Latin America (Briceño-León et al. 2008). Hence, countries such as 
Colombia, Mexico and Honduras, would have higher rates of violence than Chile and 
Uruguay because the former have a higher concentration of risk factors than do the latter.  
We cannot conclude this section about social oriented theories on crime and 
violence without revisiting the literature that emphasizes the effect of inequality and 
exclusion per se in the dynamics of violence. This approach, known as conflict or critical 
theory within sociology, suggests that the gap between the power and abundance of the 
rich and the disenfranchisement of the poor is the origin of violent crime, as the latter is 
an expression of reprisal  of the dispossessed over the unjust conditions that are imposed 
on them (Holston 2009). In that sense, for some authors working on violence in Latin 
America, rather than expression of strain and disconnect between values as strain theories 
would argue, criminal violence would be an expression of resistance from oppressed and 
marginalized populations (Benson et al. 2008; Hagedorn 2008; Rodgers 2009; Sassen 
2007). For these theorists, the disparities created by market liberalization and 
globalization are important also in explaining crime. The key dynamic, however, is not 
whether the values propagated by capitalism match the opportunities available to the poor 
as in strain theories; rather, the key social dynamic is the struggle of the poor and 
marginalized to dismantle systems of oppression and marginalization using violence. 
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Scholars of this school of thought perceive the law and the criminal justice systems as 
tools of oppression, and violence a form of contestation.  
As has been shown, all these theories fixed on social structures and processes 
serve an important role in the development of scholarship on violence and crime in Latin 
America. However, thus far much of the literature has intended to survey the situation of 
violence in the post-authoritarian era rather than test specific hypotheses and theoretical 
interpretations about the causes or outcomes of violence.  Consequently, it is possible to 
find different theoretical interpretations incorporated in the same research without a clear 
engagement by the author in a single theory or framework. Even in those studies that rest 
on  a strong methodological imprint and a clear preference for a singular theoretical 
interpretation, such as the papers by Fajzylber and others, for example (Fajnzylber et al. 
2000; Fajnzylber et al. 2002b), the authors end up accommodating other variables in their 
models that do not necessarily fit the explanation. Likewise, many pieces are essays that 
advance insightful interpretations by borrowing from different traditions, so 
interpretations that fit into the rational choice approach are combined with strain theory 
or even critical criminology. In short, much of the theoretical basis of research has been 
eclectic, even when it professes to adhere to a single perspective. 
This corpus of research has an additional and, in my view, more important 
limitation. It generally ignores the role of some political variables, such as regime type, 
the state, or political institutions, in the reworking of criminal violence in Latin America. 
Most of the contributions we have reviewed so far view the problem of violence as 
residing in society where family, school, poverty, urbanization, and other characteristics 
are the key explanatory variables of violence. That is why criminology frameworks have 
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appeared to be so important thus far. However, a closer and more critical look at the 
violence in the region also suggests the presence of the state and its institutions in the 
overall set of relationships that yield collective violence. Critical or conflict approach 
literature has included the issue of the state in the treatment of violence, but the central 
argument  always ends up focusing on  the society, and on the strategies that draw on 
violence to contest state neglect of citizen rights.  
In addition, a booming and interesting scholarship has been looking at the role of 
institutions in the upsurge of violence in the region in the last decade and some seminal 
papers have been written regarding the apparent disjuncture between crime and 
democracy (Holston and Caldeira 1998). Nevertheless, most of the works concentrate on 
the performance of criminal justice institutions and whether they are efficient or 
transparent enough in dealing with violence (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Duce and Pérez 
Perdomo 2003; Fruhling 1998). This is so because in the discussion about violence in 
Latin America, the predominant underlying idea is that once countries democratized or 
consolidated their democracies  the fundamental source of violence can no longer be the 
state or the regime (Diamond 1997; Diamond 2008; Linz and Stepan 1996)3, but the 
society and its dynamics. Of course, several authors are open to accepting the 
participation of state institutions in the maelstrom of democratic-era violence. But since 
in most of these countries, the power of the military—the fundamental source of state 
violence and human rights abuses— was sharply curtailed, there seemed to be no reason 
to believe that the state would be a direct cause of criminal violence, unless the military 
                                                 
3 Note the frustration of Larry Diamond in 2008, acknowledging that democratic transitions did not stop 
what he calls predatory states (Diamond 2008).  
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and the fearsome militarized police forces managed to resurrect some political power 
(Call 2003; Millet and Pérez 2005; Rial 1996). 
Family, community, weapons availability, social capital, culture, urbanization, 
poverty, social exclusion, and inequality became the important variables in explaining the 
new wave of violence. Even those studies which incorporated timely discussions about 
the rule of law and democratic citizenship tended to view violence as the result of the 
incapacity of the emerging (semi) democratic state to grant rights to the entire population 
(Méndez 1999; O'Donnell 1999) or its incapacity to cover national territories. Violence, 
then, would be the result of the “brown” areas of the state, where the latter was unable to 
control all the territorial segments of the national state and therefore incapable of 
regulating the social conflicts that endanger civil liberties and human rights. 
Therefore, in order to understand why criminal violence in general has reached 
world-class levels in some Latin American countries precisely when democracy is the 
only game in town, we have to look again at the state; that is the consideration of the role 
of the regime in the upsurge of violence and the development of violent actors. In this 
dissertation, I argue that the state remains a significant source of violence—criminal, 
common, social, and, of course, political. However, before we do that, we must first 
advance our literature exploration to the relationship between violence and democracy.  
 
 
Violence and Democracy 
I begin this part by discussing the link between democracy and criminal violence. The 
empirical scholarship linking democracy and violent crime has usually focused on the 
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overall effects of well-consolidated democratic institutions on levels of crime (Lin 2007) 
and whether democracy increases crime or not. According to LaFree and Tseloni (2006) 
the literature concerning the link between democracy and crime in contemporary 
societies has revolved around three major perspectives: civilization, conflict, and 
modernization.  
Drawing from Max Weber, the civilization perspective claims that crime would 
decrease as states establish institutions for the legitimate use of force and develop 
complex mechanisms of non-violent social representation (Elias 1982; Mares 2009).  In a 
series of independent empirical research projects examining historic crime rates 
predominantly in Western countries, Ted Robert Gurr and Manuel Eisner found that 
murder rates have been decreasing since the thirteenth century and especially during the 
nineteenth century (Eisner 2001; Gurr 1981; Gurr et al. 1977). Gurr interprets this decline 
as a manifestation of cultural change in Western society, especially the “growing 
sensitization to violence and the development of increased internal and external controls 
on aggressive behavior,” (Gurr 1981: 295), that is institutions, norms, and values. The 
short deviations from this pattern are, according to the author, the result of periods of 
warfare, strains produced by the industrialization processes, and changes in the 
demographic structure. In a similar vein but using a larger pool of data on Western 
Europe,4 Eisner (2003) concluded that the civilizing process, the influence of the 
Protestant Reformation, and the strengthening of state powers have been key to the 
decline of violence.    
                                                 
4 Gurr used only twenty data points in his original analysis while Eisner used more than three hundred 
(Monkkonen 2006).  
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The modernization perspective builds on the idea that democracy would reduce 
crime, but suggests that instead of a linear declining trend, crime would experience an 
inverted-U tendency. That is, it will increase in the early stages of modernization as the 
new order weakens the old normative structures, but once economic transformations 
fundamentally driven by industrialization are consolidated, violence will diminish 
(LaFree and Drass 2002). If we applied this logic to the process of democratization, 
criminal rates would grow during the transition period as result of the strains of rapid 
political transformation, but then they would decrease with democratic consolidation 
(LaFree and Tseloni 2006). In the modernization approach, the fundamental idea is that 
only consolidated democracies produce low levels of common violence. However, in 
practice, few studies have explored the relationship between democracy and violent 
crime. Most of the modernization scholarship that links violence to democracy, 
democratization, or regime type focuses on political violence, civil conflicts, or ethnic 
wars (Collier 2009; Fein 1995; Hegre et al. 2001). They show that as a society moves 
from an authoritarian to a democratic regime—or the other way around (Hegre et al. 
2001)—, politically motivated violence and civil wars intensify. Many of the indicators 
used to measure political violence, such as number of murders, can also be employed to 
measure crime; hence, it is very hard to separate criminal violence from political violence 
during periods of social unrest and institutional confusion that characterize regime 
change.  In fact, some of the few studies that have empirically examined the effect of 
democracy on criminal violence have reached the same conclusion: crime grows during 
transitional periods and declines as democracy takes hold (LaFree and Drass 2002).  
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Finally, the conflict perspective, which I have already reviewed above, argues that 
market economies, which have accompanied democracy, increase the levels of crime by 
generating economic inequality, unemployment, and poverty to a large scale and by 
weakening the institutions of social welfare (Neuman and Berger 1988), especially in the 
post-communist countries (Karstedt 2003). Therefore, contrary to the other approaches, 
which see a positive effect of democracy, the conflict—or critical— perspective suggests 
that liberal democracy has an adverse effect in the control of crime as a result of 
economic liberalization. The effects of economic problems and rising inequality would 
explain the upsurge of violence in Western societies during the second half of the 
twentieth century, and especially in the developing world during the third wave of 
democratization. However, as with modernization, very little empirical research has been 
conducted examining the link between the economic effects of democracy and violent 
crime. To be sure, many studies point out the effects of inequality and economic factors 
on crime, and if we assume that democracy exacerbates problems of inequality, we 
certainly can establish a link between democracy and rising levels of crime. But 
important scholarship tells us quite the contrary, that democracy reduces inequality and 
advances economic growth (Gerring et al. 2005; Muller 1988; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990).  
Therefore, the association between democracy and violence is frequently drawn from the 
fact that Latin American and post-communist emerging democracies are now facing new 
levels of social violence without further empirical testing. 
The emerging scholarship on Latin America has in some ways subscribed to 
either the conflict theory or modernization theory. For example, Mendez, O’Donnell, and 
Pinheiro (1999) see the structural reforms that accompanied the transitions to democracy 
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in Latin America as partially responsible for the increasing levels of insecurity and the 
(un)rule of law in the region. Many others authors view the problems of crime as a direct 
result of the Washington Consensus and the market transformations that have impacted 
the entire region in recent years (see, for example, Benson et al. 2008). However, these 
authors usually draw their conclusions based on the study of single cases, while failing to 
explain why other countries that have introduced such reforms in even harsher ways, such 
as Chile in Latin America, have managed to keep insecurity and crime under control 
while others have not.  Modernization theorists, on the other hand, predict that the wave 
of crime produced by the transitions will recede once the democratic institutions have 
become consolidated (LaFree and Tseloni 2006). The problem with this view for the 
scholarship currently concerned about crime in post-transitional societies is: when can 
institutions be deemed to be fully consolidated in order to yield security and order? 
Further, why do countries that experienced transitions two or three decades ago still have 
a growing problem of criminal violence? Take the highly dissimilar cases of Brazil, El 
Salvador, and Mexico, in which authoritative classifications have labeled them as 
democracies, some having achieved this designation for longer than twenty-five years 
(Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005; Smith 2005); yet, these countries are experiencing 
extremely high levels of  criminal violence, precisely when they have also experienced 
some of their longest periods of stable democracy.  
Are these cases an indicator that democracy has not taken hold? If so, what can 
we expect for the countries that lay in the grey areas of incomplete democratization? The 
modernization perspective may be right regarding the industrialized democracies of the 
more prosperous West, but may fall short in explaining the differences in the current 
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upsurge of crime in some countries of the Third Wave thus far. As Holston (2009) states, 
the new forms of democratization, different from those experienced by the industrial 
West, demand new ways to understand why social disorder, violence, and crime erupts in 
these societies. This dissertation project aims to do that.  
 The wave of democratization that started in the 1970s and the end of several civil 
wars around the globe in the 1990s shifted scholars’ attention toward the criminal 
violence that occurs in post-authoritarian settings.  Because not all countries seem to 
descend into crime in the same way, more mid-range theories are necessary to address the 
different paths to crime.  State weakness, political culture, poverty, the legacies of 
internal conflicts, and the nature and scale of humanitarian foreign aid are the most 
common explanations of criminal violence in current democratizing societies  (Mac 
Ginty 2006). Yet, these factors fail to explain why some countries that share similar 
characteristics within particular regions experience sharply different outcomes in terms of 
public security and crime.  The cases of Nicaragua in Central America, Tanzania in 
Southern Africa, and Slovenia in Post-Communist Europe, are examples of this puzzle. I 
argue that the processes that take place during the transition are an important black box 
that has not been examined as deserved. For example, some research projects have placed  
a great explanatory burden on the processes of building new security apparatuses (Call 
2003; Marenin 1996; Stanley 1993), while many authors have pointed to wars (Cuadra 
Lira and Saldomando 1998; Torres Rivas 1998; UNODC 2007; Zinecker 2007).  These 
perspectives, however, are rarely compared across different countries, which hampers 
their explanatory power.  
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Tilly (2003) and Koonings and Kruijt (2004) have attempted to develop 
explanations that are more centered on political actors. For Tilly, violence depends on the 
relationships established by violent specialists and political entrepreneurs. Violence 
specialists are those “specialists in deployment of violent means, such as soldiers, police, 
thugs, and gang leaders” (Tilly 2003: 30); political entrepreneurs, on the other hand, 
organize, link, divide, and represent constituencies. The interaction of these types of 
actors shape the social process that facilitate or constrain the appearance of criminal 
violence, and this interaction is particularly important during periods of institutional 
transformation.  For Koonings and Kruijt, contemporary violence in Latin America is the 
result of the permanence of outlawed armed actors under democracy (1998; 2004a).  
Because the outcomes of transitions depend on the relationships established by political 
actors —meaning taking into account violent actors—, I will follow these perspectives in 
order to answer my research question. I argue that the nature of those relationships 
between political actors explains the likelihood of high levels of criminal violence during 
the post-transitional period. 
 
Violent Actors within the Democratic State?  
In order to understand violence in Latin America we must first recognize who are the key 
actors perpetrating that violence. The current scholarship on criminal violence tends to 
focus on the actors who lurk at the margins of the state or who inhabit civil society. 
Gangs, drug-traffickers, human smugglers, and potential terrorists seem to be the 
preferred studied actors in the current scenario of violence  (Jutersonke et al. 2009; 
Manwaring 2006; Sullivan 1997). However, as some authors have been calling attention 
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to the phenomenon at least since the transitions took place in Latin America, in the 
dynamics of post-transitional violence state agents and institutions are  among the major 
perpetrators of violence (Davis 2009; Koonings 2001). The best-known works on this 
matter are those concentrating on abuses perpetrated by the Brazilian police in the 
democratic era (Brinks 2006; Cano 2001; Chevigny 1996; Hinton 2006). These works 
point to police agents as perpetrators of murders, tortures, and abuses against civilians 
and persons identified as suspects of crime. Some authors have interpreted this pattern of 
abuse to the legacies of militarized law-enforcement and the culture of authoritarianism 
in which these institutions were developed (Chevigny 2003); in fact, the institution 
responsible for patrolling the streets of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are the military 
police and although they are under civilian command, their procedures and culture are 
essentially those of the military. Other scholars see the problem of police abuse in Brazil, 
as well as in other Latin American countries, as a result of shortcomings in standards of 
professionalization and institutionalization of law-enforcement organizations (Bailey and 
Dammert 2006; Fruhling 2003). Police and state agents engage in abuse and violence 
because of deficiencies in the process of reforming the criminal justice system (Call 
2003; Call 2009; Neild 2002). These limitations close the prospects of “police 
management models that are more democratic and more respectful of the rights of 
individuals” (Fruhling 2003: 40) while open opportunities for corruption and the 
continuation of military approaches to the problems of insecurity and order.  
 In asking herself why issues of police abuse and corruption seem so resilient in 
democratic consolidating Brazil, Mercedes Hinton (2009) argues that the problem of 
violence within state institutions cannot be confined to rogue police agents or individuals 
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using police institutions as cover-ups.  Rather, the problem with post-transitional state-
linked violence has to do with political relationships based on corruption and patronage, 
which permeate institutions and the mechanisms of policy production. Police abuse, then, 
emerges as a result of traditional patterns of politics, where power relations generate 
impunity and prevent democratic mechanisms of accountability from taking hold. In a 
seminal paper about social networks in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, Enrique Desmond Arias 
unveils the complex political dynamics that allow police officers, criminals, community 
leaders, and politicians to form bonds that reproduce criminal violence. More 
importantly, Arias says that “violence in Rio stems from a particular articulation of state, 
social and criminal relations, which actively deploy state power in the service of criminal 
interests” (323). In other words, criminal violence is a product of social relationships and 
political arrangements where the state is a relevant player (Davis 2010; Koonings and 
Kruijt 2004a). The participation of the state as an entity, and not only as single 
individuals or institutions, in the prevalence of criminal violence, is best illustrated by the 
argument of Arias and Goldstein (2010a), when they argue that, even after democratic 
transitions, violence emerges from the way state power is used, through its structures and 
activities, to support existing social relationships. I would add—or stress— that such 
relationships go far beyond the institutional and formal character of the state and include 
the informal and illegal areas and activities in which the states is embedded through 
clientelism, patronage, and corruption politics.  
 In other words, the participation of the state in the construction and prevalence of 
violence revolves not only around formal institutions, such as the police, courts, and 
military, but also hinges on informal actors, extra legal violent entrepreneurs, who are not 
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part of state structures, but who act on their behalf or manage to project state power in 
order to benefit certain groups. Literature on this topic in the post-transition era is still 
scarce, but Diane Davis and Adriana Beltran, the latter working at the Washington Office 
on Latin America, have made significant contributions along this line. Davis (2009), for 
instance, argues that informal armed actors “have been known to act clandestinely on 
behalf of state—or in conjunction with the state’s own armed actors, sometimes as formal 
or informal contract employees— as much as against the regime in power” (222). For 
Davis, this trend of “privatization” of the management of violence in the democratic era 
is a legacy of the warfare that authoritarian states in the past wielded against their unruly 
citizens. Along the same lines, looking at Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, and Peru,  
Peacock and Beltran (2003) argue that organized crime is embedded in the same state 
institutions. Against what has become a common mantra in many analyses on the rise of 
organized crime in Latin America, Beltran argues that these networks did not penetrate 
the state from the outside; rather, they were already in place when the transitions 
advanced the political reforms concerning law-enforcement and criminal institutions.  
 This is a key observation because it suggests not only that some sectors of the 
state may actually be direct criminal actors themselves, but more importantly because it 
implies that political transitions that reformed security apparatuses did not effectively 
remove the pre-existing criminal rings from within state institutions. Similarly, Davis’ 
proposition that the privatization of state policing functions stems from the actions 
developed by past repressive states, suggest that there is continuity,  a direct line, so to 
speak, between the former authoritarian regimes and democratic states that emerged from 
them. In other words, rather than focus on the growth of transnational criminal networks 
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or the emerging social determinants of crime,  these arguments shift our attention to the 
critical junctures (Collier and Collier 2002) of political transition and underline the 
importance of the creation of the (democratic) political regime on the development of 
organized crime and violence.  
 Furthermore, the consideration of informal armed actors, violent entrepreneurs, 
and private armed organizations tapped into the actual democratic state forces us to 
reconsider the premise that informal armed groups develop primarily with the purpose of 
undermining or overthrowing a regime or to contest political authorities (Davis 2009).  
Most of the scholarship examining informal armed groups views them as challengers of 
state order and power; hence the research agendas have focused on the reasons for their 
emergence or prevalence after transitions, democratizations or, simply, state formations 
(Boix 2008; Collier 2009). Yet, these explanations fit in the current state of affairs of 
contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, where civil war and ethnic conflict ravage the region, 
but they are not as useful to explain the seemingly apolitical violence that affects Latin 
America and some post-communist countries such as Russia (Volkov 2002).   
As this dissertation will show, informal violent entrepreneurs play an important 
role in the management of security, order, and violence in the post-transitional state. They 
are, in some ways, the legacies of the authoritarian state, but have been reshaped to 
function under conditions dictated by contemporary electoral democracies.  In this sense, 
informal armed groups can also function as collaborators of a democratically elected 
government. Indeed, they can turn against and challenge it, but the literature has 
extensively studied this path and I do not wish to pursue it here. Rather, I want explore 
the ways in which such groups have managed to become important players in the current 
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post-transition state, from which they reproduce criminal violence. Therefore, the 
underlying argument here  is that a great deal of explanation of post-transitional violence 
and crime affecting Latin American countries can be found in the collaborative 
relationships between informal violent entrepreneurs, formal institutions, and the state.   
 Such a statement opens the discussion to a myriad of topics regarding not only the 
quality of democracy in contemporary post-transitional countries, but also the process of 
state (re)formation in post-transitional countries. Since Max Weber (1994), we have 
assumed that the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence has always been a crucial 
characteristic of the modern state. Some authors argue that in reality states never had the 
opportunity to enjoy such monopoly, not even in the industrialized western states (Bayley 
and Shearing 1996), and the prospects to do it are now bleaker with the liberalization of 
security and the privatization of public protection (Newburn 2001). The surge of state-
related violent actors in the post-transition era posits the question as to whether the issue 
of democratization is also a problem of state-formation, and the violence that follows the 
transition is a gauge of a faulty state or, rather, of a failed democracy. To be sure, from a 
normative point of view, the existence of irregular armed groups lurking behind state 
institutions seems to be an indicator of state failure. As some authors put it, informal 
institutions often emerge in the vacuum created by weak formal institutions (Van Cott 
2006), or they surface as a result of transition processes gone wrong. But these views, 
which are widespread in the literature, reduce the existence of informal actors acting on 
behalf of the state and the violence that stems from them to a mere malfunction of state 
institutions or an anomaly of the democratic transition process. 
 44
 Although I agree that widespread violence can be deemed a failure from our 
poliarchic ideal and that in some cases criminal violence may reflect the “brown” areas of 
state reach, I do not think that assuming a normative-driven examination of post-
transition Central America will help us unveil the mechanisms that reproduce crime in 
one place but seem to prevent in another. After all, some Latin American countries, such 
as Nicaragua and Ecuador, which are relatively peaceful in comparison to El Salvador 
and Colombia, are not more democratic than the latter. As I expect to show in the 
following chapters, especially those that tackle the issue from a comparative historical 
analysis, the problem of post-transition criminal violence not only resides in societal 
variables that have been extensively explored by criminology and the social sciences, it 
also resides in the manner in which political relationships between the state, its agents 
and civil society were configured during regime transformation. It has to do with the way 
the state set out to manage security and violence. That is the fundamental crux of our 
research venture. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF REGIMES, TRANSITIONS, AND 
VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
We know very little about the empirical relationship between democracy and violent 
crime in Latin America. All of the scholarship examining the impact of democracy, or 
democratization for that matter, on violent crime has been carried out using ethnographic 
methods or qualitatively oriented approaches. I do not want to walk away from those 
traditions, as the scientific inference stemming from qualitative research is very helpful to 
illuminate the mechanisms through which the potential relationship between democracy 
and violence takes place. I will use some of those inferences in my quantitative analysis. 
But before I do that, I have to frame my exploration of the impact of transition in a 
general picture of the relationship between democracy and crime. In other words, in order 
to understand why some post-transition countries have more violent crime than others do, 
we have to explore whether democracy (or regime type more generally) has any impact 
on violent crime, and whether the emergence of political transitions in Latin America  in 
the last three decades has been associated with  reduced, increased or stable levels of 
everyday (i.e., non war-related) violence.   
 As I discussed in the previous chapter, this relationship has hardly been explored 
world-wide using multivariate analyses, not to mention Latin America. In this region, the 
extant empirical literature linking democracy and violence has focused rather on the 
opposite direction of the relationship, namely, the impact of violence on democracy, 
especially on values and norms that support democracy  (Azpuru and Seligson 2000; 
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Cruz 2008; Pérez 2003; Seligson and Booth 2010). Other works have also pondered the 
impact of crime on the rule of law and for human rights observance, two basic traits of 
democracy (Call 2000; Fruhling 2003; Koonings 2001; Méndez 1999; Rodgers 2006a). 
Hence, in this chapter I attempt to disentangle the hitherto fuzzy impact of democracy on 
crime in Latin America using a quantitative approach. Considering the theoretical 
discussion developed in the previous chapter, I will depart from the perspectives that 
anticipate a reduction in the levels of criminal violence with the establishment of 
democracy. In other words, my priors are that I expect that democracy will have a 
negative impact on violence and crime in Latin America; therefore post-transition 
countries should have less violence than during or before the transition.  
In the following pages, I describe the data used to conduct this cross-country 
longitudinal analysis. I then present some basic results describing the trends of homicidal 
violence in the region and about democracy, measured by the Polity IV project (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2007). After that, I fit a random coefficient model that accounts for the 
effects of both country-specific variables and time-variant variables. I conclude the 
chapter discussing the results of the impact of regime change on violence, the relevance 
of country-specific variables, and the role of the state in the prevalence of homicidal 
violence in post-transition Latin America. 
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The Dependent Variable: Homicide Rates 
The key dependent variable is violence. In this analysis, I will use country level homicide 
rates per year, based on data from the World Health Organization, as an indicator of 
crime. While there are many ways to measure violence, the availability of reliable data 
restricts the possibility of using other measures. Furthermore, the scholarship on crime 
and violence concurs that since homicides are one of the most heinous of all crimes, these 
tend to be more frequently reported and better registered in the institutional statistics, 
allowing for comparisons that, ceteris paribus, are more reliable. In addition, homicide 
indicators are less vulnerable to definitional variations when comparing data from 
different countries (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). In contrast to other felonies 
such as rape, robbery, or assault, which are frequently exposed to legal tweaks and 
cultural interpretations, murder is usually defined in the same way across countries.  
Admittedly, the national statistics of homicides are not free from problems that 
affect their reliability. Institutional limitations, political agendas, unsettled criteria of 
classification5 and simple human error can affect the quality of the data, especially when 
large datasets on homicides are gathered (International Council on Human Rights Policy 
2003; UNODC 2007).  This problem of data quality is something that has to be kept in 
mind when dealing with any data that has gone through several stages of aggregation, 
since the errors can be cumulative and also likely contain random noise that would 
attenuate any “true” associations that are in the data. However, this is the most 
comprehensive recollection of data on homicidal violence available to researchers. It 
provides an extremely helpful pool of comparable information that no other dataset does.   
                                                 
5 Some countries separate “homicidios dolosos” from “asesinatos,” some others classify deaths as result of 
traffic accidents as homicides, and even some others include abortions as “homicides.”   
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 I collected annual time-series data on homicides mainly from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Mortality Database, which gathers information about the causes of 
death in all the countries of the world from 1950 to 2005 (World Health Organization 
2010). I selected data corresponding only to Latin American and some Caribbean 
countries for which systematic information was available regarding the independent 
variables.6 The figures on homicide are data reported by the health offices or ministries of 
health and human services of the states members of the United Nations system; hence, 
most of this information comes from health institutions and not from law-enforcement 
agencies. In addition to the aforementioned factors that might limit their reliability, the 
most important thing to bear in mind regarding these data from WHO is that the numbers 
are derived from stitching together information supplied by countries and coded using 
four different versions of the International Classification of Diseases (e.g. ICD, 7, 8, 
9,10). Therefore, it is possible that some changes in the reported homicide numbers will 
be an artifact of countries shifting from one edition of the coding system to another 
(which occurred at different times for different countries).7 
Nevertheless, I do not expect these shifting of classification codes will be 
detrimental to my analysis, because I tested whether code classification had any 
systematic impact on the reports about homicidal violence and the results returned no 
statistically significant relationship.   
                                                 
6 Countries included in the sample are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
7 Personal communication with Robert Alexander Butchart, who is the prevention of violence coordinator 
of the Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention at the World Health Organization in Geneva, 
Switzerland, May 7, 2009.  
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Furthermore, the WHO dataset has also gaps: some countries lack information on 
several years, and data about Bolivia is completely absent from the catalog. Given that 
Central America is key to the present analysis of post-transitional violence, I decided to 
use other sources to fill the gaps in the Central American figures, especially from the 
1990s (see Table 1). These alternative sources were the national police statistics, the 
UNDP reports on violence, and the forensic institutes (Molina Vaquerano 2007; Policía 
Nacional de Nicaragua 2008). Nicaragua and Honduras had considerable gaps of WHO 
information. In the case of Honduras I used all the information available from national 
sources (the police and the local UNDP) starting from 1994 (Programa de las Naciones 
Unidas para el Desarollo 2007). In the case of Nicaragua, which has the larger 
uninterrupted series of police data in the region, the supplementary data starts from 1980, 
the year of the Revolution. 
 The WHO dataset and the additional sources of data provided only the raw 
number of homicides per country-year. In order to make this information comparable 
across countries, I estimated the homicide rates (per 100,000 populations) per country-
year using the CELADE/ECLAC population projections database for the Latin American 
countries from 1950 to 2025. These homicide rates are the dependent variable in my 
study (ECLAC/CELADE 2000).  
  The length of the series and the countries that were included in the analysis were 
determined by the availability of the data provided by the World Health Organization 
Database and the other sources mentioned.  I did not impute values for the missing data 
on homicides (the dependent variable).8 Hence, the analysis is being carried out only for 
the years and the countries on which we have actual homicide data. These limitations 
                                                 
8 Although I did impute values for some independent variables. See below.  
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notwithstanding, 658 country-year data points were collected for this analysis; this is a 
substantial number considering the endemic lack of systematic information in the region. 
Nineteen Latin America and Caribbean countries are included in the sample, with a mean 
of thirty-four years available per country.  Table 1 presents the sample of countries and 
years assembled.  It shows the total number of years per country, including the number of 
years with sources other than the WHO dataset. It also displays the first and the last year 
for each country in the sample (although this does not mean that data are available for all 
the years in between those points). More importantly, the table shows the statistics of 
homicide rates for each country.  
 The table provides a first and quite interesting overview about violence in the 
region for the last five decades. It shows, first, that the incidence of violence is very 
different across the region, with some countries exhibiting very low levels of violence 
over the past fifty years (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay), while other 
neighboring countries displaying extremely high rates of violence (Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).  In geographical terms, it is interesting to note that 
Costa Rica and Panama, two of the less violent countries in the region are surrounded by 
nations with severe problems of insecurity.  This is something recent studies have already 
shown (Cruz 2008; PNUD 2009; UNODC 2007). Hence, even if we think of Latin 
America as a very violent region, there are important differences from one country to 
another or from one sub-region to another. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Homicide Rates in Latin America 
Country Years Homicide rates per 100,000 
population 
 Total Non-
WHO 
First Last Mean SD Min Max 
         
Argentina 32  1966 2003 5.35 1.30 3.49 9.08 
Brazil 25  1977 2002 17.97 6.06 7.66 28.39 
Chile 49  1955 2003 3.48 1.28 1.72 6.51 
Colombia 42  1953 2004 40.52 20.78 13.13 82.49 
Costa Rica 46 2 1961 2006 4.53 1.23 2.39 7.73 
Cuba 24  1964 2003 5.36 1.47 3.59 8.23 
Dominican Republic 36  1965 2001 5.27 1.30 2.90 8.61 
Ecuador 42  1961 2004 10.01 3.39 5.08 17.05 
El Salvador 47 5 1950 2008 36.57 8.12 23.62 56.18 
Guatemala 35 12 1963 2006 26.21 20.20 1.60 115.5 
Haiti 6  1980 2003 0.94 0.98 0.02 1.95 
Honduras 18 15 1976 2008 37.38 17.88 1.19 56.89 
Mexico 50  1955 2004 18.48 6.51 1.41 33.97 
Nicaragua 42 29 1961 2008 15.71 5.49 9.38 30.16 
Panama 44  1955 2004 3.23 2.92 1.75 12.37 
Paraguay 9  1994 2003 11.08 1.07 9.75 12.22 
Peru 25  1966 2000 2.55 1.21 1.04 6.49 
Uruguay 42  1955 2001 4.07 1.01 1.98 5.23 
Venezuela 44  1955 2002 10.74 5.46 4.13 29.84 
         
All countries 658 63 1950 2008 14.26 14.94 0.02 115.0 
         
         
  
Yet, a second revealing feature of Table 3.1 is that the distribution in the levels of 
violence per country does not seem to be the result on a recent regional trend, but a 
regular country-specific distribution across time. In other words, some countries seem to 
have a history of high levels of violence long before the so-called crime wave burst on 
the region in the 1990s, while other places have remained with relatively low levels of 
violence since the 1960s. For instance, the lowest homicide rate in El Salvador since 
1950 was 23.6, which occurred in 1968; this rate is higher than the average homicide rate 
for most of the countries in the region. Likewise, since 1953, Colombia has never had a 
homicide rate lower than 13.1. In contrast, there are countries in which homicide rates 
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have never gone above the symbolic threshold of 10 homicides per 100,000 population.9 
Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Peru, and Uruguay have never surpassed 
those levels of violence, not even when neighboring countries reached appalling rates. 
While on the one hand Argentina and Chile seem to be more resilient and avoid severe 
outbreaks of violence, despite their dictatorships and their histories of social unrest,  on 
the other hand Brazil and Guatemala seem to be more prone to high levels of violence 
throughout their recent history. These figures point to an internal constancy or stability 
per country in violence and suggest that historical patterns and “cultures”  may be an 
essential factor in the explanations of current levels of violence. 
Despite this stability of violence patterns Table 3.1 also shows that some 
countries have had significant variations in their levels of violence. Guatemala is a good 
example of such variation. If we are to believe the figures provided by the WHO 
database, this country has had extreme variation in its levels of violence. It has had one of 
the lowest rates of homicide in the sample, in 1974 and 1977 (1.60 and 1.72);10 but also, 
it has had the highest murder rate in the hemisphere for a single country: 115.60 in 1981, 
in the middle of the full military campaign against the guerrillas and indigenous 
communities (Schirmer 1998). Other examples of important internal variations are 
Colombia and Honduras.   
 
                                                 
9 Following a public health approach, Luis Ratinoff, a researcher from the Inter-American Development 
Bank, claims that a homicide rate above 10/100,000 can be considered a severe epidemic. Eleven Latin 
American countries in our sample have surpassed such threshold at least once in the last fifty years  
10 Guatemala suffered devastating natural catastrophes in 1974 (hurricane) and 1976 (earthquake). These 
events may have contributed to reduce interpersonal violence; but also they may have undermined  the 
record systems, thus leaving many deaths unreported..  
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      Figure 3.1. Average Homicide Rates per Country, Latin America and the Caribbean,  
                          1955-2008 
       Source: WHO Mortality Database. 
 
 
In order to have a clearer picture of the homicide rate trends in the region, Figures 
3.1 and 3.2 present average homicide rates from 1955 to 2008 for the countries included 
in our analysis. Figure 3.1 shows the average for all the countries and years included in 
our sample. It shows that in general, violence, measured by homicide rates, was rampant 
in the late 1950s, in part driven by the Colombian “violencia;” then, it gradually declined 
throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, reaching a low point by 1978. Murders 
abruptly skyrocketed from 1979 to 1981, a possible effect of the intensity of the Central 
American civil wars; and then declined again for a short period. The figure shows that the 
current wave of violence is part of a general trend that started in the mid 1980s, leveling 
off during the 1990s, but experiencing another sharp uptick after 2000. These trends calls 
into question the notion that Latin American countries were peaceful societies before the 
neo-liberal transformations experienced during the 1980s and the 1990s. To be sure, 
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murders have been growing since the 1980s, and the 1990s were a period of relatively 
stability on the high end; but several countries faced serious problems of violence before 
the 1970s. Colombia is perhaps the most notorious case, but data indicate that rates were 
also especially high in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 
during those years. 
Although this picture is important to put the whole region into perspective, it also 
might be a little bit misleading. Not all countries experienced the same evolution in the 
murder rates. Some countries, in fact, have had little significant variation across time, and 
some others have followed the general trend of the region but with important yanks. 
These variations hint at the nature of the violence affecting those countries. For instance, 
countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador seem to be driving much of the trend in 
Central America, whereas Colombia does it in the Andean region. In the Latin American 
region as a whole, two sub-regions seem to be pushing the overall rates: Central America 
and the Andean countries. Central America seems to be responsible of the high levels of 
violence before the 1970s and the peaks experienced during the 1980s; whereas the 
Andean countries have contributed to the sustained increase between the 1980s and the 
1990s.   
With the purpose of viewing those differences more clearly, Figure 3.2 shows the 
homicide rate trends separating the region in three distinctive sub-regions. Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica comprise the Central 
American region; whereas Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru are pooled together 
as the Andean region. The Southern Cone encompasses Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 
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In order to draw attention to these regions, Brazil and the Caribbean countries in the 
sample are not included within any of these groups.  
 Figure 3.2 reveals very distinct trends for each sub-region. In Central America 
and Mexico, homicide rates were high during the 1960s; they decreased during the 1970s 
to reach a bottom level, and then rocketed upward in the early 1980s with the civil wars 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. By the end of the decade, Central American 
countries managed to lower their murder rates before the political transitions took place; 
but rates started an upward trend again during the 1990s, during the first post-transition 
years;  leveled off in the early 2000s, and topped the 35/100,000 mark by 2008. By 2010 
(not shown here; see next chapter), the Central American average for homicide rates has 
surpassed the levels reached during the heights of the civil wars. In contrast, the Andean 
region trends have followed a different path. As in Central America, violence was high 
during the 1960s, but then it declined substantially during the early 1970s, nearly 
reaching the Southern Cone levels; by the second half of the 1970s, rates started an 
irregular trend, probably driven by the lack of data for Colombia. The late 1980s brought 
a clear upward trend in the consolidated data: the 1989 Venezuelan “Caracazo” and the 
development of the cartel-wars in Colombia rocketed homicide rates to new heights. 
Violence receded as the 2000s approached, a trend most likely influenced by the decline 
of Colombian homicide rates.  
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Figure 3.2. Average Homicide Rates per Country in Three Different Latin American 
                    Regions, 1960-2008  
Source: WHO Mortality Database 
 
 
 In the Southern Cone, homicide rates have displayed a very different behavior 
across time from that elsewhere in Latin America. The most striking feature of the 
southern countries is that violence never surpassed seven murders per one hundred 
thousand inhabitants per year. This is a level particularly low in comparison with other 
Latin American sub-regions, and about the same as it is in the U.S. in the first decade of 
the 21st century. Furthermore, although political instability produced by the dictatorships 
ruling in that region seem to have boosted the rates in Argentina in the late 1960s and 
1970s, in Chile in the early 1970s, and in Uruguay during the 1970s, violence never 
reached the levels of Colombia and northern Central America.11 In sum, by looking at the 
                                                 
11 It is important to acknowledge that during the dictatorships, state institutions were the main perpetrators 
of lethal violence against the populations (McSherry 2005). Hence, it is possible that state figures from 
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data on homicides we now have a picture of the trends of homicidal violence in Latin 
America. We know that not all regions have had the same trends of violence and that, in 
general, they have followed distinctive patterns across time.   
 
Democracy as an independent variable 
Following the model of LaFree and Tseloni (LaFree and Tseloni 2006), I use the Polity 2 
variable drawn from the Polity IV data set as my principal indicator of democracy. Polity 
2 is a computed score obtained by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score 
in the same database (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The DEMOC score stands for 
“Institutionalized democracy,” and Marshall and Jaggers built this variable taking into 
account three factors: the existence of public mechanisms through which people can 
express their political and policy preferences; the presence of effective institutionalized 
constraints on the power of the executive; and guarantees of civil liberties to all citizens 
(2009: 13). The AUTOC score, on the other hand, measures the opposite: 
institutionalized autocracy. It taps regimes that restrict political participation, that choose 
their executive in a “regularized process of selection within the political elite” (Marshall 
and Jaggers, 2009: 14), and that face very little constraint to their exercise of power.  
 The combined Polity 2, then, ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly 
democratic).  Transitions or cases of “interregnum” are coded as 0, and several transition 
years in between two different types of regimes are prorated across the duration of the 
transition period. For example, a country X with a Polity 2 score of -5 (somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                 
those years are particularly unreliable. These caveats notwithstanding, it is also important to bear in mind 
that even in the worst repression periods, the extent of violence practiced by the Argentinean and Chilean 
dictatorships never reached the levels of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran authoritarian regimes (see Stanley 
1996).  
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autocratic) that goes through a transition and emerges four years later with a Polity 2 
score of +3, is prorated as to move progressively each year from -5 to + 3. Although 
some authors consider that Polity 2’s measure of the level of democracy during periods of 
interregnum and transitions are “problematic” and produce democracy scores that lack 
face validity (Plumper and Neumayer 2010) a check on the Polity 2 scores for some 
countries and years did not reveal any gross mismatch between the literature  and the 
scores (Mainwaring et al. 2007; Smith 2005).  
 
 
 Figure 3.3. Mean Democracy Scores from Polity 2, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
        1955-2008 
  Source: Polity IV Database 
 
 According to the authors of the Polity IV dataset, the Polity 2 scores can be used 
to classify political regimes into three types: democracies, when scores range from 10 to 
6; autocracies, when scores go from -10 to -6; and what Marshall and Jaggers call 
“anocracies,” when scores range from -5 to 5. Periods of interregnum and transitions fall 
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into anocracies. A first look to our data indicates that 20 percent of our sample can be 
classified as “autocracies;” 25 percent fall into the category of “anocracies;” and 55 
percent, more than half of the country-years of our sample, can be considered as 
democracies. Figure 3.3 shows the average Polity 2 scores for the whole sample from 
1955 to 2008. As can be seen, according to the former classification, Latin American 
regimes were predominantly “anocracies” or autocracies before the 1990s. Democracy is 
established across the region after 1990. By 1996, only Cuba, Haiti and Peru remained as 
non-democratic.  
 
Control Variables 
In addition to the Polity 2 index, I also used the measure of regime durability from the 
Polity IV database. This variable, called DURABLE in both the Polity IV database as 
well as in the dataset created for this analysis, stands for “the number of years since the 
most recent regime change (define by a three-point change in the Polity 2 score over a 
period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable 
political institutions” (Marshall and Jaggers 2009: 16). Hence, this measure refers to the 
number of years passed from any regime change, not necessarily a transition to 
democracy. For instance, the value of the variable DURABLE for Chile in 1973 is 0 and 
for 1983 10, but for 1993 is 4 because in this case is counting from the last Chilean 
regime change in 1989. This variable may help to tap the possible effect of regime 
stability across time on the prevalence of homicide rates. 
 In order to have a more straightforward variable tapping the stability of a 
democratic regime from a single defining transition, I constructed a variable called 
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“Years from transition” (TRANYEAR) to represent the number of years since the 
democratic transition took place. First, based on a review of the literature I fixed the year 
when there is some reasonable consensus that the third wave transition took place and put 
it in a variable called DEMCOH (for Democratic Cohort). For example, the year for 
Argentina is 1983; for Dominican Republic is 1978; for Mexico 2000; for Paraguay 1990. 
In Costa Rica, which experienced a democratic transition long before the third wave and 
the span of the data, the value of the variable was 1951. In the case of Cuba, which has 
not experienced a transition to democracy at all, the value of DEMCOH was the last year 
of the series of data for that country, in this case 2004. Then, I subtracted every year-
point to DEMCOH, generating the number of years from the settled democratic 
transition. Hence, for instance, the value of TRANYEAR for El Salvador in 2000 is 8 (El 
Salvador “transitioned” in 1992), whereas for Uruguay in 2000 is 15 (Uruguay’s year of 
transition is 1985).  For the year-points before the transition “event”, the values of the 
TRANYEAR variable take a negative sign, representing the number of years before the 
democratic transition. For example, the value of the TRANYEAR variable for El 
Salvador in 1960 is -32, and for Uruguay in the same year is -25.  In sum, this variable 
will allow us to see the relationship between the longevity of electoral democracy and 
homicide rates across time.  
 Cross-country empirical research on crime has shown the importance of economic 
variables, especially inequality (Bourguignon 1999; Fajnzylber et al. 2002a; Glaeser et al. 
2009); wealth, measured as GDP per capita (Fox and Hoelscher 2010; Nadanovsky and 
Cunha-Cruz 2009; Stamatel 2009); and, in some cases, economic growth (Lederman et 
al. 2002; Mares 2009). Perhaps the most utilized economic variable and the one that has 
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returned more significant results across different empirical designs is income inequality. 
Nearly every empirical study of income inequality and violence in Latin America has 
shown a positive relationship between these two variables. For example, a one-point 
increase in the Gini coefficient of a country is associated with nearly a one-point increase 
in homicide rates (quoted in Buvinic and Morrison 2000) (see also the series of 
publications by Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza: Fajnzylber et al. 2002a; Fajnzylber et 
al. 1998; Fajnzylber et al. 2000; Fajnzylber et al. 2002b). I attempted to include a 
measure of income inequality by using Gini indexes for each country-year. Data come 
from the World Income Inequality Database V2.0c (WIID), available from the United 
Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research.12 However, it was not 
possible to obtain systematic data for all country-year points, especially before 1990s. 
The WIDD, which marshals an impressive pool of data, has important gaps in the series, 
and even some records refer only to major cities or urban population. When possible, I 
have incorporated only the national data following a similar method of recollection 
(household socioeconomic surveys or census). This lack of data on income inequality 
may affect the cross-country analysis as it would substantively reduce the number of 
cases included in the regressions. Furthermore, it may return misleading results if the 
absence of data introduces a systematic error in the computation. Hence, I use this 
variable in a limited way in the analysis.  
 Gross National Product has also been one of the most commonly used economic 
variables in the empirical research of macro-determinants of criminal violence (LaFree 
and Drass 2002; LaFree and Tseloni 2006). Findings usually indicate that country wealth 
                                                 
12 Data were obtained from: http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/. Accessed 
December 2009. 
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is negatively associated with criminal violence; countries with high GDP tend to have 
lower rates of crime.  Drawing from Angus Maddison’s World Statistics on Population 
and GDP, I included data on Per Capita GDP for the Latin American countries and years 
included in the sample.13 In addition, after checking the data provided by the Madisson’s 
dataset, I also included data on Gross National Income Per Capita (Atlas Method at 
current US$) from the World Bank Socio Economic indicators datasets.14 GNI data series 
were available starting in 1964; so, in order to fill the gaps for previous years, I used 
Amelia II, a software routine that performs multiple imputations for missing data in time 
series cross-sectional datasets, developed by Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2010).15 
 Different researchers have also found an interesting relationship between 
economic growth and violence. For instance, Fox and Hoelscher (2010) and Fajnzylber 
and colleagues (2000) have found that rapid economic growth has a positive impact on 
violence rates, supporting modernization theory that says that abrupt changes tend to 
produce more crime. However, in a different result, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found 
that homicide rates are higher when growth rates are slower. I incorporated data on 
economic growth measured as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. These data were drawn from the World Bank world 
development indicators and range from 1961 to 2008.16 Descriptive statistics for the 
independent and control variables are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Data obtained from: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. Accessed December 2009. 
14 Madisson’s GDP per capita projections do not match recent data on the economy performance in Latin 
America provided by ECLAC or the World Bank. 
15 I used Amelia II only to imputate values for some independent variables, not for the dependent variable.   
16 Data were obtained from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Accessed December 2009. 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent and Control Variables 
Variable Percentage Mean S.D. Min Max 
      
Polity 2  2.82   6.37    -9        10 
Durable  14.84   17.57   0 87 
Years from transition  -.45 20.15 -45 55 
      
Log of GDP per capita  8.26 0.53 6.56 9.32 
Log of GNI per capita  6.93 1.19 .20 9.00 
% grow rate of GDP  3.59 4.35 -13.37 18.22 
Gini index  51.15 6.14 28.3 63.9 
      
Population Density  51.25 60.99 6.79   343.06 
%  Urban Population  60.97 16.34 20.5   91.44 
%  Population 15-24 years  19.03 1.76 13.32 22.61 
      
Political Terror Scale  3.16 1.17 1 5 
      
Internal Armed Conflict 11.1     
Central America & Mexico 36.2     
Andean Countries 24.6     
Caribbean Countries 16.8     
Southern Cone Countries 22.49     
      
      
  
Demographic variables have also proven to be significant factors in the 
explanations on the prevalence of homicide rates, although the findings around them are 
not always consistent across the literature. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
urbanization is deemed to play a significant role in the levels of criminal violence: as 
urbanization rates increase, so does the levels of criminal violence measured as murder 
rates (Fajnzylber et al. 2002a; Gaviria and Pagés 1999; Nadanovsky and Cunha-Cruz 
2009). The percentage of population living in urban areas was included as an indicator of 
urbanization. Once more, data come from the World Bank socioeconomic indicators, 
starting from year 1960 in each country. Other topic frequently associated to crime rates 
is age structure. Cross-country research on crime has shown that young population are 
more likely to be involved in violence than any other age group (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004; LaFree and Tseloni 2006; Neumayer 2003). As a well-known 2000 Inter-American 
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Development Bank Report pointed out, the existence of large cohorts of young 
population increases the probabilities of violence in the Latin American region (BID 
2000). In Central America, people between 15 and 34 years old tend to be more 
victimized and participate more frequently in criminal activities than any other age group 
(Zamora and Espinoza 2006). However, other empirical projects have not found a 
significant relationship with crime and young population (Cole and Marroquín Gramajo 
2009; Fajnzylber et al. 2002b). In order to control for the impact of age structure, a 
variable tapping the proportion of young population over the general population was 
included in the dataset for this analysis. I estimated the proportion of population between 
15 and 24 years old for each country-year point, using the population projections from 
the ECLAC/CELADE Demographic Bulletin (2000).  
Finally, population density was also considered for this analysis. Despite its 
appeal, there is little empirical tradition studying the relationship between population 
density and violence (Neuman and Berger 1988). In Latin America, the common 
assumption is that rapid growth of urban population has worsened the problems of 
density in the cities, especially among the poor and underprivileged; these problems, in 
turn, contribute to the prevalence of crime and violence (Briceño-León 2007).  Population 
density was estimated by dividing each year country’s total population by country size (in 
kilometers). So, for example, 1980 Argentina had a population density of 10.15 
inhabitants per km2, while 2001 Haiti had a population density of 306.7 populations per 
km2. 
 Some country-specific variables were also added to the database. First, given the 
importance of internal political conflict for the development of the technologies and 
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behaviors of violence in some countries (Torres Rivas 1998), I created a dummy variable 
tapping civil war or internal conflict for the countries that underwent intense political 
conflict. Many Latin American countries have suffered political violence in the last four 
decades, but I codify as civil war or internal conflict just those cases in which there was 
some systematic exercise of violence from at least two well-defined rival parties that 
affected a significant portion of the national territory. Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, and Peru fit these criteria. Zapatista uprising in Mexico and the activities of 
small guerrilla groups in Chile, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay, among others, during 
the 1970s and 1980s do not.   
 Many studies, especially those focused on internal ethnic wars (Cederman 2008; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fox and Hoelscher 2010), point out to the importance of 
ethnic diversity in the prevalence of violence. Behind this, there is the assumption that 
cultural differences matter. However, Fearon and Laitin (2003)  have claimed that ethnic 
or religious diversity do not seem to impact political violence in the post-Cold War era; 
and the role of these variables seems to be less important in Latin America than in other 
places, given its relatively homogeneity in comparison with Africa or Southern Asia. 
Nevertheless, in order to grasp any cultural impact on the prevalence of violence in Latin 
America, I created regional dummies that underscore the similarities between some 
countries within the region while accentuate the differences across regions. Four 
dummies were created: Central America and Mexico (includes all the Spanish speaking 
countries of the isthmus except for Panama); the Caribbean (Cuba, Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, and Panama); the Andean region (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela); 
and the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay). 
 66
 Finally, I also added a variable that taps political violence. This measure comes 
from the Political Terror Scale developed by Mark Gibney and colleagues (Gibney et al. 
2006). The information used in this scale comes from the country reports of Amnesty 
International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
Researchers review the reports released each year and, based on the information, they 
grade each country with a score based on the political violence and state terror that the 
population experience during the previous year. The scale follows a 5-level index 
originally developed by Freedom House. Level 5 in the scale represents the highest level 
of violence and terror exerted by the government or the country leaders against the 
population; whereas level 1, the lowest in the scale, are granted to countries under a 
secure rule of law, in which people are not imprisoned for their views, torture is rare or 
exceptional, and “political murders are extremely rare.”17 I decided to plug this variable 
into the analysis to pick the possible effects of state violence on the overall prevalence of 
homicide rates. The relationship between common crime and political violence has 
scarcely been studied in the literature. As pointed out in the previous chapter, these topics 
have remained as separate fields of scholarship: one studied by criminology, the other by 
political science. The recent work of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is an exception to this 
rule. They found that crime and civil war have the same set of economic determinants; 
but they also found that democracy and the proportion of young population are more 
important as causes of homicides than they are as causes of civil war. In addition, they 
found that civil war has an effect on homicide rates, but they could not conclude that 
crime increased the likelihood of civil war.  In this project, I test whether political 
violence wielded by the state is a significant factor in the overall rates of murder. My 
                                                 
17 See: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/about.php. Accessed February 2010.  
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expectation is that political violence, measured by PTS is a key factor in the overall rates 
of murder, even during democratic periods.  
 
Method and Model 
In order to test whether democracy, regime types, political transitions, and state violence 
have an impact on the levels of criminal violence in Latin America, I utilized a 
hierarchical model approach using the Stata program (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
Under this model, longitudinal data can be treated as two-level data with occasions nested 
in subjects, so subjects become the clusters. In this particular case, I am assuming that 
occasions are the years and they are treated as level-1 units; while the subjects are the 
countries, and they are treated as level-2 units or clusters. There are as many level-1 units 
as years in the sample: 658; whereas there are 19 level-2 units, namely, 19 Latin 
American countries.  
 The use of this model in this case is an extrapolation of its utilization in 
psychology and education, where they are instrumental to study the psychological growth 
and development of people in cohorts (Goldstein 2003; Raundenbush 1995). This type of 
approach allows incorporating the effects of individual change over time, while 
controlling subject-specific effects. In other words, I am assuming that homicide rates in 
Latin America are the result of variables that vary within each country across time, such 
as urbanization or wealth; but they are also the result of variables that are largely fixed, 
such as culture or geographic position. The first group of variables is considered time-
varying covariates; while the second are time-invariant covariates. Polity 2 scores, years 
from transition, Gini index, Gross National Income per capita, rate of GDP growth, 
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urbanization, population density, proportion of young population, the Political Terror 
Scale, and the condition of civil war operate as level-1 covariates in this analysis, as they 
all vary from year to year. Countries and regional dummies (Central America, the 
Andean region, the Caribbean, and the Southern Cone) as considered as level-2 
covariates. That is, they do not vary across time. 
 Other advantage of this type of approach over, let us say ANOVA, is that simple 
multivariate models do not perform well when there are unbalanced data, namely, subject 
specific occasions, and missing points in the data. Hierarchical models allow us to control 
variables in this type of longitudinal data.  
According to the literature reviewed above, I expect that homicide rates will 
decline as democracy steps in, and as it “consolidates” across time. The first element is 
captured by the Polity 2 variable; the second factor, the consolidation, is treated as a 
function of time since the transition took place. This is tapped by the variable “Years 
from transition.” In order to test this hypothesis, I will fit a random-coefficient model. 
This model assumes that the random intercept and the level-1 residuals of the covariates 
are both normally distributed with zero means, independent of one another, with random 
intercept independent across countries and residuals independent across countries and 
points in time (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). In other words, I am assuming that 
homicide rates are independent from country to country, and that they vary not only as a 
result of time-varying covariates within each country, but also as a result of country 
specific conditions. In addition, I am also assuming that the homicide rates decline (or 
increase) at different pace depending on the country (For instance, post-transition 
violence in Guatemala would decrease at different rate than in Uruguay during a similar 
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period of time). That is, I am including random coefficients for the variable “Years from 
transition” to allow the effect of this variable to vary between countries.  
 The general model can be specified as follows: 
 yij = β1 +   β2x2ij +  β3TYij + β4x4ij + …+ β14x14ij + ζ1j + ζ2jTYij + Єij 
where:  
y = Log of homicide rates 
i = year 
j = country 
x2 = Polity 2 
TY= Years from transition 
x4 = Log of GNI per capita 
x5 = % Growth rate of GDP 
…  
ζ1 = Random intercept 
ζ2jTYij = Random coefficient for “Years from transition” 
Єij = Residuals 
 
Table 3.3 shows the results of three different models, with the last of the three 
being the most relevant. Model 1 incorporates all the control variables previously 
considered. It shows that democracy, as measured by Polity 2 has a positive significant 
effect on homicide rate. So does the percentage of urban population and the dummy for 
Central American countries. The rest of the variables showed no statistical significance at 
all. However, the model is estimated based only on 262 level-1 cases, with a mean of 14 
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years per cluster (country). This is so because the Gini index has many missing data 
values, reducing the overall pool of data for the analysis from 658 to 262. Besides, the 
coefficient for the Gini index is very low (-.0019), suggesting no statistical significance 
regarding the log of homicide rates. Hence, I decided to exclude the income inequality 
index from the equation in order to conduct the random-coefficient analysis with most of 
the data in the sample.18  
 
Table 3.3. Estimates for Log of Homicide Rates in Latin America (Random-Coefficient  
                  Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error 
       
Polity 2 .0114* .0058 .0244** .0040 .0275** .0042 
Polity 22     -.0024* .0009 
Years from transition -.0006 .0076 .0044 .0090 .0056 .0090 
Years from transition2     .0004** .0001 
Log of GNI per capita -.1406 .0743 -.1402* .0559 -.1355* .0547 
% Growth of GDP -.0025 .0042 -.0058 .0034 -.0062 .0033 
Gini Index -.0019 .0061     
Urbanization .0391** .0106 .0235* .0085 .02229* .0081 
Population Density .0005 .0024 .0033 .0022 .0019 .0021 
% Population 15-24 years -.0098 .0183 -.0121 .0142 .0211 .0169 
Political Terror Scale .0127 .0255 .0569** .0170 .0632** .0168 
Internal Armed Conflict -.1830 .1327 -.0992 .0663 -.0841 .0700 
Central America & Mexico 2.379** .5682 1.294* .4856 1.299* .4467 
Andean Countries .9589 .5679 .5752 .4734 .6657 .4345 
Caribbean Countries .6229 .6878 .2054 .5229 .2795 .4773 
Constant -.1851 1.115 .8363 .7943 .3799 .7595 
       
SD (Years from transition) .0133 .0031 .0297 .0056 .0308 .0057 
SD (Constant) .8105 .1597 .6605 .1117 .6190 .1048 
Corr (Tran.,cons) .6623 .2185 .4594 .2195 .5208 .1910 
SD (residual) .2641 .0124 .3257 .0098 .3208 .0096 
       
Wald test (df) 56.76**  (13) 85.54**  (12) 109.77** (14) 
N level-1 262  592  592  
N level-2 18  19  19  
       
Log likelihood  -75.12  -249.63  -239.89  
       
** p≤ .001; * p≤ .05 
 
                                                 
18 Actually, some missing data from other variables reduced the overall sample of level-1 cases to 582, but 
all countries (19) were included in the sample. Each country has an average number of cases (years) of 31.  
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The estimations under Model 2 in Table 3.3 are, then, the results of this new 
model. As can be seen, the coefficient of Polity 2 remains significant and positive. Other 
things being equal, each additional point in the Polity 2 scale is associated with a 2 
percent increase in the homicide rates [exp(0.0244)-1= .02]. The log of Gross National 
Income per capita proved to be negatively associated with homicide rates: as a country 
turns wealthier, the incidence of violence decreases. The rate of growth of GDP also 
returned a negative relationship, but the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 
p<0.05 threshold.  We also see that urbanization and political terror are significantly 
associated with the increase of homicide rates in Latin America.  The dummy for the 
region of Central America and Mexico turned out to be statistically significant as well, 
corroborating what we have seen in Figure 3.2, namely, that Central America stands out 
as particularly violent region across time, even within Latin America: given the other 
covariates, homicide rates in the Central American region, including Mexico, are nearly 
three times higher than in the rest of Latin America [exp(1.294)-1= 2.64].  
Looking at the random part of the model, we can see that the between-countries 
standard deviation is 0.6605; whereas the within countries standard deviation is 0.3257, 
indicating that homicide rates vary more between countries than they do within countries.  
However, the previous model, particularly the finding that democracy is linearly 
associated to violence rates and the fact that time associated with transitions does not 
seem to be related to murder rates, raises more questions than answers. Cases such as 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile would not fit in the scheme that democracy increases 
murder rates. Hence, would it be possible that democracy and democratization (years 
after transition) have a curvilinear affect on violence? Previous work (Fein 1995; LaFree 
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and Tseloni 2006) have precisely suggested that the relationship between democracy, 
transition period, and violence is parabolic.  
In order to test this, I fitted a growth-curve model in which quadratic terms were 
introduced for the variables Polity 2 and Years from transitions.19 Results are shown in 
Table 3.3 under Model 3.  The estimated coefficients of Polity 2 and Polity 22 are both 
significantly different from zero at the p<0.01 level; but whereas the first is positive, the 
second is negative. Holding the other variables constant, we can visualize the relationship 
between regime type, measured by Polity 2 and homicide rates in Figure 3.4. The graph 
shows the predicted values for the log of homicide rates according to the Polity 2 scores. 
It indicates that murder rates would increase as a country moves from autocracy to 
anocracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2009), but they would stabilize and even start to decrease 
as they reach the democratic zone.  
 
                                                 
19 In fact, Model 2 was also a growth model because I have introduced a random slope for the variable 
Years of transition. In Model 3, I am only adding the quadratic terms, allowing for curvilinear functions.    
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Figure 3.4. Predicted Values for Log of Homicide Rates by Polity 2 Scores 
 
 
 Likewise, the introduction of the quadratic term of Years from transition 
(TRANYEAR) provides us with an interesting outlook of the relationship between 
homicide rates and time (when related to political transitions). The estimated coefficient 
of TRANYEAR remains positive and statistically non-significant, but, holding the other 
covariates constant, the added term is also positive and statistically significant at the 
p<.001. Both variables  produce an U-shaped trend (see Figure 3.5) that indicates that as 
countries move toward a transitional period or event, homicide rates tend to decline; but 
then as years pass, the level of murders increases. A discussion of these results is 
provided below.   
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Figure 3.5. Predicted Values for Log of Homicide Rates by Years from 
                    Transitions 
 
 
Meanwhile, it is important to note that other control variables turned out to be 
statistically significant with effects in the expected direction. Wealth, measured here as 
the log of Gross National Income per capita, reduces the prevalence of murder rates; 
while urbanization increases them. From the three regional variables shown in the model 
(the Southern Cone was used as a reference, so it is not displayed), only the region of 
Central America and Mexico emerged with higher homicide rates than the rest. These 
results are most likely driven by the influence of Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran 
data within the region, and suggest the significance of these countries in the overall 
picture of violence in Latin America. 
One control variable that is also important for the present analysis is that 
encapsulated in the Political Terror Scale (PTS). Coefficients of this variable indicate 
 75
that, ceteris paribus, a one-point increase in PTS leads to a six percent increase in the log 
of homicide rates. This result suggests that the state is also significantly engaged in the 
prevalence of murder rates. However, as specified, the model is also open to the problem 
of endogeneity: instead of measuring the impact of PTS on homicide rates, we may be 
tapping the effect of the overall climate of violence on the scoring of the terror scale 
instead. Although the creators of PTS base their scoring on human rights reports, which 
usually focus on state violence and not on crime statistics (Gibney et al. 2006), it may 
well be that such reports are influenced by the waves of crime that end up producing 
abusive state responses. Hence, the relationship between state terror and murder rates 
would be originally determined by crime rather than by violence produced by the state.  
Thus, in order to dig a little bit deeper into this issue I also fit a small model only 
with those country-year cases that can be considered as democracies (Polity 2 equal or 
higher than 6), after their political transition (Years from transition equal or higher than 
1). I am assuming that a post-transition democratic regime would be less prone to abuses 
responding to common violence than authoritarian regimes or “anocracies,” diminishing 
the possibility that crime would impact subsequent PTS scores. So, any relationship 
between PTS and murder rates would be most likely produced by systematic abuses 
conducted by the state, than by occasional responses to crime waves. The model 
incorporates all the covariates that came up significant in our general model 3 (see Table 
3.3), but since I only want to test the importance of PTS under democratic rule and not 
the complex effects between countries and time, I fitted a fixed-effects model. This will 
allow me to estimate the effect of PTS and the other time-varying covariates included in 
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the model while controlling by the countries in the sample. The estimations can be seen 
in Table 3.4.   
 
 
Table 3.4. Determinants of Homicide Rates in Post-Transition  
      Countries (Fixed-Effects Model)  
Variables Coefficient Standard Error 
   
Political Terror Scale .0740** .0147 
Polity 2 -1.619** .2471 
Polity 22 .105** .0164 
Years from transition .0276** .0065 
Years from transition2 .0001 .0001 
Log of GNI per capita -.1214** .0455 
Urbanization .0001 .0102 
Constant 8.615** 1.0971 
   
sigma_u .9797692  
sigma_e .19231427  
Rho .96290142  
R-squared within countries 0.616  
   
Level-1 N/Level 2 N 308/17  
   
** p≤ .001; * p≤ .05   
 
   
 With a total of 308 country-years, the model shown in Table 3.4 indicates that all 
variables with the exception of urbanization are statistically significant. The PTS 
coefficient even is even higher than in the general model suggesting the importance of 
this factor even during democratic regimes, and reducing our concerns of endogeneity. 
Actually, this model does not prevent the possibility of a relationship running in the 
opposite direction, but it makes that possibility less likely to happen.  The coefficients for 
Polity 2 resulted both significant but they exchanged signs compared to the general 
model. This is so because now we are only considering those cases above the democratic 
threshold, suggesting a more pronounced inverted-U curve and a reduction of homicide 
rates as democracy takes hold. In the case of the variable “Years from transitions”, only 
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the linear coefficient resulted statistically significant indicating a linear association 
between time and murder rates after transitions take place. Finally, the log of GNI per 
capita also remained negatively associated to the log of homicide rates, underscoring the 
importance of country wealth in the prevalence of violence. Regional dummies were 
dropped from the model because they are country specific variables and cannot be 
estimated in a fixed-effects model.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Three important topics for our research agenda emerge from this cross-national 
longitudinal analysis. First, there is a complex interplay between regime type, political 
transitions and time in the prevalence of common violence. Second, conditions specific to 
countries are important in the overall levels of homicidal violence. And third, state 
violence, measured through the PTS scores, seems to be an important determinant of 
murder rates in Latin America, even under democratic regimes. 
 Following the civilization and modernization perspectives, I expected that an 
empirical test of the relationship between regime type and violence rates would return a 
negative association, meaning that as a country moves across an imaginary continuum 
from autocracy to democracy, common violence would decline in the overall picture. 
Results have proven me partially wrong. Even if we buy the modernization argument that 
democracy ends up reducing violence after a peak during the transition stage, the results 
indicate that with democratic consolidation (Polity 2 equal to 10), violence does not 
diminish to the same levels held when political transitions started in Latin America. 
However, this is not to say that democracy boosts violence as Paul Collier argues, 
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especially among low-income countries (Collier 2009). Rather, after the cross-national 
longitudinal analyses, we can conclude that anocracies —namely those regimes that are 
no longer autocracies but neither are democratic— constitute the critical regime under 
which violence notably increases. When fairly democratic rule steps in, violence has 
already escalated to outstanding levels. Thus, since no regime emerges from a vacuum, 
“new democracies” have to struggle with the legacies of transitional regimes, for better or 
for worse. One of them is high crime. If democracy takes hold, then, it may contribute to 
reduce homicidal violence; but if not, and the regime remains in the institutional limbo, 
yielding what has been called hybrid regimes (Karl 1995; O'Donnell et al. 1986), 
violence most likely will keep escalating. Here, it is important to bring to bear some of 
the findings of Fajnzylber and colleagues (2002b), who detected that previous homicide 
rates are also a critical predictor of future murder rates. In other words, violence tends to 
be self-perpetuating: once it reaches some new level, it generates its own inertia and 
becomes very difficult to reduce in the short term.20 Therefore, high rates of violence can 
be a legacy of authoritarian regimes, but they can also be a legacy of transitional regimes 
or hybrid regimes.21 This conclusion has important implications for our research. 
 These findings, that transitional regimes tend to produce more criminal violence 
than autocracies and, to some extent, than democracies, coincide with the findings of 
LaFree and Tseloni (2006) and other authors in the realm of political violence. However, 
the relationship between regime type and violence pose a seeming problem when 
contrasted with our other findings that show homicide rates tending to decline as the 
                                                 
20 A seminal work about the inertial and contagious reproduction of violence is the one published by Loftin 
(1986).  
21 I will come back to the issue of authoritarian legacies in Chapter V. Meanwhile see the contributions of 
Hagopian (1993), and Hite and Cesarini (2004).  
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transitional event approaches and then to increase after the transition takes place. This 
contradiction becomes all but apparent when comparing figures 3.4 and 3.5: while logs of 
homicide rates increase under anocracies or transitional regimes in Figure 3.4, they 
appear to go down when approaching the transitional event in Figure 3.5. The 
explanation lies in the nature of the variables. Although they seem to refer to the same 
phenomenon, Polity 2 and Years from transition (TRANYEAR) refer to different 
phenomena. The first variable underlines the regime characteristics, and its continuum 
does not allude to a time frame but only to the traits of the regime. In contrast, as 
explained above in this chapter, years from transition refers to a time frame that uses the 
third-wave transition events as reference points for each country to contextualize the 
evolution of violence in the last fifty years; the variable says nothing about the nature of 
the regime.  
 The problem is that regime types and time frames have usually been confounded 
in the literature, and in the last thirty years we have been inclined to see democratic 
regimes as a function of time. As Thomas Carothers (2002) says, the literature on 
transitions has tended to see democratization unfolding in a set sequence of stages that 
progress from dictatorial to democratic regimes. Hence, we have to separate regime type 
and time frame in the analysis of the impact of political regimes. Results in this chapter 
have shown that regime type and time frame around transitions do not produce the same 
trends. Time has not made some Latin American regimes more democratic, but perhaps 
more hybrid or “anocratic” (Diamond 2008; O'Donnell 2010). High levels of violence, 
then, would not be the result of consolidated democracy, but the outcome of hybrid 
regimes that have institutionalized faulty institutions after the transitions (Aguero 1998; 
 80
O'Donnell 1994). Rather than demonstrate that democracy has brought violence to Latin 
America, these results suggest that the institutionalization of hybrid regimes after the 
transitions have contributed to the raise of criminal violence.  
 Nevertheless, according to the results of this chapter, regime type and transition 
processes do not account for all the explanations on post-transition violence in Latin 
America. A great deal of variance in the homicide levels is produced by the countries’ 
particular conditions. From the results presented here, we know that wealth, urbanization, 
and type of regime, among other factors, are significant in the prevalence of homicidal 
violence, but the results also suggest that being a Central American country makes a 
substantial difference in the development of high rates of violence, in the same way that 
being in the Southern Cone is related to comparative low levels of violence. Do these 
differences refer to cultural traits? I introduced regional dummies as proxies of cultural 
characteristics that may reflect geographically-based idiosyncrasies. However, such 
regions may also reflect different patterns of political development, as there are more 
historic similarities between neighboring countries than distant countries. Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua, for instance, share more similarities in culture and social and 
political development than Argentina and Chile; while Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela share between each other more cultural and sociopolitical traits than with 
Mexico. The results of this chapter highlight those regional similarities suggesting the 
importance of regional and country traits. 
 The results also suggest that Central America and the Andean region have 
historically had problems with common violence, a problem that has set some countries 
apart from the rest of the region at least since the 1960s. Nevertheless, the results 
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presented in this chapter do not tell us exactly what the discriminating characteristics of 
the regions and countries are. We can presume that those differences refer to culture, but 
such approach would limit the explanations as to why some differences in the levels of 
violence persist within any given region: think in the differences between Colombia and 
Ecuador, for example; not to mention the differences between northern Central America 
(Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) and southern Central America (Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica, and Panama).  In both cases, countries that share similar culture yield very 
different historical levels of violence. The responses, hence, have to be found elsewhere, 
not in the cultural traits, but in their political processes.  
 A window to that is, nonetheless, provided in this chapter. The third important 
conclusion we can draw from the data presented above is that political violence is still 
associated with post-transition violence in Latin America. Results showed that high 
scores in the Political Terror Scale are associated with high murder rates, even under 
democratic regimes. From such finding, we can conclude that the state is still a relevant 
player in the reproduction of homicidal violence in the post-transition era.  Even if we 
interpret the results in the opposite causal direction that has been assumed here (which is, 
homicide rates influencing the human rights reports and, therefore, the PTS scores), the 
link between political violence and common violence suggest that we cannot rule out 
state institutions from the contemporary cast of violence perpetrators. In that sense, the 
legacies that hybrid, transitional regimes or anocracies had left in many countries do not 
only refer to inertial effects of contagious violence, they also refer to the continuity of 
institutions and actors that reproduce violence from the state.  In reality, some of them are 
direct descendants of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, who managed to survive 
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the transformations imposed by the pacts and/or transitional electoral processes, but some 
others are the actual result of the very transitional regime, as with those police institutions 
and internal intelligence services that were created during the transitions.  
  As many authors have been pointing out lately, post-transitional police and 
military institutions have not been absent from the reports of human rights abuses and 
political violence, even under nearly fully democratic regimes (Brazil, Argentina, El 
Salvador) (Bailey 2008; Brinks 2008; Hinton 2006; Ungar 2008). On the contrary, they 
keep being a significant source of social violence in the crackdowns against crime, and in 
the involvement of corruption and organized crime. The results of this chapter suggest 
that the contribution of state institutions on the overall phenomenon of violence is as 
significant enough as to be singled out in the cross-national empirical analysis. This 
factor seems, then more important than economic growth, young population, and 
population density, in the explanations of contemporary violence. Therefore, we have to 
explore how this contribution takes place in the following chapters. 
In this chapter, we have approached the inquiry about criminal violence and 
democracy using a quantitative cross-national longitudinal model. The findings point to 
the importance of regime type in the prevalence of violence, but the relationship between 
democracy and violence is not straightforward. Data suggest that violence increases as 
the countries transit from authoritarianism to hybrid regimes, but it does not increase 
once they reach a full-fledge democratic regime. The problem is that reducing the levels 
of violence once they reach democracy could be very hard, and countries may tend to 
remain stuck in the high levels of violence they suffered in the previous regime. A key 
player in this seems to be the state, and we are to discover why in the next chapters.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE TO 
COMMON VIOLENCE 
 
Violence still reigns over Central America. According to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (2007), Central American nations, particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras “may have recently surpassed the traditional world leaders in the number 
of murders committed per 100,000 members of the population” (53). Yet, this violence is 
different from the one that reigned not long ago, in the midst of civil wars and political 
instability. The major thrust of this new wave of violence does not seem to be political 
but criminal; economic profits, interpersonal relations, and collective dynamics have 
replaced the struggle for power and political vindication that drove the bloodshed in the 
past.  
The transitions from authoritarian rule that took place in the early 1990s seem to 
have yielded a wave of criminal violence that has been flooding the Central American 
countries since the mid 1990s (PNUD 2009). From the results in Chapter III, we know 
that common violence in Central America did not emerge along with civil wars or 
internal conflicts. Violence—whether criminal or political— has been endemic to the 
region for many decades, even when the authoritarian regimes were firmly established. 
More than thirteen years after the last transition, this crime wave has produced the 
paradox of regimes that are allegedly democratic but live under a de-facto state of siege 
produced by violent crime. Guatemala and Honduras, for instance, had more than five 
thousand homicides each during 2009 (Infolatam 2010; Pineda 2010). These figures 
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surpass the 4,645 murders in Iraq during the same year; El Salvador had nearly as many 
murders as that war-torn country (Valencia 2010).22 
 In this chapter, I review the situation of violence in Central America, paying 
particular attention to the manifestations of violence in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Then, 
I briefly discuss the arguments that have been used to explain the differences in the levels 
of violence in these two post-transition countries. The purpose of this chapter is to 
prepare the reader for the discussion about the relationship between the transition 
processes and post-transitional criminal violence. I expect to show the differences in the 
manifestations of violence in these two countries, especially those regarding their 
magnitude, and how traditional explanations have failed to grasp the critical factors 
behind such differences. 
 
 
Violence in the Isthmus: The Two Central Americas 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, violence in Latin America varies substantially 
across and within countries. With the end of authoritarian regimes and civil wars, Latin 
American countries not only “discovered” new forms of violence; they also “discovered” 
that such new expressions of violence and public insecurity could reach endemic levels in 
many regions and cities. For years, Colombia was considered the most violent country of 
the region with homicide rates above 80 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas Chile 
and Uruguay had remained with rates of less than 5 deaths per 100,000 populations 
(Morrison et al. 2003). The end of political violence in Central America unveiled 
previously unimaginable levels of warless violence. A study funded by the Inter-
                                                 
22 Iraq has a total population of nearly 29 million inhabitants whereas Guatemala has 13 million, Honduras 
7 millions and El Salvador 6 millions. See: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 
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American Development Bank in the mid 1990s found out that El Salvador has had 
murder rates over one-hundred per one-hundred thousand  inhabitants in first years after 
the peace accords (Cruz and González 1997). Another publication of the Bank reported 
that in the first years of peace, Guatemala experienced rates of nearly 150 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants (Buvinic et al. 1999). Although later studies showed that Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan figures have been overestimated due to problems of official statistics 
(CIEN 2002; Cruz et al. 2000), those same studies confirmed that political peace have not 
eradicated high levels of violence. Furthermore, most of the literature have argued that 
violence has jeopardized the prospects of economic development and well-being of the 
population in Latin America (Buvinic et al. 1999; Londoño et al. 2000).  
However, recent reports tend to portray the current levels of crime and social 
violence as a new phenomenon in the region (Chinchilla 2003), and they have mistakenly 
assumed that criminal violence was not a major problem before the political transitions. 
The data presented in Chapter III has shattered those assumptions.  In fact, additional data 
from the Pan American Health Organization- PAHO (1982) show that most Central 
American countries had high numbers of murders in the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid 
1970s, when the Latin America average homicide rate was approximately 9 per 100,000 
inhabitants, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua had rates between 25 and 30, higher 
than any other Latin America country, including Colombia. In those years, however, 
internal political conflict had already begun in Guatemala, and pre-war violence had 
started to build up in El Salvador and Nicaragua. PAHO statistics are based on the same 
data from the World Health Organization. 
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In order to check the reliability of these sources I conducted a search among 
primary sources in El Salvador and Nicaragua for any year prior to the 1970s. In El 
Salvador, a Ministry of Health yearbook from 1959 reported that 903 murders have been 
perpetrated in the national territory during that year. This means 163 more homicides 
than those reported in the WHO database for that year (740). In Nicaragua, a Bulletin 
from the General Direction of Census and Statistics reported that there were 463 
homicides committed during 1962; this figure represents 111 more cases than reported by 
the WHO data. Such data suggest that even cross-national data might be underestimating 
the magnitude of violence in the past and that any notion of idyllic crimeless societies in 
the past is completely erroneous.     
That history notwithstanding, the violence that is currently afflicting Central 
America is the most complex and prominent this region has faced in its periods of peace. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007) identifies eight areas where the 
problem of violence is especially serious: drug trafficking, homicide, youth gangs, 
domestic violence, firearms trafficking, kidnapping, money laundering, and corruption. 
Table 4.1 shows some indicators of violence as of 2009: homicide rates, percentage of 
people who have been victim of armed robbery, gang membership per 100,000 
inhabitants, fire arms in civilian hands, number of kilograms of cocaine seized by local 
authorities, percentage of people who have witnessed drug-sales in the neighborhood; 
percentage of people victimized by corruption, and a percentage of households with 
family member victims of kidnapping. As evident, the northern triangle of Central 
America —Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador— shows figures in key indicators of 
violence that exceed those of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The differences are especially 
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striking with respect to homicide rates, number of gang members, and the rate of fire 
arms in civilian hands—these are indicators of critical expressions of violence.  
The differences between the north and the south of Central America have been 
documented by different organizations (UNODC 2007; USAID 2006) and, as a result, the 
UNDP Human Development Report for Central America 2009-2010 has separated 
Central America into two sub-regions according to crime levels: one of high criminality, 
which includes El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras;23 and the other of low criminality 
includes Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama (2009: 85-86). The former does not mean 
that Nicaragua and Costa Rica are crimeless. Rather, it means that crime occurs at a much 
lower rate in these countries than El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Research has 
shown that public insecurity is also a matter of concern in these countries (Cuadra 2002; 
PNUD 2005; Serbín and Ferreyra 2000).  
 
Table 4.1. Indicators of Violence in Central America, 2006-2009 
Indicators Guatemala El 
Salvador 
Honduras Nicaragua Costa 
Rica 
      
Homicide rates (per 100,000 pop) (2009) 63 71 58 13 11 
Victims of armed robbery (%) (2008) 11.5 10.7 5.8 5.7 5.4 
Burglary (%) (2008) 6.0 6.0 3.8 9.2 8.3 
Gang membership (per 100,000 pop) 
(2006) 
111 153 500 81 62 
Fire arms (per 1,000 pop) (2006) 81.5 75.8 116.2 45.8 56.6 
Total cocaine seizures (kg) (2001-2006) 26,095 7,006 13,577 26,411 42,844 
People selling drugs in neighborhood 
(%) 
11.1 9.8 11.6 18.5 30.7 
People victimized by corruption (%) 19.6 14.8 13.8 16.6 17.5 
Household victims of kidnappings (%) 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2 
      
Source: PNUD (2009); UNODC (2007), and Americas Barometer database 2008. 
 
 
                                                 
23 UNDP also includes Belize in this group, but I have not considered this country given its distinctive 
history and political development within the region.  
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 In fact, Table 4.1 also shows that Central American countries are not far apart 
when in comes to other indicators of violence. Burglary, for example, is even a little bit 
higher in Nicaragua and Costa Rica than in the northern triangle; corruption victimization 
(bribery) of the population is slightly more frequent in Costa Rica than it is in El 
Salvador. Furthermore, according to the 2008 World Drug Report (quoted in PNUD 
2009), Costa Rican and Nicaraguan governments have seized more cocaine from 2001 to 
2006 than in northern Central America. Of course, this could be an indicator of 
institutional effectiveness rather than an indicator of drug trafficking activities, but the 
2008 Americas Barometer survey, which collected the perceptions of drug trafficking 
activities at the community level, showed similar results: Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
exhibited higher percentages of drug-sale activities at the communities than Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras.  
In other words, crime also affects Nicaragua and Costa Rica, but the prevalence of 
the most heinous crime (homicide) and the presence of some of the most important 
players of criminal violence (street gangs) are definitely more prominent in Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras than in the rest of the region. This is an important gap, 
especially if we consider murders as the principal indicator of violence. Studying the 
structure of crime in El Salvador through “location quotients of crime,” Carcach (2008) 
found that in most Salvadoran territory, homicide dominates the prevalence of crime in 
the country. The former does not mean that there are more murders than any other type of 
crime but that homicidal violence tends to have a disproportionately high rate in relation 
to the area and other type of felonies committed in the surrounding areas. Checking the 
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overall data of violence, it is clear that homicide dominates the prevalence of crime in 
northern Central America.  
  
 
    Figure 4.1. Homicide Rates from 1990 to 2006 in Postwar Central America 
(per 100,000 pop.) 
     Sources: Chinchilla (2003); PNUD (2005); PNUD (2009); Raudales (2006); UNODC (2007). 
 
 
More importantly, the gap can be traced back to the early 1990s, in the wake of 
political transitions, but it has increased in the last decade. Figure 4.1 shows the trends for 
homicide rates from 1990 to 2006. Homicide rates increased noticeably in all countries, 
but in the northern triangle, they reached skyrocketing levels. Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
tell a much different story. Although Nicaraguan rates were relatively high at the outset 
of the transition, by 2000 they have managed to bring them down significantly as to come 
closer to Costa Rica. Nicaragua’s relatively lower violence is traceable at least from the 
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early 1990s but, as we will see below, it goes well back to the 1980s.24 Costa Rica, which 
is the only one in the region with a stable democratic regime since the 1950s, has shown a 
clearly lower and more stable trend in the homicide rates (similar to those seen in the 
Southern Cone), although homicidal violence has slightly increased in the last decade.   
All in all, the post-transition period and the particular decline in Nicaragua seem 
to have contributed to the widening of the gap between the two sub-regions in Central 
America, suggesting distinctive social and political mechanisms behind the crime trends 
(Moser and Winton 2002). The following sections concentrate on the manifestations of 
violence in El Salvador and Nicaragua, our two case studies. It shows their larger trends 
of homicidal violence, their relationships with the armed conflicts, and main 
characteristics of contemporary violence.   
 
Salvadoran and Nicaraguan Histories of Violence 
The best way to have a perspective on the dynamics of violence in these two countries is 
to observe their particular trends of violence from 1950 to 2008. Figure 4.2 provides us 
with that opportunity. Based on the database used in the previous chapter, it shows the 
national average homicide rates for El Salvador from 1950 to 2008 and for Nicaragua 
from 1961 (the first year available) to 2008.25 Two points become clear looking at the 
figure. First, with the exception of a brief period between 1968 and 1970, since the 1960s 
                                                 
24 Some authors have expressed serious caveats about the reliability of Nicaraguan data, as violence may be 
much higher than usually reported due to underreporting and political interference (Godnick et al. 2002; 
Rodgers 2009). However, the same warnings apply to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras where 
problems with data are endemic and governments have tried to curb image-damaging statistics (see Estado 
de la Región 2008). Furthermore, in its recent report about violence in the region, the UNDP considered 
Nicaraguan record system “more reliable” than in the rest of the region (PNUD 2009: 79). 
25 The dotted lines in each of the country trends indicate years for which no reliable data is available. These 
are 1966 and from 1971 to 1974 in Nicaragua; and from 1976 to 1980 and from 1984 to 1989 in El 
Salvador. 
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El Salvador has always had higher levels of homicidal violence than Nicaragua. Second, 
the gap between the two countries widened in two historical periods: during the early 
1980’s and more generally after 1992, and particularly during the first half of the 2000s. 
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          Figure 4.2. Homicide Rates in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 1950-2008 
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The gap between Salvadoran and Nicaraguan murder rates implies that the 
differences between these two neighboring countries do not rise with the start of the 
transitional period (which is considered by some as starting in 1980), but they have 
already existed for some time. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Nicaragua was a 
peaceful and crimeless country before the revolution or even during the Sandinista 
period. By any measure, Nicaraguan rates were repeatedly over 20/100,000 before 1983, 
and a definite declining trend did not take place until after 1993. Put in other words, prior 
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to the transition period, Nicaragua had a serious problem with violence, but El Salvador 
had it even worse.  
The two periods when the differences between El Salvador and Nicaragua became 
wider were moments marked by political events. The first one took place during the early 
1980s: the escalation of civil war in El Salvador and the pacification of the Sandinista 
regime after the deposition of Anastasio Somoza.   The second occurred during the first 
half of the 1990s with the outset of post-war period in El Salvador and the pacification of 
the countryside in Nicaragua after the 1990 elections. The widening of the gap in the 
early 2000s, a result of a skyrocketing trend in El Salvador, seems to be related to the 
enactment of the “Mano Dura” plans in that country. As I will show in Chapter VI, mano 
dura policies unleashed many informal operators of violence that, in the all-out war 
against gangs, ended up escalating violence.26  
 In the next sections I describe the nature of post-transition violence in both El 
Salvador and Nicaragua and underline the differences not only in terms of its magnitude, 
but also in terms of its complexities. 
 
El Salvador: From Delayed Revenges to Gang Rule 
During the 1980s, it is fair to say that most of the violence that took place in the 
Salvadoran territory was war-related. According to some estimates done by Seligson and 
McElhinny (1996) based on a review of different sources, civil war may have produced 
between 37 thousand and 65 thousand civilian deaths from 1980 to 1991. If we take some 
of the information on which those projections are based (Baloyra 1983; Booth and 
Walker 1989) and translate them into murder rates, we easily reach rates that surpass 400 
                                                 
26 I discuss this in-depth in Chapter VI.  
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homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in some years. It is not the purpose of this research to 
explore the nature of the violence during the war years or even the reliability of the data 
during that confusing period. Yet, from what we have seen so far (figures 4.1 and 4.2), it 
is clear that when the ceasefire was enforced by the peace accords, violence, measured as 
homicide rates, continued at a high rate.    
According to sources available, in 1991, one year before the end of the armed 
conflict, the homicide rate was 29 per 100,000, but by 1993 the figures reached a rate 
above 45 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. Aside from the discussion about the reliability 
of these figures, all the information available bears out the idea of a sharp increment of 
homicidal violence.  Interestingly, despite some killings of guerrilla leaders in 1993 and 
1994, political violence seemed to be largely eradicated from Salvadoran dynamics, at 
least in comparison with previous years (Lauria-Santiago 2005). Common crime then 
became apparent for much of the population. Offenses processed by the General 
Attorney’s Office augmented from 20,812 in 1994 to 40,410 in 1998; by year 2000, more 
than 31,000 of the prosecutions led by authorities were due to violent crime (homicides, 
assaults, injuries and threats). In public streets, these were the type of crimes that people 
complained about. The majority of Central Americans became aware of the increases in 
crime through the media and personal daily experiences with assaults, robberies and 
threats (Ladutke 2004). 
A series of surveys conducted by the University Institute of Public Opinion at the 
University of Central America throughout the 1990s found that in 1993, 35 percent of the 
urban population were victims of crime during the four months preceding the survey 
(Cruz 2003a; IUDOP 1993). Furthermore, public opinion surveys detected a rising 
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concern among the population for problems of security: in 1991, only one percent of 
Salvadorans mentioned the problem of insecurity and criminality, by 1994, forty percent 
of Salvadorans were pointing to problems of insecurity and violence (Londoño and 
Guerrero 2000).  Despite this eruption of common crime and the seeming vanishing of 
political violence, one of the main features of post-transition violence was the 
development of dynamics of what has been called “delayed revenges.” A study 
conducted by the World Bank in late 1990s found that there were two different kinds of 
crime and violence in Salvadoran society. One type of crime can be defined as 
economically motivated violence which tended to be concentrated in the urban areas of 
the country, mostly in San Salvador. The other type of crime can be summarized as 
physical violence against individuals. This type of crime was mainly focused in rural 
areas and gained notoriety after a series of family slaughters (Béjar 1998; Cruz et al. 
2000). 
According to human rights activists interviewed by Cruz (2003a) during the 
1990s, the first years of the post-war period saw an increment of violent events and 
murders that had no apparent motivation: they did not seem to be economically 
motivated. People were murdered in rural areas without apparent signs of robbery and the 
conditions of some murders resembled those committed by death squads (Proceso 1996); 
some other murders were simply committed by unknown perpetrators. In fact, some of 
these murders prompted concerns that political violence was still on-going and motivated 
the creation of the Joint Group for the Investigation of Illegal Armed Groups with 
Political Motivation in El Salvador (Spence 2004; United Nations 1994).  For instance, 
investigations conducted by the Central American University Institute of Human Rights 
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concluded that 49 percent of the more than 700 murder cases investigated by the Institute 
in 1997 were committed under unknown circumstances,  whereas 35 percent were 
committed under common crime and economically motivated situations (IDHUCA 
1997). A deeper examination of some cases showed that while some cases seemed to 
have been perpetrated by death squads with some sort of political motivation, others were 
committed by private citizens in order to settle grievances produced during the war (Béjar 
1998). According to Benjamin Cuellar, director of IDHUCA, those murders were the 
result of vengeful private individuals who contracted the services of hitmen, former 
squad members, former guerrilla members, police, or soldiers to kill former personal 
enemies or people who were blamed for killings of family members or for having been 
working as informers for the military, the police or the former guerrilla. Ideology or 
political agendas, then, did not motivate all of  those murders, but retribution and the 
pursuit of settling old scores.27 Béjar (1998) argued that such expressions of violence 
reflect the incapacity of the transitional state institutions to grant order and enforce the 
law.  
Thus, violence during the first years of post-transition was not only about 
common crime, but also about what Moser and Winton (2002) call “social violence”, 
namely, “the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, 
for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power” (9). After 1998, both “social 
violence” and “delinquency” receded and started a decline that took the country to the 
lower level of violence that has experienced in the last two decades. In those years, 
however, the burst of organized crime became apparent with youth gangs and drug cartels 
                                                 
27 See also Bourgois (2001).  Based on ethnographic work, Bourgois has documented how some of these 
dynamics have taken place among former guerrilla members.  
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entering the stage of the dynamics of violence (Santacruz and Concha-Eastman 2001; 
Smutt and Miranda 1998).  
Youth gangs emerged as a mild security problem before the end of the civil war in 
El Salvador (Argueta et al. 1992). The influx of returned migrants and deportees after the 
end of the war and, especially, after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in the United States in 1996, transformed the 
dynamics of the gangs, yielding what has come to be known as the “maras” (Cruz 
2007a). Maras is a vast network of groups of young people associated with the identity 
franchises of two gangs that had their origins in the city of Los Angeles in the United 
States: the Mara Salvatrucha Thirteen (MS-13) and the Eighteenth Street gang (Barrio 
18). Such identity franchises were copied by local Salvadoran gangs through contact 
facilitated by migration and deportation (Cruz and Portillo Peña 1998; Smutt and 
Miranda 1998). These gangs now make up two separate transnational networks that have 
undergone a clear process of formalization and institutionalization throughout the last 
few years that, in some places more than in others, have enabled them to become 
organized crime webs (Cruz 2006a; USAID 2006).   
 Despite the obvious problems of data reliability, all accounts agree that street 
gangs are responsible for a substantial share of the criminal violence in Central America, 
especially in El Salvador (Comisión de Jefes y Jefas de Policía de Centroamérica y el 
Caribe 2003; UNODC 2007; USAID 2006).  According to the Institute of Forensic 
Medicine (Instituto de Medicina Legal) (Molina Vaquerano 2009), probably the most 
reliable source of information about homicides in El Salvador, during the late 1990s 
around 4 percent of murders were committed by gangs; in 2005 more than 13 percent of 
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the nearly 3,800 homicides committed in El Salvador were carried out by street gangs 
(Aguilar and Miranda 2006). But the most distinctive feature of contemporary maras is 
their formation of protection racket rings whose leaders operate from prisons. According 
to the director of the Salvadoran National Civilian Police, 70 percent of the extortions 
committed in El Salvador are carried out by maras (Iraheta 2009). Gangs extort money 
from local convenience stores, transport unions, and informal vendors at the streets. A 
survey conducted by Demoscopia (2007) in a sample of poor neighborhoods in El 
Salvador revealed that around 20 percent of owners of small business pay “protection 
taxes” to maras; in addition, 34 percent of residents of poor communities have to pay 
taxes to gangs. Furthermore, according to former gang members interviewed in the same 
study, a single Salvadoran gang member weekly collects around US$ 1,250 from 
“extortions and protection taxes” (Demoscopia 2007: 57).  Youth gangs, then, are one of 
the main actors of post-transition violence in El Salvador, but not the only one.  However, 
this “contribution” of maras in the maelstrom of violence was not always the same and it 
did not develop to its current levels until after the enactment of the Mano Dura plans in 
2003.  
 Starting on July 2003, the Salvadoran government implemented a series of 
policies known as Mano Dura and Súper Mano Dura. Those programs were a copy of 
similar ones carried out in Guatemala and Honduras in 2001 and 2002 respectively. 
Nevertheless, Salvadoran policies were characterized by their overreaching thrust: they 
entailed the reform of the laws in order to ban the grouping of young people, the 
imprisonment of any suspicious-looking youngster, the creation of specialized anti-gang 
commando units, and the implementation of massive police crackdowns on gangs (Cruz 
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and Carranza 2006; Hume 2007). These policies had an appalling and unexpected impact 
on public security. In a two year span, more than 30 thousand gang members were 
arrested turning prisons into the new nodes of ganglife (Aguilar 2006; Aguilar and 
Miranda 2006), while homicide rates increased by 50 percent, going from 40 murders per 
100,000 thousand inhabitants in 2003 to 62/100,000 in 2005.28 
 As of the late 2000s, violence in El Salvador has increased. The most recent report 
on homicidal violence for 2009 indicates that murder rates have reached the “milestone” 
of 71 homicides per 100,000 (Valencia 2010). However, the structure of murders 
according to circumstances or apparent motivation has also experienced some changes. 
Such transformations suggest interesting dynamics behind the prevalence of homicidal 
violence in the Salvadoran post-transition. Data from the Salvadoran Forensic Institute, 
which is in charge of documenting all the causes of violent deaths in the country, reported 
that the proportion of homicides with unknown causes diminished between 2002 and 
2003, and then skyrocketed during the 2000s, especially after the Mano Dura plans in 
2003 (Molina Vaquerano 2009: 69). Table 4.2 presents the share of homicides per year 
according to the circumstances surrounding the event. In 1999, 60 percent of homicides 
were committed under unidentified circumstances; 29 percents were perpetrated under 
common crime (robberies, burglaries, kidnappings, etc.), and just 3 percent by gangs. By 
2002, government institutions have managed to identify most of murder circumstances: 
55.5 percent of the 2346 murders perpetrated during that year were attributed to common 
crime and only 4.3 percent were committed by gangs (gang brawls, drive-by shootings, 
assaults, etc.); 6.7 percent were perpetrated under interpersonal violence circumstances 
                                                 
28 For a detailed account of the impact of the mano dura plans in El Salvador, see Cruz and Carranza 
(2006) and Cruz (2010).  
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(domestic violence, bar brawls, personal revenges, etc.). However, as we saw with the 
data coming from IDHUCA during the 1990s, an important share of the murders still had 
unknown circumstances.  
 The author of the forensic report defines “unknown motives” (mόvil desconocido) 
as those murders in which the corpses are “found in ravines, waste lands, open fields, 
canyons, river banks, roads, streets, some days after the death, and in which nobody saw 
or heard anything” (Molina Vaquerano 2009: 72). This category became again 
predominant by 2005, when nearly 60 percent of murders had no information about the 
circumstances of the crime. By 2008, 67 percent of the murders had unknown 
circumstances, as opposed to 16 percent committed under common crime circumstances. 
In addition, data also show that participation of gangs on the overall homicidal wave 
increased significantly, especially from 2004 onwards, although they never got to be 
responsible of all the murders.   
 In other words, homicidal violence in the post-transition period does not seem to 
have been dominated by economically motivated violence as is usually assumed. Without 
denying the importance of common crime and economic violence, data suggest that an 
important share of the murders occurred under social violence and also under what seems 
to be politically motivated violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 100
Table 4.2. Percentage of Murders in El Salvador According to Circumstances,  
       1999-2008* 
Circumstances 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
          
Common crime 29.3 29.7 55.5 57.4 33.6 23.2 18.2 16.4 16.2 
Unknown 59.5 52.6 33.3 28.5 48.4 58.9 66.9 68.2 67.6 
Gangs 3.4 7.5 4.3 8.0 9.8 13.4 12.0 10.9 12.3 
Interpersonal violence 7.5 9.9 6.7 5.9 7.7 4.0 2.7 4.0 3.3 
Police abuse 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 
          
Number of murders 2544 2374 2346 2388 2933 3812 3928 3497 3179 
          
* No data available for 2000. 
Source: Molina Vaquerano (2009) 
 
 
Finally, an examination of the territorial incidence of murders provides some 
important insight into the dynamics of violence. The forensic institute statistics show that 
around 55 percent of homicides are committed in 15 out of the 262 municipalities of the 
country (Molina Vaquerano 2006; 2007; 2009). Hence, violence is highly concentrated in 
some areas, especially around the main urban and economic centers: San Salvador, Santa 
Ana, San Miguel, and the trade corridors across the country and around border points. 
More interestingly, in a comparative historical examination of the distribution of 
homicidal violence in El Salvador since 1965, Carcach (2008)  found that the 
geographical distribution of violence in 1995, three years after the transition, was not 
significantly different from that recorded in 1965 and 1975 when political violence and 
war were not yet on sight. Furthermore, he found that the geographical increment of 
violence during the post-war years did not irradiate from the municipalities affected by 
war toward new points of violence, but from pre-war “clusters” of violence toward new 
centers of economic activity. Yet, the old spots of violence, especially those around the 
coffee-growing zones of the country (departments of Santa Ana, Sonsonate, and La 
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Libertad), which drove the national economy before the war, remained with high levels 
of violence.  
Studying the determinants of contemporary violence, Cardenal Izquierdo (2008) 
reached a similar conclusion. The author found no positive association between those 
zones directly affected by the civil war and the departments affected by post-transition 
homicidal violence; in addition, measuring the impact of war-exposition on 1999 
homicide rates, her findings show that those departments affected by war had lower 
violence rates in 1999 than departments where the war was not intense.  These findings 
question the arguments that blame civil war as the main cause of post-transition violence. 
 As we have seen in the cross-country analysis in the previous chapter, wars do 
not seem to be predictors of post-transitional violence. This does not mean that they are 
not somewhat related, but data seem to be very consistent indicating that, first, violence 
already existed in El Salvador before the war; and second, it conserved some of the same 
geographical characteristics that prevailed before the armed conflict. To be sure, 
homicidal violence has expanded during the post-transition, now it is more intense and 
more spread-out than in the past. But contemporary violence also has novel actors: the 
maras. To some extent, they have transformed the dynamics of violence and contributed 
to its overall incidence. However, the available information on homicides also suggests a 
lingering trait of the “traditional” violence: the predominance of social (and political?) 
motivations behind the crimes. It is astonishing that as of 2008, 60 percent of homicides 
remain with similar characteristics of those perpetrated by death squads and political 
groups in the past. Although these figures may also reflect the endemic shortcomings of 
data recollection in El Salvador, they also suggest that the nature of post-transition 
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violence largely surpass the typical indicators of economically motivated crime. The 
inquiry, then, about the factors behind the Salvadoran epidemic of violence should go 
further than individual motivations and traditional criminological explanations; they have 
to incorporate the sociopolitical process behind the phenomenon.  
 
Nicaragua: From “Organic” Violence to Crime 
Nicaragua also has a large history dealing with violence (Rodgers 2006c). However, the 
levels of violence in the last five decades have been lower than those displayed by the 
Salvadoran nation. Though devastating, the civil war in the late 1970s and the Contra war 
throughout the 1980s did not produce the same amount of deaths as in El Salvador 
(Seligson and McElhinny 1996), and the overall violence has been somewhat lower in 
Nicaraguan than in El Salvador. The differences become even more apparent especially 
after the mid 2000s, when homicide rates in El Salvador skyrocketed and Nicaragua 
managed to keep homicides relatively low. With the exception of a brief period during 
the first years of the Sandinista Revolution, by 2008 Nicaragua was experiencing the 
lowest levels of homicidal violence in the last five decades.  
The reduction of violence has not been a smooth process. Actually, a review of 
the overall indicators of violence (not only homicides) indicates that the amount of 
violent crime has been increasing unrelentingly, since the 1990 elections. Table 4.3 
shows the total number of felonies perpetrated in Nicaragua from 1990 to 2006. Felonies 
in Nicaragua have gone from 27 thousand in 1990 to 67 thousand in 2000 to more than 
100 thousand in 2006. The growth has been especially serious regarding crime against 
people or physical integrity against others. Crimes against physical integrity (murders, 
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assaults, rapes, injuries, etc.) have increased nearly seven times from 1990 to 2006; 
conversely, crimes against properties (robberies, burglaries, thefts, frauds, etc.) have 
increased three times more. In other words, general violence has gone up in post-
transition Nicaragua too and this has impacted public opinion as it has impacted 
everywhere in the region (IEEPP no date). Despite the comparatively low levels of 
violence in relation to the rest of the region, Cuadra reported that after the end of the 
internal war, “citizens’ insecurity, now related to the situations of public security, 
gradually became in the primary issue on the national agenda” (2002: 189).  
  
Table 4.3. Criminal Violence in Post-Transition Nicaragua 1990-2006 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
          
Felonies against people 7,340 12,072 15,500 19,821 25,804 26,548 33,519 43,888 48,973 
Felonies against property 19,961 22,645 29,231 32,201 37,047 40,599 47,057 49,579 56,553 
          
Source: Policía Nacional de Nicaragua (2003; 2008).  
   
 
Yet, murders in Nicaragua have not risen to the same relation, and even, as we 
saw in the graphs above, they have decreased significantly since 1995, putting this 
country closer to stable Costa Rica than to El Salvador.  Although Nicaragua exhibits an 
upsurge of homicides in the following two or three years after the war, changes in the 
trends have not been as sharp as in the case of the other countries. In fact, as previously 
stated, Nicaragua experienced lower levels of violent crime in comparison with its 
northern neighbors. The increment of homicides between 1991 and 1993, after the 
political transition, seems to be part of a trend that started during the last years of the 
Sandinista regime. This increase was quickly offset by a sustained decline until the end of 
the decade.  
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The drop in homicide numbers throughout the 1990s coincide with the tendencies 
shown by a characteristic type of Nicaraguan violence, namely violence generated by 
former combatants of the Contra war.  As indicated by local researchers, Nicaraguan 
violence has two distinct dimensions (Cuadra Lira and Saldomando 1998), but in this 
case the division is between common crime that resemble economically motivated 
delinquency and is also concentrated in the cities, and violence that “is related to specific 
conditions linked with the instability generated from the war, and to conditions of social 
and political fragility that remained afterwards” (Saldomando 1999: 134). In fact, 18 
percent of the 732 murders that took place in 1991 occurred under the activities of these 
armed groups. In other words, the actors of the second type of violence are those who 
played a role in the local political dynamics of the armed conflict, and so their use of 
violence was linked to social demands. Following a Marxian framework, Nicaraguan 
scholars have called the first kind of violence “inorganic violence”, and the second, 
“organic violence” (Cuadra Lira and Saldomando 1998).  
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Figure 4.3. “Organic Violence” in Nicaragua: Armed Actions and Land  
        Seizures, 1990-2002 
Source: Policía Nacional de Nicaragua (2003) 
 
Organic violence consisted of actions carried out by former combatants of the 
war. Cuadra (2002) has argued that organic violence was the major source of public 
insecurity in the early years of political transition. In 1988, the Sandinista government 
and the Contra groups signed a series of agreements that reduced hostilities and 
established a schedule to demobilize a portion of the Contra combatants and the Army. 
The defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections represented a turning point that 
accelerated the reduction of the Army and the demobilization of Contra combatants 
(Cajina 1996). However, as some reinsertion programs failed to carry out all the promises 
and as drastic economic reforms abruptly cutback former Sandinista programs, some 
former combatants rearmed and formed bands and guerrilla-like groups who engaged in a 
new wave of armed actions (Walker 2000). These groups were called “Recompas” 
(former Sandinista soldiers), “Recontras” (former Contra fighters), and “Revueltos” 
(former Sandinistas and Contras acting together). As Figure 4.3 shows, the number of 
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armed actions carried out by different bands of demobilized combatants or para-political 
groups was 291 in 1991, and it reached its peak by 1993 with 709 actions, declining in 
the following years. Incidents of social instability, such as land seizures, exhibited a drop 
in number from 1991 to 1995, then rose again in 1996 —probably associated with the 
elections that took place that year— to drop again in subsequent years. The former means 
that while common crime has been steadily increasing along the post-transition period, 
politically related violence dropped and has remained low after 2002.29   
This type of post-transition violence was a direct legacy of the political process 
experienced by Nicaragua, but in contrast to the “delayed revenges” and the activities of 
informal armed groups during the first years of the post-transition in El Salvador, the 
violence conducted by the Nicaraguan groups was more publicly organized. The violent 
claims of Recompas and Recontras were openly made. As in El Salvador, they also had 
old grievances to settle, many motivated by personal experiences; but in contrast to El 
Salvador, they were framed in a public struggle for justice and economic compensation. 
In any case, that characteristic made them easier to identify and engage, as the 
Nicaraguan police and the Army strongly did throughout the 1990s (Policía Nacional de 
Nicaragua 2003; Spalding 1999). The substantial reduction of “organic violence” in 1996 
seems to have been, then, a direct result of this engagement. Hence, part of the reduction 
in the homicidal violence in Nicaragua may be related to the neutralization of this kind of 
groups, especially in a context in which overall criminal violence was expanding.  
According to the 2009 Statistical Dossier of Delinquent Activity, provided by the 
Nicaraguan police, in 2008, 38 percent of homicides were committed under 
                                                 
29 However, episodes of political violence have erupted from time to time, especially around electoral 
processes. As this chapter was being written, a three-day wave of violent protests took place in Managua 
(see Pantoja 2010).  
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circumstances of interpersonal violence (interpersonal quarrels, domestic violence, 
personal revenges, crimes of passion, etc.), 18 percent of murders involved alcohol 
effects and/or bar brawls; 15 percent occurred during robberies or economically 
motivated events, and 4 percent of murders were committed by youth gangs. In 24 
percent of the cases of 2008, police reported no information about the circumstances of 
the death, in other words, the circumstances were unknown. In 2009, this proportion grew 
to 41 percent, but the police explain that this figure might change given that as of 2010 
they are still working on the investigations of some cases (Policía Nacional de Nicaragua 
2010). For past years, Nicaraguan police offer a figure of the number of murders that 
have been cleared up (“esclarecidos”), namely, they know the motives behind the crime. 
However, with the exception of years 2008 and 2009 that we just reviewed, they do not 
provide public information about the specific circumstances under which homicides were 
committed—neither do any other Nicaraguan institution.  According to police records, in 
1991 23 percent of the homicides were not cleared-up; in 1995 this percentage was 21 
and by 2000 it dropped to 18 percent. In 2005, nonetheless, the percentage of homicides 
with unknown circumstances grew to 36 percent and has remained relatively high for the 
rest of the decade (Policía Nacional de Nicaragua 2003; 2008).  These shortcomings in 
recent figures notwithstanding, the general picture that emerges from the Nicaraguan data 
is that local institutions have a better grip on the conditions surrounding crime and 
violence, and that homicidal violence tends to be more closely checked in Nicaraguan 
than in any other post-transition country in the region. In fact, the UNDP has pointed out 
that the quality of criminal statistics are superior in Nicaragua than in any other country 
in Central America (PNUD 2009).  
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The information provided by such statistics suggests that most of the homicidal 
violence taking place in Nicaragua is concentrated in two types of areas: the metropolitan 
areas of Managua, Granada, and Leόn, which form a corridor along the Pacific Coast and 
where most of the population is concentrated; and the cities and towns along the lengthy 
Caribbean Coast, especially in the cities of Puerto Cabezas in the Región Autonόma del 
Atlántico Norte (RAAN), Bluefields in the Región Autonόma del Atlántico Sur (RAAS), 
and Corn Island, a small island in the Caribbean Sea. Although most of the raw numbers 
of homicidal violence concentrate in the metropolitan areas along the Pacific Coast given 
its high population density, the highest crime rates take place in the Caribbean Coast and 
in some small departments that are sandwiched between the metro areas and the regions 
of the Atlantic coast (Zelaya Central and Chontales) (Policía Nacional de Nicaragua 
2008). These areas, characterized by low population density, large extensions of virgin 
tropical forests, and economic underdevelopment, have been increasingly used by 
transnational organized crime and Colombian drug-trafficking cartels since the mid 1990s 
as transient points for re-shipment and rendezvous in the flow of drugs headed for 
Mexico and the United States (Dudley 2010; Orozco Betancourt 2007b).  
In fact, official statistics account for an increment in the amount of drugs seized 
by Nicaraguan authorities since the 1990s.  Seizures of cocaine, for instance, went from 
535 kilograms in 1990 to nearly 5 thousand kilograms in 1998 to 13 thousand kilograms 
in 2007. Heroine seizures went from 0 in 1990 to 53 kilograms in 2001 to 180 kilograms 
in 2007 (Policía Nacional de Nicaragua 2008). Although these figures may reflect the 
effectiveness of Nicaraguan authorities in fighting drug-trafficking, they also hint at the 
magnitude of the penetration of organized crime in Nicaragua. High levels of violence in 
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the areas of the Caribbean Coast, then, would be caused, in part, by organized crime.  The 
arrival of the Mexican Sinaloan drug cartel in the mid 2000s and the use of the Pacific 
rim areas (departments of Managua and Carazo) as new entry points for drug-traffic in 
Central America, contributed to violence in the metropolitan areas as well (Orozco 
Betancourt 2007a). Authorities, however, seem to have been more successful in 
containing drug-related violence in the metro areas than in the Atlantic Coast (Orozco 
Betancourt 2007a).  
Youth gangs also participate in the reproduction of violence in the metropolitan 
areas. Nicaraguan gangs do not have the relevance that maras have in northern Central 
America when it comes to the reproduction of violence and the development of 
protection rackets, neither are they connected to transnational gang networks (USAID 
2006). These groups are also more scattered and dispersed than maras in the north, but 
according to some authors (Rocha and Rodgers 2008), in recent years they have become 
an important actor in the expansion of local-community drug markets in Managua and 
some important Nicaraguan cities. In an ethnographic research conducted in 
impoverished communities and slums in Managua, Rodgers (2006b) found that in a six-
year span, youth gangs transformed from corner street groups of pickpockets and street 
bullies to alleyway drug dealers. Drug-trafficking became the main activity of  these 
groups; they served as local distributors of drug stocks utilized to pay locals for 
collaborating with the Colombian and Mexican cartels (Rocha 2007; UNODC 2007). In 
contrast to northern maras, whose criminal activities are more diversified and their 
protection rackets more widespread, Nicaraguan gangs profit almost exclusively from 
local drug-trafficking (Rocha 2007). According to Rodgers (2003), drugs have increased 
 110
the occurrence of violence among gang members and the availability of heavy weaponry 
in the communities where they dwell.  
An interesting feature of Nicaraguan gangs is that they have been used as shock 
groups by the FSLN party. Rocha Gómez (2009; 2007) argues that within the Nicaraguan 
police there is a strong network of supporters of the Frente Sandinista; this network has 
driven some of the community-oriented policies toward youth gangs in Nicaragua; it also 
has brought gangs and law-enforcement officials closer in the community and has created 
spaces of working relationships that go beyond local violence prevention. These 
rapprochements have been used by the FSLN in periods of social unrest and instability to 
mount pressure on the government, the ruling party, and opposing elites. Clandestinely 
organized by the FSLN, gangs perform as agitators and lead violent actions during strikes 
and street protests (Rocha Gómez 2009; Rocha 2007).  
In sum, Nicaragua has also been affected by important levels of violence during 
the post-transition. Although general figures on common crime and organized drug-
related crime have been unrelentingly on the rise in the last two decades, Nicaragua 
remains an outlier and atypical case in terms of the relatively low evolution of post-
transitional violence. In contrast to El Salvador, the rest of northern Central America and 
many other post-transition countries, Nicaraguans have managed to reduce the incidence 
of homicidal violence and to avoid the development of super violent groups in their 
territory. At some point, the government even launched a marketing campaign, naming 
Nicaragua as the “safest country in Central America” (Policía Nacional de Nicaragua 
2008). This may just be a publicity stunt; but any comparison with the northern neighbors 
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`in the region proves that Nicaraguan citizens are in general safer than the average 
Salvadoran or Guatemalan.  
 
The common explanations 
What explains these varying levels of homicide violence in Central America, particularly 
between El Salvador and Nicaragua? The extant literature points to diverse factors behind 
the post-transition crime surge in Central America. Structural factors such as poverty and 
inequality have consistently been recognized as key variables behind crime (Acevedo 
2009; Chinchilla 2003; Moser and Winton 2002; PNUD 2009; UNODC 2007).   These 
factors would have been exacerbated by the effects of economic globalization and the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms across the region during the 1990s (Benson et al. 
2008; PNUD 2009), which have produced social disruptive processes of unemployment 
and migration (Rocha 2006; Zinecker 2007),  dynamics of translocation and segregation 
of urban spaces (Baires 2003; Lungo and Martel 2003; Rodgers 2009) and the increasing 
utilization of private security groups (Ungar 2007).  Other set of factors commonly cited 
are the legacies of civil conflicts. These range from the demobilization of thousands of 
combatants (Chinchilla 2003; Cruz 1997; Cuadra 2002), to the proliferation of arms in 
the post-conflict (Godnick et al. 2002; Moser and Winton 2002), to the continuation of a 
sort culture of violence (Cruz 1997; Godoy 2006). The rise of criminal economies around 
the transnational drug-business, state weakness, and predominantly young population 
have also been pointed as driving factors behind Central American violence (PNUD 
2009; UNODC 2007). 
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All these factors indeed play important roles as the different research agendas 
have shown, but they fall short in explaining the complexities behind the differences 
between Nicaragua and the northern Central American countries. Let us examine the 
economic indicators first.  Nicaragua is considered one of the poorest and most unequal 
countries in the region (Programa Estado de la Región 2008). For example, the Gross 
National Product per capita for Nicaragua in 2007 was the lowest in the region with the 
exception of Honduras. In contrast, El Salvador and Guatemala are much wealthier than 
Nicaragua and they have remained in similar situation throughout the last two decades 
(see Table 4.4). Similarly data show that income inequality in Nicaragua is as high as it is 
in Guatemala, and it is significantly higher than in El Salvador. In the region, only 
Honduras is more unequal than Nicaragua. Finally, although economic growth (measured 
as percentage increase of GDP) in El Salvador has been the lower in the region in the 
period from 1990 to 2006, data show that Guatemala and Honduras have experienced 
slightly more economic growth than Nicaragua.  
This quick outlook of economic data in Table 4.4 yields a blatant conclusion: 
widespread poverty and inequality have not made Nicaragua more violent than its 
northern neighbors. To the contrary, El Salvador, which in general displays better 
economic indicators, is the most violent country in the region. The argument pointing to 
economic factors as key variables in the explanation of violence would only apply to 
Costa Rica when compared to the region; but this country is, by itself, an outlier in the 
region, and its singular combination of democratic stability and economic performance 
put it in another set of conditions that prevent it from direct comparison. 
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As mentioned above, the legacies of civil wars and internal conflicts are one of 
the most common explanations to post-transition violence in Central America 
(Brentlinger and Hernán 2007). Yet, a simple comparison between Honduras and 
Nicaragua shatters this argument.  After all, Honduras, which faced much less internal 
conflict and insurgency, has higher levels of violence than Nicaragua, which suffered a 
decade of internal war. Even if we consider the number of demobilized former 
combatants during the wars—one of the most preferred line of explanations in the war-
legacies argument—, the evidence does not tally: Nicaragua, as shown in Table 4.4 had 
the highest number of demobilized formal combatants after the war. This does not deny 
that some former combatants engaged in criminal activities after the war, but the bulk of 
demobilization did not translate automatically in levels of crime.  The only important 
difference between Nicaragua and the other two countries that underwent internal war 
(Guatemala and El Salvador) is the demobilization of paramilitaries. But this is so 
because Nicaragua did not have paramilitaries or informal armed groups acting on behalf 
of the state. The participation of paramilitaries, in turn, may be a better line of 
explanation and we are nearly poised now to follow it in the next two chapters.  
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Table 4.4. Proposed Causes of Violence 
 Guatemala El 
Salvador 
Honduras Nicaragua Costa 
Rica 
Indicators of economic 
performance 
     
GDP per capita (2007) 4,568 5,255 3,430 3,674 10,180 
Gini Index 54.5 52.2 55.3 54.5 48.5 
Average Growth (1990-2006) 3.75 2.94 3.70 3.16 5.31 
      
Indicators of war-legacies      
Demobilized soldiers (n) 14,000 24,500 n/a 72,720 n/a 
Guerrillas/Contras (n) 500 12,362 n/a 19,000 n/a 
Paramilitaries (n) 279,421 30,000 n/a 0 n/a 
Total (n) 293,921 66,862 n/a 91,726 n/a 
      
Indicators of institutional 
infrastructure 
     
Police officials per 100,000 
pop. 
152 300 118 155 277 
Judges per 100,000 pop. 6 10 9 6 17 
Public attorneys per 100,000 
pop. 
1 4 3 2 6 
Average percentage of public 
spending on national budget 
(2006-2007) 
9.9 14.3 8.0 8.1 7.7 
Average police officer 
monthly payment (in US$) 
470 470 280 150 584 
      
Sources: PNUD (2009); World Bank socioeconomic indicators; WIID (2008); Gonzalez (2009) 
 
 
But before we do that, let us check the indicators concerning institutional law-
enforcement infrastructure, as institutional infrastructure is also considered a key variable 
in states’ capacity in tackling crime (Duce and Pérez Perdomo 2003; Morrison et al. 
2003; UNODC 2007). If we had to judge the effectiveness of law enforcement 
institutions in handling crime just from the infrastructure indicators shown in Table 4.4 
(police officers, judges, and public attorneys per 100,000 inhabitants, and the share of 
national budget devoted to public security institutions in 2007), we would easily reach the 
conclusion that El Salvador is the safest country in the region, even safer than Costa Rica. 
In addition, El Salvador has been positively singled out for its institutional process in the 
law-enforcement area (Call 2000), and the United Nations has repeatedly praised the 
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Salvadoran police reform as one of the most successful in the world (Bayley 2006). Yet, 
as I have been pointing out throughout this work, El Salvador is perhaps the most violent 
country in the Western Hemisphere, and its apparent success in reforming the security 
apparatus and putting out much more resources to fight crime have not returned positive 
results by any standard. It is possible, nevertheless, that such indicators are a result of the 
national effort to combat violence: El Salvador would have more policemen, judicial 
operators, and resources precisely because the magnitude of the problem is bigger there 
than anywhere else. But if that were the case, we should be finding elevated indicators of 
law-enforcement institutions in Guatemala and Honduras as well. That is not the case. 
Rather, these indicators suggest violence is not associated with the availability of 
resources. The answers, then, have to be looked for anywhere else.   
In sum, none of these factors—not even the drug-trafficking enclaves that operate 
along Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast (UNODC 2007)— have made Nicaragua as violent as 
the north. To be sure, there are specific processes that may enhance some variables in one 
country and not in the other, but none of the previously quoted factors seem to render a 
satisfactory explanation about the gap between Nicaragua and the rest. 
One theory that has gained momentum and specifically taps into the differences 
between Nicaragua and the northern triangle puts the blame onto the development of the 
maras. According to this argument, maras are largely responsible for the skyrocketing 
levels of violence in northern Central America (Arana 2005; Boraz and Bruneau 2006) 
and their activities may explain the noticeable differences between these countries and 
Nicaragua, where maras have been unable to gain a foothold. The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (2007) estimated seventy thousand gang members roaming the 
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streets of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. These groups, made up of two large 
gang networks have gained notoriety as the most powerful youth gangs not only in El 
Salvador, but also in the region. As such, they have probably become the single most 
important actors of criminal violence in the northern sub-region of Central America 
(Jutersonke et al. 2009), as their role in the reproduction of crime is as important in 
Guatemala and Honduras as it is in El Salvador. Hence, any comparison between 
northern maras and Nicaraguan pandillas yields a blatant difference not only in terms of 
the number of youth associated with them, but also the violence wielded by these groups 
(UNODC 2007). Different authors (Cruz 2009; Rocha and Rodgers 2008; USAID 2006) 
have ascribed these divergences in gang development to the distinct flows of returned 
migration and deportation in Central America. U.S.-type gangs, like MS-13 and 
Dieciocho, have flourished in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, this argument goes, 
because of the deportation and voluntary return of migrant youth from the United States 
back to their home countries, where they have played a role in forming new cliques and 
spreading Southern California gang culture. Conversely, in Nicaragua, gangs have not 
been affected by youth deportation from the U.S. because most of their poor migrant 
communities have settled in Costa Rica and, to a lesser degree, Southern Florida, where 
they have joined street gangs to a much lesser extent (Rocha 2007). 
 Although returned migration certainly plays a part in the development of gangs in 
northern Central America as opposed to Nicaragua, it is misleading to blame the growth 
of maras and the prevalence of violence in the northern triangle for the most part to 
migration. If we accept the argument of migration as it is usually raised, we could not 
explain why, after years of cyclical migration and deportation of Mexicans from the 
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United States, maras, and particularly the Eighteenth Street Gang—which was formed by 
Mexican immigrants long ago—, have not gained a foothold in Mexico as they did in 
Central America. As Cruz et al. (Forthcoming) have argued, it is important to consider 
the domestic conditions that made Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, fertile lands 
for powerful gangs, but not Mexico or Nicaragua.     
 Likewise, the problem with ascribing the mounting levels of criminal violence to 
the activities of youth gangs is that it obscures the institutional features that determine not 
only the intensification of violence but also the development of youth gangs.   To be sure, 
gangs reproduce violence. But, as we have seen above, the rise of MS-13 is not the main 
factor behind the escalation of violence in some countries, as the same conditions that 
enabled gang growth have also facilitated the spread of criminal violence.  As I see it, in 
the public security crisis in northern Central America we have to bring back another 
variable. We have to bring back the state. Along with it, we have to pay attention to the 
relationships between state institutions and society, not only in terms of security policies, 
but more importantly in terms of direct reproduction of violence.  
Rather than poverty, internal war, lack of resources, and maras, the fundamental 
underlying difference between northern Central American countries and Nicaragua is the 
manner in which these states have articulated the administration of what Robert Holden 
calls public violence (Holden 2004). Skyrocketing violence and super gangs are both the 
consequence of such articulation. They are not only entrenched in the institutional 
capacities and policies carried out by the security institutions, but also in the utilization of 
informal violent entrepreneurs and armed civilian collaborators to deal with social 
violence and unrest; they are the result of the specific mode of transition experienced by 
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each country. In the northern tier of countries and in El Salvador in particular, the parallel 
security agents— and the elites that supported them — substantially survived the 
transitions and they have continued operating long after the transitions were over. 
Nicaragua is a distinctive case because the complex interplay of conditions set by its 
historical process, beginning with the 1979 Revolution, led to a different path of 
institution-building in the security apparatus, one that insulated it, to a certain extent, 
from criminal organizations and enabled it to construct a different type of relationship 
with the population.  The remaining chapters tackle how that process took place.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
 
How can we explain the differences in the levels of violence between northern Central 
America and Nicaragua, especially between the critical cases of El Salvador and 
Nicaragua? By all accounts, if we rely on poverty alone, Nicaragua should be more 
violent than any other country in Latin America, as it is one of poorest, if not the poorest 
and most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere. Only Haiti in the Caribbean 
suffers from greater poverty. If we pursue the war-demobilization-cultural theses, 
Nicaragua should be at least as violent as Guatemala and El Salvador, since all three 
countries underwent extremely violent and protracted insurgencies, with the Guatemalan 
case lasting the longest. If we blame the lack of resources of the security institutions and 
the state in general, Nicaragua would be in the hands of vigilante groups and private 
organizations of security in order to fill the vacuum created by the smallest security 
budget in the region (UNODC 2007). As we saw in the previous chapter, not even the 
low pay of police agents in Nicaragua has made them as ineffectual as those found in 
northern Central America. Still, if we subscribe to the currently popular approach of 
blaming crime on the penetration of drug cartels in Central America, we should be just as 
concerned about a potential Nicaraguan collapse as we are with El Salvador and 
Guatemala(see, for instance, Smyth 2005). But judging by the evidence from a variety of 
sources, the lesser problems Nicaragua has had with transnational cartels have not 
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yielded the extreme levels of violence we are seeing in northern Central America and 
Mexico.  
Of course, all the aforementioned claims do not mean to imply that those factors 
play no role in the level of violence in the region. But even taking all these factors 
together and attempting to build an explanation that accounts for the interplay of all those 
variables, there is still something missing from the picture. To be sure, economic 
backwardness has not made the challenges of security easier for Nicaragua; neither have 
political polarization, war legacies, and an entrenched practice of corruption at the 
highest incumbent levels. But even taking all those things in consideration and comparing 
them with El Salvador and the rest of transitional Central America, we still face the 
question as to why Nicaragua is different. 
The answers are situated in a, thus far, infrequently explored field of inquiry, that 
is, the role of the state in the management of violence. I refer to the means by which state 
institutions relate to societal actors in order to control, administer, or allow violence. It 
does not refer, in contrast, to an examination of the formal traits and legal frameworks of 
state institutions. Neither does it mean an analysis of public security policies. Rather, it 
entails an exploration of the relationships between the state and its institutions, the 
society, and what Charles Tilly (2003) calls the “violence specialists.” This exploration, 
nonetheless, views institutional design and public policies as a reflection of those 
relationships: they can provide a useful window to understand how violence is generated 
and perpetuated in transitional societies, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
But this analysis attempts to go beyond those manifestations that operate at shallow 
levels, as it assumes that the root cause of high levels of collective violence and rampant 
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crime are not in the specific institutional design, but in the political relationships built 
from the state.  
In other words, what I argue and demonstrate in the two remaining chapters is that 
we have to “bring the state back in” (to use popular terminology) to our consideration of 
etiology of post-transition violence. Thus, I view current violence affecting Central 
America not only as a new form of contestation from society, especially after neo-liberal 
reforms, as it has been widely argued elsewhere (Auyero 2000; Davis 2006b; Godoy 
2006; Hagedorn 2008; Holston 2009; Rodgers 2009); but, more importantly, as a new 
variety of informal control and domination. By this, I do not mean the perpetuation of the 
authoritarian model of suppression of the liberal project of freedoms, but the utilization of 
the state by some elites and social groups to illegally extract resources and benefit 
themselves from by exploiting state institutions. At the institutional level, the control 
exerted by these groups is useful to grant impunity for past human rights violations and 
atrocities; but at the local and community levels, the control of state institutions to 
promote, create, and perpetuate violence is instrumental to the protracted continuation of 
the patronage politics and clientelistic relationships by which power is still exerted in 
most of Latin America.  
Drawing on recent works by Arias (Arias 2006; Arias and Goldstein 2010b), 
Davis (Davis 2009; Davis 2010), Koonings and Kruijt (Koonings 2001; Koonings and 
Kruijt 2004a; Kruijt 2001), and Pearce (2010), who elaborate on the relationships 
between state institutions and informal armed actors from different perspectives, I argue 
that in Central America political transitions are important to the understanding of the 
surge of post-transition violence not only because they had the potential to transform the 
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security apparatuses into democratic institutions, and not only because they removed the 
militaries from power. Most critically, in my estimation, political transitions are critical 
to the understanding of contemporary violence in Central America because they had the 
potential to alter the social relationships that generated violence from the state; and 
because they had the potential to dismantle the old structures of authoritarian state 
partnerships that reproduced collective violence in the society.  
Behind this assertion, there is the assumption that in addition to the military, the 
police, and the internal intelligence services, state-related violence was also produced by 
informal actors and a variety of murky civilian collaborators acting in lose coordination 
with the state. In Central America, the historical participation of these extra-state agents 
has been critical to state running and regime survival (Holden 1996). Transitions 
represented an opportunity to transform authoritarian institutions and build democratic 
rule of law. Due to a variety of factors I elaborate upon below, transitions succeeded in 
transforming those relationships, at least in part, in Nicaragua, but they did not do so in 
El Salvador, nor in the other two countries of the northern triangle. 
 As the old, deeply authoritarian, regimes were drawing to a close in the 1980s 
and 1990s, state informal collaborators—violence specialists— were pushed to search for 
new forms of survival. They in fact survived almost intact—although sometimes with 
new superficial forms— while they continued contributing to violence in northern 
Central America. In sharp contract, they were eliminated or drastically constrained in 
Nicaragua. The differences in theses paths rested upon the conditions present in and the 
decisions taken by the political actors during the regime transitions from dictatorship to 
democracy. Historical paths (Mahoney 2001), critical junctures (Collier and Collier 
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1990), modes of transitions (Karl 1990), and resources that political actors brought to the 
bargaining table (Haggard and Kaufman 1997) determined how those transitions 
transformed the relationships between state institutions, violence specialists, and society.  
I pursue the exploration of that process by conducting a comparative historical 
analysis. Following Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003), I have chosen this 
methodological approach because it puts a critical emphasis on the processes over time 
and, as the reader can deduce from previous chapters, many of my questions stem from 
the transformations countries have experienced over the last three decades. I am also 
aiming to offer a systematic comparison between two countries (El Salvador and 
Nicaragua), that while sharing similar stories of authoritarianism, political violence, 
underdevelopment, and culture, have diverged in terms of the levels of post-transition 
violence. And finally, I have chosen this approach because it provides the opportunity to 
engage in a proposition of causal inference; in other words, I can conclude by singling 
out a factor or a set of factors that explain the phenomenon.  
I therefore systematically review the relevant history of regime change in Central 
American countries, especially El Salvador and Nicaragua. I contextualize the historical 
similarities between these countries, but more importantly, their differences, which stem 
from a specific point of time: the moment of political transition. Hence, I view the 
resolution of the transition period as the critical factor that explains the development of 
post-transition violence in Central America. This transition period thus shapes and 
transforms the relationships between the state, the violence operators, and the society. It 
also provides a roadmap for those engaged in other such transitions in places like Africa, 
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where futures may well be determined by decisions yet to be taken during the moment of 
transition. 
In this chapter, I begin by laying out some additional theoretical considerations 
that are helpful to identify the main variables at play and to understand the critical events. 
Then, I concentrate on the historical traits of the pre-transition authoritarian regimes, 
specifically its relationship to the use of force and violence used in dealing with social 
control of their populations. After that, I describe the third-wave political transitions in 
the region. I do this by emphasizing El Salvador and Nicaragua, my main two cases of 
comparison, but I also briefly refer to Guatemala and Honduras in order to provide more 
evidence.    
 
Some Theoretical Considerations 
Seven points are fundamental to understanding the importance of the transitions in 
shaping the conditions for the surge of violence in post-transition Central America.  First 
of all, it is important to remember that the state is the main player in the management of 
violence, whether legitimate or illegitimate, because it controls the fundamental and most 
important means of coercion within a territory (Tilly 2003). This notion comes directly 
from Max Weber (1994), who defined the state as the entity that can claim the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, but also from Charles Tilly 
(2003) who, building from Weber, asserts that violence depends upon the way 
governments define legitimate force and order. However, three additional points have to 
be brought to bear on this matter. Firstly, following Michael Mann (1984), I view the 
state as an actor, with its own corpus of interests, autonomous from civil society, and also 
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from elites. Secondly, in the contemporary era, the state does not hold monopoly of the 
means of coercion, as nowadays it is not the only one that wields legitimate means of 
coercion, at least in many transition countries around the world. Transformations in  
social and economic realms have pushed states to surrender some of their claims of 
exclusivity over the means of force, in favor of private security organizations and armed 
groups (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Singer 2004). Finally, in this new environment, the 
participation of the state in the management of coercion and violence does not necessarily 
mean that its formal institutions participate in the utilization of force against the threats to 
order and enemies. It means, rather, that the state has the capacity to regulate and 
designate who, in addition to its own institutions, enforces order and administers 
violence.  
 Second, following the previous ideas, the importance of the state in the 
management of means of coercion and violence rests not only in its formal institutions, 
the military and the criminal justice system, but also in informal institutions and actors 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2006) that revolve around the state.  As Guillermo O’Donnell 
(1999; 2004) argues, in some occasions, these shadowy institutions or actors turn more 
important in defining the relationships with other groups of the society than the mere law-
enforcement institution. An example of this would be the system of informal norms that 
drive extrajudicial police violence in Brazil and Argentina (Brinks 2006); or the existence 
of illegal spheres of law-enforcement that Ranum (2010) detected in her work with gangs 
in Guatemala. The key point to understanding violence in post-transition Central America 
is not whether the army, the formal institution of the military, has bent to the rule of law 
and to the democratic procedures of accessing to power, but whether the informal 
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institutions they created around them, with the collaboration of civilian politicians, 
economic elites, and grassroots organizations, have disappeared or have accepted playing 
by the formal rules of the game.   
Third, moving onto the issue of transitions to democracy, building democracy 
entails not only the construction of institutions aimed to ensure transparent electoral 
processes, thus fulfilling the minimalist Schumpeterian requisite, it also entails the 
construction of institutions aimed to promote the rule of law and to protect citizens’ basic 
rights (O'Donnell 1999). As Diamond (2008: 46) states: “The most urgent imperative [to 
effective democracy] is to restructure and empower the institutions and accountability 
and bolster the rule of law.” The former also entails the disappearance or—at least— the 
weakening of institutions that systematically operate in the margins of law or in the 
illegal channels of power. As Koonings (2001) has put it, the biggest challenge for a 
democratic government trying to escape its authoritarian past lies not only in the 
subordination of security forces to civilian rule, but also entails the public monopoly of 
legal force in order to secure public order, rule of law, and citizenship rights on the basis 
of accountable norms and procedures. 
Fourth, security and justice institutions (the criminal justice system) are 
fundamental in the development of democratic governance (Karstedt and LaFree 2006) as 
they are responsible for granting security and the observance of the law. This is 
particularly important in societies that are emerging from authoritarian regimes. As 
Marenin says (1996), political transitions typically imply some degree of social disorder 
and political unrest, and the institutions capable of managing such turmoil are 
fundamental to underpin democratic transformations. Such capacities call for a delicate 
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balance in the performance of the new institutions of security: they have to be sufficiently 
coercive to prevent a spiral of violence and disorder that threaten governance, but at the 
same time they must exhibit self-constraint and attention to human rights to avoid back-
sliding toward authoritarianism. Along these lines, it is interesting to bring to 
consideration the findings in Chapter III, which suggest that countries “stuck” in the 
hybrid “stage” face more homicidal violence than authoritarian regimes and full-fledged 
democracies (see also: Davenport and Armstrong II 2004; Fein 1995; LaFree and Tseloni 
2006). Those findings suggest that security institutions in some countries have failed to 
resist the lures of authoritarianism.  Going back to security institutions, it is important to 
underscore the critical role of law-enforcement institutions in managing the implications 
of regime change; they are called on to control the very disorder that can threaten the 
transition itself (Marenin 1996).  
 Fifth, as several authors note for the modes of democratic transitions (Karl 1990; 
Karl and Schmitter 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), the formal arrangements are 
negotiated by elites, necessarily shaped by elite interests. Those agreements are made by 
those who wield power —formal or real. They are conditioned not only by organized 
interests and resources that bring to the table (Haggard and Kaufman 1997), but also by 
the context of interactions that are produced by the transition itself and how they shape 
new notions of citizenship and stateness (Yashar 1999). In this phase, those interactions 
will shape how the intended pacts are carried out, and what their effects will be on the 
security apparatuses. Popular mobilization  and external influence take part in those 
interactions as well, reinforcing or eroding previous institutional patterns (Stepan 1988).    
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 Sixth, following Charles Tilly (2003) in assessing the politics of violence, we 
know that regime interactions entail violence specialists. So, the institutional pacts made 
during the transition and immediately thereafter are conditioned by agents who hold 
power derived from their capacity for violence, namely, army, police, paramilitaries, and 
guerrillas (Davis 2009), from their links to networks of interest mediation and masses, 
and from their relationships with external states. Some of these agents survive the 
transitions to constitute legal players in the new institutional arena, while others do not. 
However, some others maneuver and use their connections to colonize shadowy areas 
within institutions and state bureaucracy whereby they keep operating (Cruz 2007b). The 
survival of authoritarian violent entrepreneurs with connections to the new regime means 
that the informal actors and illegal institutions associated with the state keep operating 
even under democratic rule. These actors, private and informal agents that in some cases 
may drift into criminal operations using state institutions as a cover-up, and then mutate 
into vigilante groups, death squads, partisan gangs and mobs (Davis 2009; Schlichte 
2009).  The participation of these actors, which do not fully abide by the rules, are also 
part of what Guillermo O’Donnell (2004) calls the “brown areas” of rule. The importance 
of the relationship between the state and informal armed groups goes beyond the 
clandestine utilization of these groups in state-approved activities. It stems from the fact 
that, as Schlichte (2009: 247) argues, “a decisive element in the process of formation [of 
armed groups] is produced by states themselves,” as violence expertise, training, access 
to weapons, and strategic military thinking is provided within state institutions. 
    Finally, the acting connection between violence specialists, informal armed 
groups and state institutions builds from alliances established by state elites, party 
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leaderships, local “caciques,” and local political operators (Pearce 2010). They form 
complex structures of patronage and clientelism that run from centers of national power 
to communities and local centers of patronage. Local bosses grant national elites and 
political leaders access to political support during times of election and social unrest; in 
exchange national leaders and security institutions controlled by the latter surrender some 
of their monopoly over the means of coercion and put them at cacique’s disposal not only 
to enforce the subordination of local clients (Fox 1994), but also to pursue private 
interests and profits (Holden 2004).   
All these points are useful to interpret the information below and to explain 
Nicaraguan “exceptionalism” in terms of transitional violence. I start the account about 
regime change in Central America by outlining one of the fundamental characteristics of 
past authoritarian regimes in the region: their utilization of civilian collaboration in the 
task of social and political domination.  
 
The Real Roots of Violence: Civilian Authoritarian Collaboration 
My account of the historical determinants of post-transition violence draws on the work 
of historians Patricia Alvarenga (1996; 1998) and Robert Holden (2004; 1996), and 
political scientist William Stanley (Stanley 1996a). They all point to the critical role that 
civilian collaboration with military and security apparatuses had in the repression of 
popular discontent and, thus, the preservation and protection of authoritarian regimes in 
countryside Central American countries.  
 The collaboration project between civilians and authoritarian repressive regimes 
stems from the very formation of the Central American liberal states in the late nineteenth 
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century and early twentieth century. It emerges as a mechanism to extend the reach of the 
states to areas and spheres where, despite their institutional consolidation, they had little 
control and institutional presence.  
Before the liberal economic reforms that swept and transformed the political 
structure of the region starting in 1870, Central American countries where characterized 
by caudillo politics and internal  wars: caudillos spent most of their time warring each 
other over control of the meager extant state infrastructure (Holden 2004; Lynch 1992). 
As elites embraced liberal-economy ideology and transformed land-ownership and 
socioeconomic relationships in order to build agro-exporting economies, the need of a 
strong centralized state to protect economic activity and facilitate the integration to the 
world economy became apparent. In a stark difference from the mode of state formation 
in Europe proposed by Charles Tilly, which emerged as protection rackets  and war-
making machines that, nevertheless, had to bargain with their own citizens in order to tax 
them and access to resources  (Tilly 1985; 1990); the Latin American states, especially 
the Central American ones, emerged to integrate these peripheral societies to the world 
economy (Mann 2002), producing the paradox of creating coercive institutions more apt 
to control internal population in order to force them into certain modes of economic 
activities, than to waging war against other states and extracting resources from the 
population (Centeno 2002). The consolidation of Central American states, then, took 
place to address the needs of economic elites to control peasant population and access 
low-wage labor and land, fundamental to the machinery of agro-export production 
(Cardoso and Pérez-Brignoli 1977; Holden 1996). 
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However, as Central American states developed centralized military and police 
institutions (first in Guatemala and El Salvador, and later in Nicaragua and Honduras; see 
Holden 2004), they also kept some of the particular traits of caudillo politics at play. 
First, local landowners and caciques retained some of their groups of armed men and 
armies to protect their own interests and to enforce peasants to collaborate in their 
economic or political projects. These local caudillos were the ones that bargained with 
the centralized coercive institutions of the state, not the citizens (Holden 1996). Second, 
citizens were integrated to state’s instances of power as members of those patronage 
networks attached to local landowners, local political bosses, and local military 
commanders. Their own access to the state was mediated by those local bosses. 
Citizens—or clients— did not always integrate into those networks with the purpose of 
forming armed groups, but to access resources coming from the state and elites; however, 
they collaborated in peer vigilance and enforcement operations as patrons and bosses 
asked them to do so in order to pay back favors.  
 Land owners and political bosses became the representatives of the state in the 
countryside and much of national territories where law-enforcement institutions were 
absent. In the new era of centralized state, they became the brokers of power relationships 
that flowed from the center to the periphery (Holden 2004). However, these collaborators 
also reproduced those patronage relationships with their own groups of collaborators, 
extending the chain of clientelism all the way to the lower social echelons. Even in 
isolated areas, they became members of an informal structure of domination that resorted 
to violence when needed to keep order and ensure compliance with the authoritarian rule. 
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 These structures of patronage were the base for later development of large 
networks of violent state collaborators that reached their most sophisticated expressions 
in the Civilian Auto-Defense Patrols (“Patrullas de Autodefensa Civiles”-PACs) in 
Guatemala (Schirmer 1998), and the civilian defenses or “patrullas cantonales” controlled 
by the fearful semi-clandestine intelligence bureau called “Organizacion Democrática 
Nacionalista (ORDEN) in  El Salvador during the 1970s and 1980s (Lauria-Santiago 
2005).  
Alvarenga (1996; 1998) has masterfully described how this collaboration with the 
state was an essential project of domination that reached all the spheres of social life in El 
Salvador during the first decades of the twentieth century and how it yielded social 
violence in the countryside. In her seminal book on culture of violence in El Salvador, 
Alvarenga (1996) shows how unrestricted networks of civilians collaborators used 
violence not only to enforce compliance with authoritarian rules and punish political 
dissent, but also to carry out private ventures under state indulgence. Furthermore, in her 
research, she found that under those circumstances of informal repression, people’s 
resistance did not consisted in organized collective responses against the state or 
institutions such as the police, the Guardia Nacional or the military. Rather, civilian 
responses against state-sponsored violence were aimed at the informal state collaborators. 
They were private and diffused violent actions disguised under crimes of passion, 
common violence, or street brawls. Habitually, they targeted the most vulnerable 
elements in the collaborator networks, namely, other peasants, their peers. Attacks 
against leaders, local elites, and members of formal institutions were less frequent 
because they generated devastating reactions from the state and its operators, but they 
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also took place from time to time in private contexts, escalating the reactions and the 
systems of informal espionage and public retaliation from state brokers. 
As a result, violence was a common currency in Salvadoran social relationships. 
The institutionalization of civilian collaboration with state’s repressive organizations and 
networks generated relationships based on social distrust and political cynicism, and 
spread impunity at different societal levels (Sieder 2001). Violence also surpassed the 
restricted area of contentious politics insofar as dynamics of personal retribution and 
retaliation became the most common cause of violence.  Similar phenomena occurred in 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. In the latter, the first four decades in the twentieth century 
were characterized by frequent clashes between different factions of Liberals and 
Conservatives led by regional caciques and gang leaders that nowadays would be called 
warlords (Schroeder 1996). They mobilized local peasants in order to terrorize and 
exterminate their enemies and the enemies of their political patrons. Sandino was himself 
a local liberal leader who, in the wake of U.S. marines invasion in the 1920s, reframed 
his narrative of internal conflict as a war of resistance against the invader (Holden 2004; 
Schroeder 1996). 
The American intervention, the creation of the Guardia Nacional as a single 
militarized constabulary force and the consolidation of Anastasio Somoza García as its 
director and Nicaraguan dictator in the 1930s deactivated most of the organized bands 
and armed groups working for political regional caudillos, but the collaboration of the 
latter with the project of domination, this time embodied in the single Somoza 
dictatorship, remained active and turned the Guardia Nacional into the center of 
patronage and clientelist politics across the country (Walter 1993). Local commanders of 
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the Guardia became the privileged elites who acted as the local Mafiosi by engaging in 
criminal economy activities such as gambling, prostitution, and smuggling (Grossman 
2005).  
State consolidation under Somoza and the Guardia Nacional in the case of 
Nicaragua and under institutionalized military rule in the case of El Salvador did not wipe 
out the dynamics of civilian informal collaboration. This was also reinforced by the 
alliances built by state operators and economics elites at different levels, from the top to 
the bottom of social relationships. At the top, economic elites let the military (in El 
Salvador) and the Somoza dynasty (in Nicaragua) to rule the country in exchange for 
protecting their interests and crashing any political attempt that challenged economic 
order. Even in Nicaragua, where the Somoza clan rapaciously took over the main 
economic niches, the elites let the dictatorship to rule as long as the former could be part 
of the pie (Walter 1993).30 But state’s security forces also took advantage of those 
arrangements by using their own networks of informal collaborators to generate violence 
and instability in order to extort elites and landowners. This is part of what William 
Stanley has brilliantly called the “protection racket state” in the case of El Salvador 
(Stanley 1996a). At the bottom, in the remote towns of the countryside, it also meant that 
elites could use formal state operators to advance their private agendas and create 
enclaves of illegal activities under state protection.  
 Violence, then, remained as an active tool wielded not only by state institutions 
but also by their collaborators and challengers in the civil society. This fact explains why 
                                                 
30 Things started to change for Nicaraguan economic elites when Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the last 
member of the dynasty, took advantage of the devastation produced by the 1972 earthquake to concentrate 
all the financial aid poured into the country’s reconstruction, and increased his control over the most 
productive economic niches.   
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the minimally-conceived transformation of the security apparatuses in the northern tier of 
Central America during the transitions did not lead to an automatic reduction of violence. 
To be sure, police, military forces, and security institutions were responsible of an 
important share of violence in authoritarian Central America. But in contrast to Southern 
Cone dictatorships, especially in Chile, where state institutions remained almost the 
solely responsible of repression against the population; in Central America, the 
“responsibility” of torturing, killing, and terrorizing the population was also born by 
civilians and informal agents. 
When the war exploded in El Salvador in 1980, the Salvadoran state had at its 
disposal 40 thousand paramilitaries and civilian collaborators, while formal members of 
the armed forces and security institutions added up to only 36 thousand troops, (Lauria-
Santiago 2005). In Guatemala, during the height of the war against indigenous 
communities in the early 1980s, the Guatemalan military had at its disposal nearly half a 
million of PACs (Schirmer 1998).  
In sum, state’s use of informal collaborators to manage violence is a practice long 
embedded in Central American relationships. As Robert Holden (1996: 459) asserts, pre-
transition security institutions achieved an extraordinary autonomy in the use of violence 
“by a correspondingly high level of tolerance for and collaboration with the state’s agents 
of repression, among non-military agents of the state and within civil society itself.” In 
other words, it is impossible to understand Central American state violence in the past 
without recognizing that violence was wielded not only by formal institutions, but also by 
informal groups acting in collaboration with the state (Alvarenga 1998). As I will show 
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below, transitions did not eradicate this important feature in El Salvador, and illegal 
groups and rogue agents linked to the state add up to the dynamics of violence.  
 
Regime Change in Central America: The Three-Fold Foundational Transitions 
The most striking feature of Central America’s recent history is the widespread internal 
wars and peace processes that Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua experienced. In 
contrast to most of Latin America, which did not experience civil wars, the whole Central 
American isthmus was marked by these wars. Honduras did not have open warfare, but 
the conflicts in the neighboring countries influenced its transition from authoritarian rule.  
 For most of their history, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua were 
ruled by authoritarian regimes. In the 1970s, economic crises and social unrest led to the 
outbreak of armed conflicts between leftist guerrillas and military governments in 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.  The victory of the Sandinista Revolution in 
Nicaragua, however, was followed by a counter-revolutionary war (Booth and Walker 
1999). Liberal democracy came not only with the celebration of relatively free and fair 
elections but, most importantly, with the end of armed conflicts and military rule in the 
1990s.  
 There has been a great deal of discussion on when the transitions started and 
ended in the region. Although this is an important debate, chronology is not my main 
interest. Rather, I would propose to frame the transitions around three defining types of 
events: a) authoritarian breakdowns through military coups, popular uprisings or 
elections; b) electoral processes following the breakdowns; and c) institutional reforms or 
peace accords aimed to transform the security apparatuses. These types of events 
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facilitate comparison. Even more, they help us to underline the importance of two 
dimensions of democratic transitions: elections and rule of law. These dimensions do not 
always coincide and their separation may have critical consequences for democratization 
in creating what some have called “democratization backwards:” democracies that have 
introduced free elections before establishing the basic institutions of rule of law and civil 
society (Rose and Shin 2001). Such phenomenon is at the root of the paradox of hybrid 
regimes: electoral regimes that, nonetheless, perform very poorly in granting basic 
freedoms and rights (Diamond 2002; Karl 1995; Zakaria 1997). 
 The processes that led to regime change in Central America started when military 
coups, popular uprisings or international pressures led directly to the first electoral 
processes attempted under new rules of fairness and freedom. In fact, all were actually 
conducted within significant political constraints (civil war and military oversight) (Karl 
1995). Eventually, elections led to alternation in power. However, the reforms aimed to 
guarantee the full observance of human rights and the rule of law did not come about 
until the 1990s, as a result of political pacts prompted by different conditions. Table 5.1 
shows the road to liberal democracy in each Central American country, highlighting the 
sequence of events in each country. It also shows the complexities of regime change in 
the region, since what started as military coups or elections took around thirteen years on 
average to develop into reforms that would formally transform the security apparatuses. 
That is why some authors have seen the Central American regime changes as comprised 
of three different and parallel transitions (Torres Rivas 2001): from war to peace, from 
military to civilian rule, and from authoritarianism to democracy.   
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Table 5.1  The Road to Liberal Democracy in Central America 
  Preceding regime * Starting point First election held 
in: 
Ending point 
Guatemala Military authoritarianism Military coup (1983) 1984 Peace Accords 
Regime Reforms 
(1996) 
El Salvador  Military authoritarianism Military coup (1979) 1982 Peace Accords 
Regime Reforms 
(1992) 
Honduras Military authoritarianism Elections (1980) 1980 Reforms in public 
security (1995-1999) 
Nicaragua Traditional dictatorship Revolution (1979) 1984 De-Sandinista-isation of 
the Army and Police as 
result of the 1990 
elections outcome  
* With the exception of Honduras, the characterization of the preceding regime is from Mahoney (2001)  
 
From War to Peace 
The most obvious feature of Central American political transitions is the transit 
from internal wars to political peace. In the case of Guatemala and El Salvador, peace 
was intrinsically linked with processes of reforms included in the formal treaty; whereas 
in Nicaragua the 1988 treaty of Sapoá established the conditions which led to the 1990 
watershed elections (Torres Rivas 2001).  
War in El Salvador broke out after several years of increasing political turmoil 
and state repression. A coup d’etat led by young officers in the Army in October of 1979 
triggered a definite escalation of political violence that successive civilian-military juntas 
were unable to stop. The assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and of several 
leaders of the moderate-left masses organizations in 1980, the Sandinista triumph in 
Nicaragua in 1979, and the consolidation of the five armed guerrillas that have been 
clandestinely operating in the country since the early 1970s in one unified organization 
known as the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional)  led to the 
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formal start of military operations with the launch of the “Ofensiva Final” in January 
1981 (Montgomery 1995). Since then and for more than ten years, FMLN guerrillas and 
the U.S. backed Salvadoran government fought a civil war that claimed more than 70 
thousand of lives. In the period in-between, six different electoral processes took place: 
four parliamentary and municipal elections in 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1991; and two 
presidential elections in 1984 and 1989. With the exception of the parliamentary election 
of 1991, no left-wing party or FMLN-associated political organization participated in the 
elections during that period (Baloyra-Herp 1995). These electoral processes were 
presented by the Salvadoran and U.S. governments as evidence that democracy has 
installed in El Salvador, but they failed to put an end to civil war and human rights 
abuses, especially from governmental forces. 
Hence, the resolution of the war in El Salvador in 1992 is best described as a 
military and political stalemate. Despite a solid support from the United States, the 
Salvadoran government was unable to defeat the FMLN guerrilla forces.  The 
international context and pressure generated conditions which led to the 1992 
Chapultepec Accords.31 Given the virtual stalemate, the Salvadoran peace accords were 
the most ambitious in terms of reforming the state and setting conditions for a democratic 
regime (Karl 1995). Its core objectives were to end the armed conflict through political 
means, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for 
human rights, and reunify Salvadoran society (Cruz 2003b). 
The Nicaraguan conflict is actually comprised of two different wars. The first 
war, an insurrection from 1978 to 1979, was prompted by the escalation of repression by 
                                                 
31 This refers to the fall of the Communist bloc and the assassination of six Jesuit priests at the UCA 
campus in 1989 by the army. The crime generated an insurmountable pressure towards the Salvadoran 
government to negotiate peace (see Whitfield 1995). 
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the regime in 1977 and the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro (the editor and 
owner of the national newspaper La Prensa) in 1978, and led to the overthrow of 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle by the FSLN (Frente Sandinista para la Liberación 
Nacional) in July 1979. It was basically a popular uprising in which different sectors of 
Nicaraguan society (the FSLN, business elites, and unions) built a coalition led by FSLN 
forces—a guerrilla formed in the 1960s— that challenged the Guardia Nacional on the 
streets and engaged in urban warfare to topple the regime (Booth 1985). The extreme 
violence with which the Somoza regime responded to popular actions (bombing cities 
and conducting military operations against civilian population), fueled the rebellion  and 
took the death toll up to 50 thousand lives according to some authors (Booth and Walker 
1999). 
The second Nicaraguan conflict was the product of a counterrevolutionary effort 
driven mostly by U.S. financial and strategic support. After the overthrow of Somoza, the 
United States helped to organize the National Resistance (la Resistencia Nacional), a 
force integrated by former members of the Guardia Nacional, Misquitos (indigenous 
population from the Atlantic Coast), peasants, and even former Sandinista fighters who 
had been affected by early Sandinista policies in the rural areas (Payne 2000). The United 
States also organized an effort to isolate Nicaragua diplomatically and to sabotage its 
economy by mining its harbors and blowing up its oil tanks (Booth and Walker 1999). In 
the early 1980s, Honduran and Costa Rican territories were used by the Contras to launch 
attacks on Nicaraguan borders; by 1983, full operations were conducted within Nicaragua 
territory. In 1984, the Sandinistas held elections in part as a result of U.S. military 
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pressure; these elections were generally considered the first free and fair elections in 
Nicaraguan history by some authors (Anderson 1995).  
Despite the strong support of the U.S. and that at some point the Contra resistance 
totaled more than 15 thousand of men, the military threat presented by the Contras was 
never significant. However, the Contra campaign took an important toll in civilians’ lives 
and economic infrastructure, leading the Sandinistas to start negotiations with the Contras 
in order to devote more resources to economic reconstruction than to war (Spalding 
1999). Internal conflicts in the Contra directorate, low support from civilians across the 
country, and increasingly international isolation (boosted by the end of U.S. military 
support in 1988) led the Contras to a very weak position by the late 1980s. Although the 
Sandinistas had practically won the war by the end of 1988, Contras managed to keep 
military operations until general elections took place in 1990. The opposition won the 
1990 elections and a long process of pacification started.  
In Guatemala, the end of the war came by the mid-1990s as a result of a series of 
peace accords between the government and the URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca) guerrilla forces. However, since the military had virtually defeated the 
guerrillas by the mid 1980s through a military campaign directed against rural and 
indigenous communities (Schirmer 1998), the outcome was a peace treaty that did not 
dramatically diminish the real power exercised by the Guatemalan military and political 
elites associated to them.  
By 1996, political peace was the common feature in Central America. However, 
wars shaped the conditions under which political elites negotiated the transitions and 
impinged upon the quality and the depth of the peace agreements. During the conflicts, 
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state security apparatuses, the military and police, were substantially reinforced. 
Repressive institutions gained an unprecedented political leverage given their role in 
protecting the regime. Even in warless Honduras, the U.S. utilization of Honduras as a 
platform to project military assistance in the region led to an enormous increase in the 
influence of the Honduran military. Paradoxically, all this was taking place at a time in 
which electoral processes were promoted as signals of democratization.  Consequently, 
the end of the wars was intrinsically tied to the need to confront expanded military 
leverage.   
 
From Military to Civilian Rule 
Whether caused by the internal wars or by the authoritarian character of the 
Central American regimes, the military played a core role in the rule of these countries. 
The initial withdraw of the military from executive offices in the early 1980s did not 
reduce their political power; rather, by the end of the decade Central American armed 
forces were wealthier, more powerful, and more autonomous than even before. 
Therefore, political transitions aimed to expel the military from power by removing them 
from the internal security apparatuses.  Even in Nicaragua, the military that emerged 
from the revolution was as powerful or more than the former Guardia Nacional. As 
Lentner (1993) has argued, to the extent that the regime failed to draw any distinction 
between the party, which also functioned as the country’s army, and the state, the 
Nicaraguan government was a military one.  
Given that Nicaragua experienced two different internal conflicts and that the 
transformation of the political system entailed the removal of two different regimes (the 
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Somoza regime and the Sandinista regime), the process of demilitarization of Nicaraguan 
society can be best explained as comprised of two different stages. The first one took 
place with the overthrow of Somoza and the destruction of his security apparatus 
embodied in the Guardia Nacional. Rather than demilitarization, this process can be best 
described as a replacement of the security apparatus. Sandinistas wiped out all the 
institutions of the old regime and started a process of construction of new institutions that 
entailed the creation of the Ejército Popular Sandinista, the Policía Sandinista and the 
bureaus of intelligence at the Ministry of Interior (Bautista Lara 2006; Booth 1985; 
Cajina 1996). One important characteristic of these new organizations was that they were 
part of the Sandinista partisan apparatus. Military and police officers in these institutions 
were former guerrilla combatants and active members of the FSLN party. In that sense, 
and as the first director of the Policia Sandinista admitted, they were partisan institutions 
(Vivas Lugo 2009).32 The direct political control of the security institutions under 
Sandinista rule put these organizations in the same category of the Guardia Nacional, 
given its direct relationship with incumbent power; but, in contrast to the old regime, they 
responded to a sort of politburo (the nine commanders of the FSLN) rather to a single 
man. This meant that many of the decisions taken had to be negotiated at different levels 
of the government apparatus, including the Comandancia; those processes were entwined 
in a project of social transformation of Nicaraguan society.  In addition, revolutionary 
security institutions were born under the “youthful high spirits” that characterized the 
Sandinista combatants and cadres during the firs years of the revolution.  
                                                 
32 The publications of the Sandinista government during the first years of the revolution are very illustrative 
in this sense. For example, an article interviewing one Sandinista police chief is entitled “La Policía 
Sandinista no es una fuerza neutral o apolítica” (The Sandinista Police is not a neutral or apolitical force). 
See: Patria Libre. 1981. Entrevista con el Subcomandante Sabino Aguilar, No. 12, pp. 31-33.  
 144
A review of the government press between 1980 and 1985 illustrates the extent to 
which these attitudes permeated the founding years of the Sandinista institutions. For 
example, the title of an interview with the director of the police, Rene Vivas, published in 
Patria Libre in May 1980, is “La Policia Sandinista cumple con la Revolucion”; another 
article depicting the process of technical professionalization  in the police is entitled “De 
Guerrilleros a Policias Sandinistas”(Morrell 1982). The transcription of the speech of 
the Vice-Minister of Interior during the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Policia 
Sandinista, rephrases a Cuban revolutionary song (“Cuba va”) that was popular among 
Latin American students during the 1970s: “Dispuestos a matar y a morir para poder 
vivir.”33 All these articles praised values of patriotism, heroism, and commitment to the 
construction of the new Nicaraguan society.  
In contrast, the few publications of the Somoza regime that I had access to from 
the 1940s,34 depict a very different spirit in their articles. In the periodic publication 
called “Revista de Policia,” articles usually instruct citizens how to behave and why the 
use of force was necessary. An excerpt of one illustrative article entitled “Se necesita 
energía en la autoridad” says this in figurative terms: 
“…It is necessary, most of the times, to carry the cracking whip in the hand to 
teach usual lazy people to walk promptly and to teach those slovenly people to 
obey …”35  
                                                 
33 Carrión, Luis. 1984. “Dispuestos a matar y a morir para poder vivir.” Al Reviente,  Septiembre-Octubre 
1984, pp. 1-12. 
34 I am indebted to the staff of the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua at the Universidad Centroamericana in 
Managua for helping me to find these publications. 
35 “Urge las mas de las veces, andar con el látigo restellante en la mano para enseñar a caminar presto a los 
flojos habituales y para enseñar a obedecer con prontitud a los dejados…”. Revista de Policía, Volume IV, 
Issue 44, August 1942, pp. 6-7.  
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 The portrait of dictator Anastasio Somoza Garcia is shown in several issues of 
Revista de Policia. In the edition of May 1943, for instance, the portrait appears with the 
following legend: “Con motivo del 27 de mayo, Revista de Policía adorna sus páginas 
con su foto (President Somoza’s), como muestra de cariño, respeto y lealtad.”36 
 This brief review of historic press shows the conspicuous differences between the 
Somoza security apparatus and the Sandinista that replaced it. While one seemed to be 
part of a clear domination project, the other seemed to be more entrenched in a project of 
social transformation. Although partisan, the new Sandinista policing apparatus was also 
essentially civilian and with strong links with the community (Bautista Lara 2006). 
However, by the late 1980s, as the Sandinista regime was swamped in economic 
problems and the Contra war was claiming much of the political effort, information 
started to filtrate that some police and military were engaging in criminal activities, and 
that the police and the army were committing more human rights abuses.  
The second stage in the process of demilitarization of Nicaraguan society took 
place with the exit of Sandinistas from the government. It consisted of the reduction of 
the Ejército Popular Sandinista (EPS) and the de-partisanization of both, the Policía 
Sandinista and the EPS (Bautista Lara 2006; Cajina 1996; Orozco 2009).  These 
transformations did not come because of agreements between Contras and Sandinistas, 
but from negotiations between newly elected President Violeta Chamorro and the 
Sandinistas after the electoral defeat of the latter in 1990. In addition, the internal security 
system was dismantled by closing the bureaus of intelligence in the Ministry of Interior 
and disbanding the Milicias Populares Sandinistas. Although the Sandinistas developed a 
kind of civilian defense network in the Milicias Populares, they never had the violent or 
                                                 
36 Bold are mine.  
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repressive character as did their counterparts in the northern countries, and “systematic 
abuse of human rights was never a feature of the Nicaraguan military after 1979” (Booth 
and Walker 1999; Dunkerley and Sieder 1996: 70). More importantly, instead of 
transforming in armed irregular groups, most of these urban groups transformed in 
grassroots organizations working closely with the FSLN party (Spalding 1999).   
 In Guatemala and El Salvador, where the military directly controlled the state 
before the 1980s, wars gave the armed forces autonomy and political power over the 
civilians through the exclusive control over the internal security apparatus. This was 
expressed at two levels. First, by direct control of coercive apparatus, the police and the 
intelligence bureaus; and second, by reinforcing networks of clientelistic collaborators 
among the civilian population, which helped not only as counter-intelligence sources but 
also as agents of sustained violence. In El Salvador, the networks known as “patrullas 
cantonales” and civilian defenses were the direct heirs of the networks of civilian 
collaborators dating back to the early twentieth century, and who, just before the outbreak 
of the war, were managed and coordinated by ORDEN (Holden 1996; Stanley 1996a). At 
the outbreak of the civil war these networks had 40 thousand members; by the late 1980s, 
they had recruited up to 300 thousand, mostly in the countryside (Stanley 1996a). In 
Guatemala, the creation of Autodefense Civilian Patrols (PACs) in 1982 had an 
enormous influence both on the course of the war and on social community dynamics. 
When the war ended in the mid 1990s, they had nearly one million members. The PACs 
engaged around twenty percent of the adult Guatemalan population in tasks of dirty 
warfare and repression (Torres Rivas 2001). Peace accords removed the military from the 
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security realm in both countries, forcing them to relinquish the internal security 
institutions and to formally dissolve civilian partisans’ networks (Sieder 2001).  
Honduras is also an illustrative case of transition to civilian rule. Prompted by 
internal and external pressures for democratization in the late 1970s, the Honduran 
military relinquished the presidency and allowed elections in 1980. However, they 
retained formal control of the internal security apparatus and they also unleashed their 
own autonomous repressive operations (Kincaid and Gamarra 1996). Although military 
repression did not reach levels seen in neighboring countries, the military was responsible 
for several abuses. Peace agreements in El Salvador and Nicaragua prompted various 
political actors, including the U.S., to shift gears and push for reforms in the security 
arena.  By 1992, then-Honduran president Rafael Callejas appointed the Ad-Hoc 
Commission for Institutional Reform to examine the role of the Dirección Nacional de 
Investigaciones (DNI). The DNI was the investigative arm of the security apparatus, 
responsible for more than one hundred deaths and disappearances during the 1980s. The 
report of the Ad-Hoc commission started a long and rocky process of purges and reforms 
that ended in 1998, when a constitutional reform subordinated the armed forces to the 
direct control of the president. By 1999, Honduran civilians formally controlled not only 
elected offices but also the new security institutions (Meza 2004). 
 
From Authoritarian to Democratic Regimes   
Regional scholars have engaged in lively debates about the type and quality of these four 
new Central American democracies (Barnes 1998; Karl 1995; Sieder 2001), but one point 
does not seem to be contested: none of them had experienced consolidated democracy in 
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the past. Third-wave transitions in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua led 
to the first serious sustained attempt to build democracy (Sieder 2001). In this sense they 
are what Torres-Rivas (2001) has called “foundational democracies.”  These political 
transitions required the replacement of the permanent military-oligarchic and dictatorial 
regimes with the new electoral democracies that emerged during the civil wars. The very 
newness presented an additional challenge. New institutions had to be created, requiring 
not only legal frameworks and bureaucratic procedures but also social structures and 
political agents that make them work. Lacking a collective democratic memory, the new 
rules had to be built upon authoritarian notions and institutions.  
 The Salvadoran transition is generally viewed as one of the most successful from 
an institutional perspective.  The military were removed from politics; security 
institutions were reformed and put under civilian command; and rules for open, fair and 
competitive elections were crafted (Call 2003). In the public security area, the most 
important point was the dismantling of the former security institutions: the Policía 
Nacional, the Guardia Nacional, the Policía de Hacienda, and the Policía Municipal; 
and the creation of a new police called Policía Nacional Civil under the command of 
civilians. The military were restricted to tasks of defense of national sovereignty, and a 
new military doctrine was developed (Spence 2004). According to the text of the peace 
accords, 60 percent of the new police had to be comprised of civilians with no previous 
militancy in the FMLN or the Army; 20 percent could come from the ranks of the Army 
or any former security institution; while the rest 20 percent could come from the ranks of 
the FMLN. Police candidates had to go through a series of tests to check their aptitude to 
be police officers, while officers coming from former security institutions and the 
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guerrillas had to undergo an investigation to check they had not committed human rights 
abuses during the war (Costa 1999). Although most of the provisions of the peace 
accords were fulfilled and United Nations declared the accords have been satisfactorily 
completed by 1997, some institutional shortcomings cast doubt on the overall success of 
the transition (Call 2003; Neild 2002).  
Nicaragua is a particular case. The most important institutional transformations 
took place after the triumph of the Revolution and during the first years of the Sandinista 
government. For Philip Williams (1994), the overthrow of Somoza and the victory of the 
Sandinistas set the conditions for an opening in the political regime and a sort of 
democratic exercise from the bottom-up. The Contra-war and the overlapping between 
the FSLN party and state institutions put limits to such “popular democracy.” The 
outcome of the 1990 elections did not bring the creation of new institutions, but it 
generated substantial reforms as to shape them in a more traditional “liberal democracy.” 
The view that Sandinista revolution laid the foundations for liberal democracy is shared 
by Anderson and Dodd (2005), who argue that the revolution prepared Nicaraguan 
citizens for democracy as it developed their “capacity for civil engagement.” 
Finally, Guatemala has usually been seen as the least promising case. Here the 
military, despite the “civilianization” of the security apparatus, continued to wield 
significant power, which it used to supervise the civilian settlement and to shape political 
dynamics at the local level within the indigenous and rural communities (Schirmer 1998; 
Sieder 2001). However, as of this writing, the Honduran transition is, no doubt, the less 
successful. In fact, it is the only one that has undergone a coup after the third wave of 
transitions. Even without internal war, the military has held considerable power and 
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control over decision-making institutions, despite civilian control (Meza 2004). That 
power was at full display during the overthrow of President Manuel Zelaya in late June 
2009. 
So, going back to our field of inquiry, how can we explain the varying levels of 
violence which are resurgent in Central America?  In addition to socially focused factors 
such as the legacies from war, economic adjustments, or gang behavior, I argue that we 
should also focus on the political processes that gave way to institutions and groups that 
continued reproducing violence from the state. We especially should focus on the 
dynamics that allowed former violent entrepreneurs and political brokers from the old 
regimes to survive the transitions, become illegal armed groups linked to state power, and 
meddled in the new institutions so as to retain some leverage over the security agenda. 
Those dynamics are presented in the next section, paying particular attention to El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, my two principal cases.  
 
The Aftermath: the twisted processes 
The high levels of violence faced by the northern Central American countries reveal that 
something went awry in the transitions’ aftermath. Despite the new internal security 
institutions, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have serious problems of common 
and organized violence. Conversely, Nicaragua, even with its increasing security 
problems, has emerged as the least violent postwar country. Why is this so?  
 I argue that, in northern Central America, the roles played by different actors 
regarding the political pacts created conditions that allowed the old-regime power-
brokers to limit the scope and implementation of the reforms. Particularly important, the 
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new security institutions were weakened and, in some cases, were rapidly “re-corrupted” 
because some of the surviving violent entrepreneurs remained in place, some others 
transitioned into criminal actors, and some more continued being part of illegal armed 
groups operating with the active or tacit consent of the incumbent political class. 
Therefore, state institutions remained an important source of criminal violence in 
northern Central American countries.  In contrast, Nicaragua’s transition, involving first a 
popular revolution and then a liberalization of the political regime, transformed 
institutions in such a way that reduced the involvement of state or para-state agents, and 
cut the use of civilian collaborators in the reproduction of extralegal violence. First, the 
revolution cut off all the former repressive agents of the Somoza regime, and transformed 
them in state pariahs. Then, the Sandinistas fought them as enemies of the state. Second, 
when the time came for the Sandinistas to go, the active involvement of the U.S. in 
pressing for removal of Sandinista holdovers and a more active engagement from civilian 
organizations constrained the Sandinista power-brokers. Those with the prospects of 
becoming criminal entrepreneurs, using state institutions as launching pads, were more 
effectively removed and controlled than in the north.     
 
The reversals in northern Central America 
Four factors characterized the failure to successfully reform the security apparatus in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. First, in all countries, the formal withdrawal of 
the military from public security still allowed some personnel, now disguised as civilians, 
to remain in those institutions and to employ authoritarian practices.  Second, 
paramilitary groups, vigilante-type squads, and civilian self-defense militias were not 
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completely dismantled; in some cases they were even revived. Armed groups continued 
to operate covertly, reviving past criminal operations or inventing new ones as a way to 
subsist in the post-war ideological void. More importantly, these groups continued to 
have links with state institutions, sometimes even at the highest levels of the government 
(Beltrán 2007).  Related to that, new institutions were created burdened with the past 
human rights violations of former military leaders and rank and file security personnel 
who evaded accountability. Amnesty laws and procedures protected former violators of 
human rights (Sieder 2001), and some of these same perpetrators mutated into criminal 
entrepreneurs who used state institutions to obtain impunity. Finally, many of the 
institutional transformations were by-products of complex political bargains. In this sense 
they avoided vertical accountability to the public and prevented horizontal accountability 
within state institutions. The following discussion provides schematic accounts of how 
these events materialized particularly in El Salvador, but also in Guatemala and 
Honduras. 
 
The Reversals in El Salvador 
I depict the reversals in El Salvador in two areas: problems of institutionalization of the 
new police, and the survival of the illegal groups acting in connection with state 
structures.  
The problems of institutionalization of the police. The most significant attempts to 
disrupt the reform came at the very beginning of the creation of the National Civilian 
Police (PNC). As observers of the Salvadoran police reform have reported (Costa 1999; 
Spence 2004; Stanley 1993), the government opposed disbanding the former police 
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structures and favored keeping the military in public security tasks, using the argument of 
insecurity as justification.  One of the first government countermeasures was to postpone 
the gradual demobilization of the old police. Rather than demobilization, the government 
attempted to incorporate the Guardia Nacional (National Guard) and the Policia de 
Hacienda (Treasure Police) into other units of the Army, although they would keep their 
uniforms, weapons and facilities (Costa 1999; Morales 2006). This maneuver produced 
the first crisis of the implementation of the Accords: in response, the guerrillas refused to 
demobilize the initial 20 percent of their forces as scheduled in the accords. This led to 
the first re-scheduling of the Peace Accord by the United Nations.37 Even though the 
government later on started disbanding the National Guard and the Treasury Police, 
President Cristiani decided to transfer a large number of personnel from these structures 
to the National Police, which was also supposed to be dismantled.  More than 3 thousand 
National Guard soldiers and Treasury Police officers were transferred to the National 
Police just two months after the implementation of the Peace Accords; in addition, a short 
time later, the government transferred personnel from Army elite battalions to the 
National Police.38  
But the efforts to resist the transition to new policing institutions did not end 
there. When the formation of the new system seemed inevitable, the strategy shifted to 
incorporating members from the old system into the new police force.  Between 1993 and 
1994, there were several attempts to integrate former officers of the National Police into 
the PNC.  Several members of the old police were sent to the Academy even though they 
                                                 
37 Costa (1999) stresses the role of the United Nations in the implementation of the Peace Accord. He 
emphasizes their oversight over the parties and facilitation of negotiations.   
38 The National Police was finally terminated in December 1994, but only after a bank assault perpetrated 
by the chief of its Criminal Investigations Unit. The armed robbery was broadcast by national media and 
showed uniformed officers perpetrating the crime.  
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did not meet all the standards to join the new institution.  Costa (1999) argues that this 
was possible because the government was keen to control the new system and because 
the former guerrilla leadership were careless in their oversight once their own combatants 
were integrated into the new civilian police.  
Also, the government attempted to place trusted holdovers from the old regime in 
key posts to control the new structures. Hence, independent civilians were excluded from 
those posts to make way for military officers.  By the end of 1992, it was “discovered” 
that eleven out of the eighteen executive-level police candidates presented by the 
government came from the Army and the other former public security institutions and not 
from the National Police, as had been originally agreed (Costa 1999).  However, it was 
too late to rectify the errors because the candidates were already receiving training in 
Puerto Rico and Spain. Some of those candidates would later become police chiefs, 
would reach the highest levels of the institution, and would be accused of involvement in 
organized crime by 2009. 
According to Costa (1999) the most obvious attempt to shape the new institutions 
and the major challenge to the overall reform was posed by the integration of the 
Commision to Investigate Criminal Acts (Comisión Investigadora de Hechos Delictivos –
CIHD) and the Executive Anti-Narcotics Unit (Unidad Ejecutiva Antinarcóticos –UEA) 
into the PNC, and the appointment of a former military officer to the key post of deputy 
director for operations in the PNC.  The inclusion of these untouched units presented a 
double challenge.  First, their numbers exceeded the agreed 20-percent limit on former 
government forces in the new police.  Second, these units were involved in the cover up 
of important cases of violations of human rights during the war, and they would be in a 
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position to exert significant influence over the new institution.  Further, the selection of a 
new sub-director coming from the Army threatened to re-militarize the civilian police.  In 
fact, not long after his appointment, concerns arose that he was reproducing a “military 
style of organization and conduct at the PNC” (Stanley 1993: 15) and that he was 
refusing to accept supervision and help from the United Nations Mission in El Salvador, 
called ONUSAL, and its police division (Costa 1999).  
In the end, pressures led to the resignation of the officers involved and to a long 
and awkward process of dismantling these units within the PNC, although some of its 
members remained in different units within the institution. Information revealed later 
showed that many of the personnel of these units were involved in organized crime, were 
responsible for assassinations of former guerrilla leaders, and were incapable—or 
unwilling— to confront organized crime. But the infiltration of elements of the old 
structures also took place at top executive levels. The president’s principal advisors for 
public security issues were military. In addition, in 1994, the Viceminister of Public 
Security of the President Calderon Sol administration included former members of the 
CIHD and UEA units as his advisors and as parallel structures with the police; formally, 
they were not members of the police, because they had not graduated from the new 
Academy, nor did they report to the Director of the police, but rather to the Minister.  The 
minister, however, considered these units to be part of the police (Stanley 1996b).  Some 
of these integrated units were dedicated exclusively to investigate kidnappings, and they 
operated both autonomously from the PNC and with the financial support of a group of 
businessmen.  Despite complaints by the United Nations and by civil society 
organizations about the existence of these units, the ministry refused to dissolve them.   
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In 1996, Stanley (1996b) concluded that the endeavour of top officials to defend the 
irregular security units were damaging the development of the new police and were 
removing the mechanisms of accountability for the new security apparatus. 
All those problems weakened the capacity of the police to constitute an effective 
and professional organization to confront the problem of crime. The political pressures 
and the resistance by representatives of the old order to the establishment of the new, 
more democratic order depleted the police’s capacity to confront the problems of 
violence and crime that were growing within Salvadoran society.  Different students of El 
Salvador’s police reform agree that, even though the crime wave after the Peace Accords 
was severe, the attempts to obstruct the deployment of the police, to infiltrate its 
structures with holdovers from the old system and to subordinate it to political interests 
weakened its capacity to fulfill its duties (Aguilar Villamariona and Amaya Cobar 1998; 
Morales 2006; Spence 2004; Stanley 1996b).  Confronting these, the PNC could not 
become the body that society needed during a period of such change and disorder. 
Despite the presence of a strong opposition party and the active role of the UN, 
some of these tactics succeeded because the guerrilla leadership engaged in negotiations 
with the government in order to get some concessions in the electoral arena.39 In the end, 
although the military formally relinquished control of the internal security apparatus, no 
senior military official mentioned in the Truth Commission Report on major war crimes 
was subjected to court proceedings.40 The report, which pointed out that eighty-five 
percent of the violations of human rights during the war were attributable to the army and 
                                                 
39 Author’s interview with Salvadoran PNC commissioner Jaime Vigil, February 2003; see also Costa 
(1999).  
40 The only exception was the Colonel Guillermo Benavides, convicted for the murder of six Jesuits and 
two collaborators in 1989. He and other convicted official were later pardoned under amnesty law.   
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government forces, named several top officials as responsible for such abuses. In 
response, the government passed a broad amnesty that prevented the prosecution of 
military officers. This level of impunity extended to all ranks of the army and civilian 
collaborators, some of whom passed to the new police, as I just described. The failure of 
the transition to lay the foundations to a transparent and accountable security apparatus 
did not end there; it also manifested in the outright survival of illegal armed groups.  
The Illegal Armed Groups. In the early postwar years, several high-profile killings, 
including those of former guerrilla leaders, prompted the creation of an independent 
commission41, called the “Grupo Conjunto para la Investigación de Bandas Armadas 
Ilegales con Motivaciones Políticas en El Salvador”  (Joint Group for the Investigation of 
Illegal Armed Groups with Political Motivation in El Salvador, hereafter Joint Group) 
(Naciones Unidas 2000).  The commission found evidence that some death squads 
remained operational; it also found that such groups had switched to criminal activities, 
preserving close links to state structures, including the new civilian police (1994).   
A confidential document, summarizing the depiction of activities of death squads 
in the archives used to elaborate the report of the Truth Commission and prepared as a 
working document for the Joint Group, provides names of several former death-squad 
members and sponsors who have held top government posts after the political transition. 
Furthermore, the document also reveals the names of American high-ranking officials 
who acted as clandestine sponsors for the Salvadoran death squads.42    
                                                 
41 This commission was different from the Truth Commission, appointed to investigate human rights abuses 
during the war. It was also different from the “Ad-Hoc Commission”, appointed to identify and remove the 
military accused of human rights violations during the war (Naciones Unidas 2000). 
42 I obtained the document from a former collaborator of the team in charge of writing the Truth 
Commission Report. Although the authenticity of the sources in which it is based could not be established, 
given its confidential nature, the document is true to the conclusions presented in the Truth Commission 
Report (Comisión de la Verdad 1993).  
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Although the report of the Joint Group does not provides names of those involved 
in the armed groups, it depicts their connections with government officials, and local 
power networks.43 It shows that in addition to the problems of removal of old violence 
specialists at the top levels of the government, in rural areas and small towns, informal 
armed groups, formerly linked to paramilitaries, continued to protect traditional power 
structures.  
In order to illustrate these mechanisms I transcribe the text of the report 
concerning three of the several cases investigated by the Joint Group. The following three 
excerpts are accurate transcriptions from the English version obtained from the National 
Security Archive: 
(1) Situation Detected in the Department of Morazán: The investigation uncovered reasonable 
evidence about the existence in this eastern town of an armed structure, whose principle 
motives and objectives are of a political and economic nature. […] The leader of the group is 
the ex-Justice of the Peace of the town, who during the armed conflict belonged to the Civil 
Defense of the area as second-in-command with the rank of first sergeant. The Joint Group 
received individual testimonies from citizens who were witnesses to the participation of the 
ex-Justice of the Peace in actions of the Civil Defense which consisted in the summary 
executions of various people in the town during the war. A large number of members of the 
group under investigation also belonged to the Civil Defense. The activities of this structure 
have been supported by one of the most influential families of the town from an economic and 
political point of view. One of its members is known as the “cacique” (“chief”) of the area. 
The Joint Group received various testimonies that mentioned the influence of this family over 
the now ex-Justice of the Peace and the political power of the town. The Group also obtained 
testimonies and documentation regarding the relationship of the ex-Judge of the Peace with 
                                                 
43 The full text of the report of the Joint Group has not been made public by United Nations or the 
Salvadoran government. However, I found a translated English copy of the full text among the files of the 
National Security Archive at George Washington University. That copy comes from the CIA files on El 
Salvador. 
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members of the Armed Forces. Of particular significance is his petition for the deployment of 
the Armed Forces in the town, recently made in writing under the pretext of fighting 
delinquency, and his critical position regarding the deployment of the Civilian National Police 
in the zone. Testimonies were also made available to the Joint Group about weapons 
deliveries made to the former Justice of the Peace and his group of members by the Armed 
Forces, both during and after the war. […] The results of the investigations show that among 
the objectives and actions of the armed group are: Acts of intimidation and manipulation 
during the recent electoral process. There are individual testimonies about the alleged buying 
of votes and pressure on the residents of the hamlets to force their intention to vote. […] 
Results of the investigation allow the Joint Group to affirm that there is reasonable evidence 
of the existence in this area of the Department of Morazán of a group or structure that has 
military weapons, whose actions are politically motivated and carries out criminal activities in 
order to achieve its goals. This structure controls the local political power, openly manipulates 
the judicial authority-at the time of the investigation totally integrated into the structure- and 
interferes in the deployment of the National Civil Police (Joint Group 1994: 45-46). 
(2) Situation Detected in the Department of Usulután: Several communities in one area of the 
Department of Usulután denounced to the Joint Group the existence in this zone of a group of 
persons, linked to the ruling party, who conduct acts of threats and general intimidation 
against part of the population, warning that it will take direct action to block the economic and 
social projects sponsored by other political forces. […] The Joint Group carried out an in-
depth investigation into the situation in this area.  The investigation process resulted in 
reasonable evidence regarding the existence in this zone of a clandestine structure whose 
objective is the maintenance of political and economic interests, resorting to violent methods 
in the form of threats, intimidation and coercion. […] Candidates for mayor and deputy 
[congressman] of the town and department participate in the structure. They direct a group of 
ex-members of the Armed Forces who publicly exhibit war weapons and act as their personal 
bodyguards. The ex-members of the military carry out tasks of surveillance of persons 
considered objectives of the structure. A substitute judge and member of the local election 
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board is linked to the structure as is the justice of peace. The connection with representatives 
of the judicial authority provides the cover of impunity necessary for the group to carry out its 
activities. Regarding intellectual participation and logistical support for this clandestine 
group, there are indications that an ex-mayor of the town is directly related to the political 
leadership of the structure. […] The ex-mayor of the town and the other two individuals 
mentioned are said to be linked to the past activities of the “death squads.” There is some 
evidence to confirm the suspicion that these individuals carry out illegal intelligence tasks for 
the Armed Forces. […] In terms of economic support for the organization, the investigations 
involve important landowners of the area whose properties are also used for the secret 
meetings referred to above. […] These persons are involved in diverse criminal activities for 
which they continue to be impune due to the intervention of local political leaders and judicial 
authorities linked to the group. Among the criminal acts perpetrated are homicides, threats 
and coercion against the local population, public exhibition of war weapons and crimes 
against property; the victims are private individuals as well as local development projects.[…] 
(Joint Group 1994: 47-48)  
(3) Structure Detected in the Department of San Miguel: The Joint Group received 
information about the presumed existence in the department of San Miguel of illegal 
organization acting under the name “Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Organization.” […] 
Information was also obtained about the existence of a series of documents found in the area 
inside a sealed envelope which read “MAXIMILIANO HERNANDEZ MARTINEZ 
ORGANIZATION – PEOPLE UNITED AGAINST CRIME MOVEMENT.” The envelope 
contained leaflets with the same words noted above, although with different typesetting, and a 
photocopy of a letter on letterhead paper signed by a state functionary giving support to the 
“People United Against Crime Movement” and the individual who represented the 
organization. […] The Joint Group interviewed diverse sources in the zone, both private 
individuals as well as persons linked to official institutions and political and social 
organizations who said they knew about the existence of these organizations (“Maximiliano 
Hernandez Martinez Organization” and “People United Against Crime Movement”) as well as 
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their objectives, methods and possible involvement in criminal activities. These sources 
sustain that both organizations constitute in reality a single structure. The investigations have 
permitted the identification of various individuals in the area, among then (sic) members of 
the economically-powerful sector, professionals, and members of the Armed Forces, who are 
related to the structure under investigation. This group holds clandestine meetings in which 
local political leaders and judicial authorities participate. […] Apparently, the objectives of 
this structure are directed, in principle, to tasks of social cleansing.[…] (Joint Group 1994: 50-
51) 
 
The report presents several other cases with similar characteristics. In many of 
them, these groups not only carried out criminal activities in connection with state 
authorities, but also they were part of electoral machineries of the ruling party during 
electoral processes. No one in these groups was ever captured or prosecuted as a result of 
the report of the commission. To start with, due to an agreement of the government with 
the FMLN and the United Nations, the report was never published entirely and the 
depictions of cases in which it was based (such as the ones I just presented above) were 
never released to the public.  This was so because the government was run by the same 
political party responsible for operating the death-squads in the early 1980s and, also 
because the national elites managed to resist international pressure from the United 
Nations. In addition, little pressure was mounted by civil society, which largely remained 
disengaged from party politics after the war (Wood 2005).  
In sum, the peace accords in El Salvador and the political transformations it 
intended were not adequately fulfilled, especially in the creation of the new police and 
the eradication of armed groups operating with state consent. In the first case, the police 
was systematically weakened from the start as it was “contaminated” by elements of the 
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old regime. The internal structures of accountability were also weakened from the very 
top levels of the government in order to preserve former violators of human rights. 
Although United Nations and the FMLN pushed the government to follow the pacts, 
these were frequently overlooked as the FMLN ended up agreeing to amendments to the 
original agreements as a way to obtain some prerogatives in the electoral arena. Under 
such circumstances United Nations had little power of enforcement. In the case of illegal 
structures, although the Peace Accords established the demobilization of civilian defenses 
and “patrullas cantonales,” they never received the same public attention as the Army or 
the former police because they were not formal structures of the state. The government 
and the Army disbanded them in the wake of the war; but they continued informally 
operating in areas where party leaders and government officials had no oversight. Illegal 
armed groups kept operating under the protection of local bosses and businessmen, who 
provided economic and political support at the local level. In many cases, they were 
integrated to government party structures, and they were used to influence voters and to 
control social organization.  
 
The Reversals in Guatemala and Honduras 
Arguing the need to prevent a postwar criminal uprising, the political leadership decided 
that the new Guatemalan civilian police should be composed by nearly 60 percent of the 
old militarized National Police (Spence 2004). Those individuals merely changed from 
military to civilian police uniforms, transferring their old tactics, doctrine and 
institutional culture to the new institution. The flaws of Guatemala’s security reforms 
involved not only the police. According to the report “Guatemala: Never Again,” after 
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the peace accords, the perpetrators of human rights abuses continued to strike fear into 
the populations affected by past abuses as they remained in the communities and held 
power positions within the government (ODHAG 1998).  
Some individuals formed informal networks known as “hidden powers” (Peacock 
and Beltrán 2003: 5), who are or were part of state structures, and “use their positions and 
contacts in the public and private sectors both to enrich themselves from illegal activities 
and to protect themselves from prosecution for the crimes they commit.” In the case of 
Guatemala, Peacock and Beltrán have identified three types of groups. Current and 
retired military officers, who wield significant power over some state structures and 
whose leadership has been accused of involvement in organized crime during the post-
transition era, comprise one. Two separate well-known rings in Guatemala that fit this 
description are La Cofradía and El Sindicato (Hernández-Pico 2002). The second type of 
group occupied the highest executive office:  the Presidential General Staff (Estado 
Mayor Presidencial-EMP). This was an intelligence unit that provided protection and 
logistical support to the president while at the same time served as a clandestine center to 
launch criminal operations, like the assassination of Bishop Gerardi (Peacock and Beltrán 
2003). The EMP was formally disbanded on November 2003, but many of its members 
were kept in government offices, where they had the capacity to resume operations. 
Finally, the other group of individuals who survived the transition and have continued to 
wield a significant amount of local power are the Civil-Defense Patrols (Patrullas de 
Autodefensa Civil-PAC). Although these paramilitary groups were formally dismantled, 
they continued to operate on their own to terrorize portions of the population, in some 
cases with the approval of regional military commanders (Godoy 2006).  Such groups 
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have been involved in lynchings and public executions. The use of mobs as a way to 
punish criminals goes back to the internal military conflict. This strategy entailed the 
infiltration of native informers to control community life and to encourage people to 
punish those individuals seen as dangerous. Despite the end of the war, the use of 
informers seems to have continued in the rural indigenous areas, cheering on 
communities to “apply the people’s rule” against alleged criminals (Godoy 2006).  
The impunity of some military officers, however, was best reflected in an amnesty 
law protecting military and guerrillas alike from prosecution for war crimes. Although 
some military officers were eventually tried for some crimes, the Guatemalan 
government managed to appoint some officers with suspicious past to key posts in the 
police, the Public Ministry, and the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP).  
All this was possible, in part, because no effective political opposition existed in 
Guatemala. With some exceptions, neither the URNG nor the United Nations, or the 
Guatemalan civil society could counter the maneuvering of military and its allies to block 
effective institutional transformations. Furthermore, in the electoral arena, the transition 
found an alienated and distrustful electorate. The only political force that had built a 
significant link to segments of the population was, paradoxically, a sector of the military 
through the PAC’s and the FRG (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco). This precluded the 
possibility of grassroots pressure to promote implementation of security reforms. 
 In Honduras, despite the absence of internal military conflict, the institutional 
consolidation of the security apparatus was not less problematic. By the mid 1980s, the 
military were not only responsible for human rights abuses, they also were involved in 
the growing drug-trafficking rings on the Atlantic Coast (Rosenberg 1988; Ruhl 2000). 
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Reforms in the security apparatus came as a result of internal and external pressures: 
internally, through business associations, human rights organizations, student groups, and 
the Catholic Church; externally through the U.S., which no longer feared the leftist 
expansion in the region.  The report of the Ad-hoc Commission, published in March 1993 
(Kincaid and Gamarra 1996), prompted reforms that sought the creation of new policing 
institutions and the prosecution of military officers involved in human rights abuses and 
criminal activities. In spite of this, the members of the new institutions came 
fundamentally from the ranks of the old ones; personnel from the old military-controlled 
police were merely transferred to a newly-named institution (Meza 2004).  In addition, 
some indicted military officers avoided prosecution by hiding in military bases, using the 
army to shield them from civilian authorities. Paramilitary groups linked to the military 
targeted some civilian leaders, and even then-president Reina. He was not able to fully 
subordinate the military but his successor, Carlos Flores-Facussé succeeded in doing so 
in 1998 only with strong backing from the U.S. embassy and after granting amnesty to 
military prosecuted for human rights abuses in the 1980s (Ruhl 2000).    
During the reform period in 1994, the Honduran government announced the 
creation of civilian “community watch” groups, aimed to prevent crime and assist the 
police. Some of these groups rapidly evolved into vigilante-type groups, some employing 
heavy weapons and police communication equipment. Facing a general outcry, these 
groups were officially dismantled, but some Honduran human rights organizations feared 
that they were not completely disbanded (Kincaid and Gamarra 1996). 
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The special case of Nicaragua 
As I have pointed out above, there are two critical moments in the Nicaraguan transition. 
The transformations of Nicaraguan society stemmed from the triumph of the Sandinista 
revolution in 1979. The revolution toppled the Somoza authoritarian dynasty and 
introduced significant changes in society and political institutions. One change was the 
eradication of all vestiges of the security apparatus of the old regime, the other major 
change was the creation and mobilization of civil society organizations that would play 
an active political role in Nicaraguan society (Anderson and Dodd 2005; Williams 1994). 
When the Sandinistas were electorally defeated in 1990, the institutions and agents of the 
old-dictatorship were all largely gone. The Sandinista security apparatus was not 
necessarily democratic as it responded to FSLN partisan lines, but the sort of relationship 
it developed with the population, especially the urban poor and middle classes, was 
significantly less repressive than that of the Somoza regime or its northern neighbors 
(Booth and Walker 1999).  Much of the base for the post-transitional development of the 
police forces was planted between 1979 and 1990 (Bautista Lara 2006; Orozco 2009). 
 This account of the transformations of the security apparatus focuses then in the 
attempt of removal of the Sandinistas from the security apparatus and how, despite the 
failure to do so, the process yielded more solid and accountable institutions of public 
security, and the eradication of illegal armed groups. Hence, the critical moment in the 
Nicaraguan transition took place around the 1990 elections as the outcome of the election 
prompted another wave of transformations in the security realm. The key point of these 
changes was the attempt to remove the Sandinistas from security institutions and their 
submission to elected authorities. 
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The new elected government, a broad and fragile alliance of different opposition 
groups headed by Violeta Chamorro, faced the challenge of negotiating with a party (the 
FSLN) that was stronger and better positioned in key posts of the security apparatus 
(Spalding 1999; Spence 2004). For example, 80 percent of the military officers were 
active militants of the FSLN and all the commanders of the police were party members.  
In the case of the police, Chamorro agreed with the Sandinistas that most of the 
police structure would remain intact (Spence 2004), but in exchange some top officials 
would be removed and new rules and regulations for its internal management would be 
established. After the elections, the police change its name to Policia Nacional de 
Nicaragua. The director and some of the most important members of the police 
command, who have been in the police since the early years of the Sandinista regime, 
were removed in 1992, two years after the elections. The police, then started a long 
process of institutionalization that, at the beginning consisted in the “de-partisanization” 
of the police (Orozco 2009), and afterwards focused onto the professionalization of the 
police officers (Bautista Lara 2006).  
Although the Sandinista police had already started a process of 
professionalization by 1988, when most of its cadres had accumulated enough experience 
and had actively learned from Cuban and eastern European police advisors (Orozco 
2009), the definite thrust to transform the police came with the series of reforms that 
emerged from the pact between the Sandinista leadership and the new government. The 
police law, enacted in 1992, established that the police would be an “armed institution of 
civil nature, apolitical, non-partisan, and non-deliberative” (Bautista Lara 2006: 25). 
Then, between 1995 and 1997, several legal reforms were enacted in order to regulate the 
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relationship between the government and the police; they provided a framework for a 
police career and defined a national command structure (Spence 2006). Given the 
complex scenario of having a coercive institution which political loyalties have 
traditionally been on the opposition party, some of those regulations ensured that the 
police would be loyal to the government and the national laws, but that it would have 
some degree of autonomy regarding public security policies (Spence 2006).  
On the military front, Chamorro agreed that Humberto Ortega, the head of the 
Sandinista Army, would remain as commander in chief, but in exchange he would have 
to resign from the FSLN and accept a drastic reduction in the size of the army. These 
agreements were not reached easily, as throughout the negotiation process there were 
several threats from Ortega to ignore the agreements and deploy the army in the cities.  In 
addition, agreements between the Sandinistas and Chamorro government generated 
strong divisions within Chamorro’s governing coalition and prompted enormous U.S. 
pressure on the government to further reduce Sandinista influence. In response, the army 
and the police took several measures to demonstrate their independence from the FSLN 
and their allegiance to the regime such as combating veterans of the former Sandinista 
Army who have risen up in arms to demand land and benefits (Cajina 1996).   
As we saw in Chapter IV, the end of the Nicaraguan war left many former 
combatants from both sides without a program for reinsertion into society; the Recompas 
and Recontras tried to force the government to attend their demands by conducting raids 
and military operations in many towns and middle-size cities and in the countryside; most 
conspicuously, they also engaged in banditry and criminal activities (Cuadra 2002). 
Three points differentiated these groups from the ones that continued operating in El 
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Salvador. First, in contrast to the case of El Salvador, the end of the war left the Contra 
army fundamentally dispersed and disorganized; they split in several little armed groups 
that held some territorial control in some areas of the countryside. Whereas in El 
Salvador, the government had to negotiate with one major politico-military organization 
(the FMLN), and did not have to engage with splinter groups of the former guerrillas; in 
Nicaragua the Chamorro government engaged in multiple negotiations with small re-
armed Contra groups, local strongmen, and also demobilized army combatants over 
resettlement benefits (Spalding 1999). Second, in Nicaragua, most of the post-war armed 
groups in the countryside were remnants of the Contras (the opposing guerrilla) or rogue 
members of the Sandinista Army, which was being transformed to become a National 
Army; they were basically opposed to the government and its policies of demobilization 
and reconstruction.44 In contrast, in El Salvador, since the guerrilla was completely 
demobilized, most of the surviving informal armed groups had been attached to the 
government forces, which remained in power in the post-transition era.  The ruling party 
of the post-transition was the same party responsible of the death squads during the pre-
war and war periods (Wood 2003). Third, the existence of post-transition armed groups 
in Nicaragua was related to public claims regarding post-war benefits and difficult 
economic conditions. In El Salvador, illegal groups directed their claims and demands 
using the private channels of patronage within the ruling party. 
Conditions in Nicaragua, then, led to a different response from the state during the 
post-transition period. When a negotiation failed, the army launched military operations, 
even against former Sandinistas, to force them to negotiate. The aim of the army and the 
                                                 
44 Some authors also mention the dissatisfaction produced by harsh economic policies enacted during the 
Chamorro government in order to stabilize Nicaraguan economy (Saldomando 1999; Spence 2006: Walker 
2000).. 
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police was not only to stop the consolidation of any irregular armed group but also to 
convey  the message that the new institutions of security and the state would not tolerate 
the existence of defiant or parallel armed groups, whether inside or outside state 
institutions (Bautista Lara 2006; Cajina 1996).  
This did not always operate transparently. For instance, after information was 
leaked in July 1993 suggesting that the Sandinista-controlled intelligence services were 
allowing criminal organizations to operate in Managua, the U.S. Senate cut off nearly 
$100 million in aid to Nicaragua (Spence 2004). Two months after that, in a politically 
bold move, speaking in front of a group of diplomats assigned to Nicaragua, Violeta 
Chamorro announced the removal of Ortega as army chief (Cajina 1996). Although 
Ortega and the Sandinistas threatened with rebellion, the pressure of the U.S. and 
international community forced Ortega to accept his removal.  
All in all, the effort to institutionalize and separate the police and the military 
from the FSLN  was deepened  in large part because they saw institutionalization as the 
only strategy that could grant them with survival after the Sandinista electoral defeat 
(Bautista Lara 2006; Orozco 2009; Vivas Lugo 2009).45  
As in its northern-neighbors, Nicaraguan security institutions faced problems of 
corruption and criminal infiltration in the early 1990s, but the enormous U.S. pressure 
over the economically devastated Nicaragua, directly through government agencies and 
also through multilateral organizations (IMF and the World Bank), helped not only to stir 
Nicaraguan institutions away from rogue elements in a timely manner, but also to commit 
themselves to a transformative process of institutionalization (Spence 2006). 
                                                 
45 Vivas Lugo was the director of the Sandinista police in 1979-1981, and again in 1990-1992; while 
Francisco Bautista was a founding member of the Sandinista police.  
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Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to credit everything to U.S. pressures. Popular 
organization and mobilization, a legacy of the revolutionary experiment, helped to shape 
Nicaraguan security institutions by channeling public demands through two types of 
mechanisms. One, through former pro-Sandinista grassroots organizations, that would 
target demands on former Sandinista officials serving in the new government (Cuadra 
Lira 1998). The other, by advancing street demonstrations that would — violently or 
not— challenge the new regime. In this context, the police had to exercise a delicate 
balance to enforce the law: it had to comply with the laws and decisions of the new 
regime, but without alienating or excessively repressing the former Sandinista base. 
Institutional deepening and non-partisanship was the only way to go. According to 
Orozco (2009), for an important period, the institutionalization of the police precluded 
different administrations, especially that of President Arnoldo Alemán (1996-2002), from 
using it to political purposes. 
During this process of institutionalization of the police and the military as non-
partisan organization, the war against illegal armed groups in the countryside played a 
significant role. In addition to prove their allegiance to the national government, it 
allowed the police and the military to consolidate the notion that the state was the only 
bearer of the means of legitimate force in Nicaragua. In other words, it allowed the 
consolidation of the post-transition Nicaraguan state. It removed potential competitors of 
territorial sovereignty and, despite its endemic weaknesses in other areas of governance, 
it concentrated the management of violence under the key security apparatuses of the 
state.  In contrast with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where state institutions 
tolerated, encouraged, and even integrated illegal armed groups to the structures of 
 172
informal governance; Nicaraguan institutions (police and military) struggle to eradicate 
parallel structures of violence and insecurity, in order to consolidate their own legitimacy 
in the country but also, and more importantly, in the international arena. 
The former does not mean that informal institutions of governance did not exist in 
post-transition Nicaragua or that clientelism did not pervade political relations of power. 
Actually, patronage, corruption, and illegal networks of governance are very much 
present in contemporary Nicaragua (Rodgers 2006c; 2008). However, they do not depend 
upon informal or illegal spheres of systematic violence, but upon constant and intense 
bargaining of state resources. Even the increasing utilization of gangs and mobs by the 
FSLN in recent years in order to influence national negotiations and generate social 
unrest (Rocha Gómez 2009; Rocha 2007; Rocha 2008; Rodgers 2008), state institutions 
have not yielded parallel armed organizations with the power they have in northern 
Central America. Despite the internal conflicts they generate within a police institution 
still sympathetic to the Sandinista project (Rocha Gómez 2007), gangs and mobs remain 
largely under negotiated control.  
 
Conclusions 
In sum, the mode of transition in Nicaragua is significantly different from those of 
northern Central America, particularly regarding public security. In northern Central 
America, elements of the old regime managed to block or subvert some of the 
fundamental institutional features evading the public accountability contained in political 
agreements. This was possible in part because the political operators were not confronted 
by forceful opposition. In Guatemala, the military emerged as the victors of the war, and 
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the civil society was weak and frightened enough to force only some of the changes 
entailed in the reforms. In El Salvador, although the FMLN remained a defiant opposition 
force, it later engaged in covert negotiations that weakened the scope of the reforms. In 
Honduras, although civil society and the U.S. played an active role at the beginning, the 
military retained sufficient capacity to threaten those who dared to push for further 
reforms. In all three countries the external push for reforms was erratic, inconsistent and 
unsustained. Only in El Salvador, did the United Nations (ONUSAL) play an important 
role to enforce parts of the agreement but in some cases the two former rivals agreed to 
dismiss some previous pacts. In those situations ONUSAL was left without enforcement 
power.  
Conversely, in Nicaragua, the revolution destroyed the Somoza regime and all its 
violent agents were removed from power. That was a significant step. When the 
Sandinistas lost the elections in 1990, they were pressured into withdrawing from the 
institutions. Under such pressure, the Sandinistas strengthened the security institutions as 
a way to legitimize their role; at the same time, the Chamorro government had to 
negotiate with the Sandinistas in order to prevent social disruptions. Even in electoral 
defeat, the FSLN retained the largest active social base among the population. The 
integration of some of the Sandinista leadership into the post-revolutionary oligarchy 
may have also underpinned this process (Rodgers 2006c; 2008); but the need of survival 
of some former Sandinistas within security institutions helped to create state institutions 
in which old-regime violent entrepreneurs were more constrained to develop parallel 
structures and launch extralegal violence, even when some of them continued having 
some links to party lines. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
STATE VIOLENCE IN THE POST-TRANSITION 
 
In February 2007 members of the Guatemalan National Civilian Police killed and burned 
the bodies of four Salvadorans in a remote rural area in eastern Guatemala. Three of the 
victims were members of the Central American parliament, a regional political body 
similar to the European Parliament; they were also prominent members of the Salvadoran 
ruling party, ARENA. Initial investigations revealed that the perpetrators were officers of 
the Criminal Investigations Division linked to a criminal ring operating within the 
Guatemalan police. Some of the perpetrators were arrested five days later and sent to a 
Guatemalan maximum security prison. They were killed three days later by a specialized 
armed commando unit that stormed the prison. Initial investigations pointed to a 
Guatemalan congressman, and some news reports implicated some of the victims as 
members of drug trafficking organizations (McKinley 2007).  
Two years later, as investigations continued and after some Guatemalan police 
officials were removed from the case; investigations by the Salvadoran authorities 
revealed that a former Salvadoran congressman linked to a drug-cartel who was 
imprisoned in the United States for illegal immigration, was also implicated in the murder 
of the ARENA parliamentarians in Guatemala.46 Some months later, a reputed 
Salvadoran news website published the transcription of a recorded telephonic 
                                                 
46 Noticias EFE. 2009.”Ordenan captura de ex-diputado implicado en asesinato de tres diputados.” 
February 25, 2009. [http://www.que.es/ultimas-noticias/sucesos/200902251709-ordenan-captura-diputado-
implicado-asesinato.html]. See also: Centro de Reportes Informativos sobre Guatemala. 2009. “Caso 
Parlacen: capturados por crimen han obstaculizado inicio de juicio.” February 19, 2009. 
[http://cerigua.info/portal/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=7550] 
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conversation between the congressman imprisoned in the United States and a high 
ranking official of ARENA, who was also the owner of a large private security company 
operating in the country and a former member of the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional.47 
The audio recording had been provided by the American Embassy in El Salvador to the 
news website reporters. In the conversation, recorded at the premises of the U.S. prison, 
the ARENA executive asks the congressman imprisoned in the U.S. for half million 
dollars in exchange for “mobilize his connections and powerful people” in order to 
release him from criminal charges in El Salvador. The publication of the tapes generates 
a national scandal and ARENA quickly expels the official and denies any other 
connection of its own partisan structures to the case.48 Some days after the scandal, the 
now-former ARENA official is shot outside his house and dies. After a brief 
investigation, the General Attorney’s Office rules the death as a suicide and closes the 
case.  
This case illustrates the extent of the infiltration of criminal networks within 
Guatemalan and Salvadoran institutions. Guatemalan institutions are a particularly 
egregious case; even so similar phenomena also appear in El Salvador and Honduras.  
Since the mid 1990s, news articles and human rights organizations recurrently warn not 
only about the existence of cleansing groups and death squads in the Salvadoran, 
Honduran, and Guatemalan institutions (Amnesty International 2003a; Payne 1999; 
                                                 
47 He had been naturalized after moving to El Salvador in the early 1980s. Baires, Rodrigo, and Carlos 
Martinez. 2009. “Adolfo Tórrez pidió medio millón a Roberto Silva para liberarlo de cargos en El 
Salvador.” El Faro, April 15, 2009. 
[http://archivo.elfaro.net/secciones/Noticias/20090413/noticias4_20090413.asp] 
48 Martinez, Carlos, Rodrigo Baires, Sergio Arauz, and Daniel Valencia. 2009. “Arena destituye a Tórrez e 
inicia proceso de expulsión.” El Faro, April 16, 2009. See also: Valencia, Daniel and Sergio Arauz. 2009. 
Adolfo Torrez tramitaba ingreso al PCN cuando murio. June 9, 2009. 
[http://archivo.elfaro.net/secciones/Noticias/20090608/noticias1_20090608.asp] 
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Peacock and Beltrán 2003; UNHRC 2009) but also about organized crime infiltration in 
the new security institutions (Beltrán 2007; Dudley 2010; Smyth 2005; The Economist 
2010). 
 In this chapter, I review some of the evidence that links state institutions and 
state-sponsored illegal groups to the prevalence of current violence in Central America, 
particularly in El Salvador. I show how their participation in the maelstrom of violence 
takes different forms and contributes in different ways to contemporary violence,  In 
doing this, I propose to classify the involvement of state institutions in three different 
types: legal violence, extralegal violence; and plain criminal violence.  
The history and the processes depicted in the two previous chapters suggest that 
transitions to democracy played a significant role in defining the post-transition 
relationships between state institutions and violence specialists, these relationships 
yielded state institutions that in Nicaragua, in comparison to the northern Central 
American countries, have pursued completely different approaches when dealing with 
public security and managing violence. I begin this final analysis by comparing state 
sponsored-violence comparing Nicaragua with northern Central America, especially El 
Salvador.  
 
Legal Violence and the prominence of Mano Dura 
Legal violence refers to the state’s legitimate use of force and its capacity to expand its 
limits in order to fight crime.49 This can entail the alteration of laws and penal codes to 
provide discretionary powers to state institutions in order to fight crime.  
                                                 
49 I use here the notion of “limits” proposed by Holden (1996: 439; 2004), namely, “the freedom of state 
agents to (a) both define and control (through sanctions or inducements) enemies of the state, (b) avoid 
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Before the transitions in Central America, the limits of violence exerted by the 
state had been established by the particular relationship between the economic elite and 
the internal security forces at the command of the military (Torres Rivas 1998). This 
relationship implied that fundamental security tasks were principally focused on 
protecting oligarchic economic interests and maintaining the relationship of 
subordination of a large portion of the population (Holden 2004; Ruhl 2004). Laws were 
frequently ignored or reformed to be adjusted to the need to submit political rivals and 
control threats to the established order. The political transitions generated a change of 
paradigm in the exercise of public security (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Fruhling 2003). 
On the paper, this implied that the new limits in the use of force on the part of the state 
were no longer defined by the needs of the containment of the communist threat or 
arbitrary protection of the interests of the elite (O'Donnell 1999), but from the necessity 
to provide security to all the population under the rule of law. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, these transformations generated tough resistance from the security 
operators of the former regime (military, police, and intelligence services), who utilized 
fear and insecurity as an argument to undermine the reforms or to limit the protection of 
fundamental rights (Cruz 2006b; Spence 2004; Stanley 1993). This is the context in 
which the zero tolerance programs began to be applied in several countries in the region. 
These programs, which were inspired by the hard line policies that were applied 
in New York in the early nineties, are based on the idea that, in order to establish order 
and security, it is necessary to strictly enforce the law (Eck and Maguire 2006). The New 
York experience was used in the northern Central American countries as an argument in 
                                                                                                                                                 
punishment for committing 'illegal' acts (i.e., impunity), and (c) informally deputise non-state agents in the 
exercise of state-sponsored violence (death squads).”   
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favor of more severe laws and programs (PNUD 2009). The first country to implement 
this type of policies was Guatemala with Alfonso Portillo (Merino 2001), but Honduras, 
and, especially, El Salvador developed sophisticated programs afterwards (Cruz 2010). 
They were called the Mano dura policies.    
The enactment of mano dura policies in northern Central American countries and 
the absence of this type of approach in Nicaragua (as well as in Costa Rica) highlight the 
differences between the former and the latter. In El Salvador and Honduras, the mano 
dura laws dictated the criminalization of youth by banning any “youth street group,” the 
expansion of police power by providing them with discretionary faculties, and the 
limitation of civil rights (Cruz and Carranza 2006; Hume 2007; Ungar 2009). In El 
Salvador —where the mano-dura type of policy mutated into a superlative form called 
Súper Mano Dura—, an anti-mara law was enacted in July, 2003 under the 
administration of Francisco Flores. This act, known as Ley Antimaras, also aimed to 
facilitate the detention and prosecution of suspected gang members based on the newly 
classified felony of  “illicit association” (asociación ilícita) and gang membership (Thale 
and Falkenburger 2006). In El Salvador, as in Honduras, the new rulings gave complete 
authority to the police —and in some cases to military personnel— to carry out arrests 
based on arbitrary decisions and thin evidence. Police could use the presence of tattoos, 
hand signals, some dress codes, and physical appearance as evidence of gang 
membership (Hume 2007).  
Although this specific directive was not included in the Honduran reform, 
Honduran police acted on the basis of similar criteria, jailing even children who happened 
to be dressed like gang members (Carranza 2006). In El Salvador, a 2005 report by the 
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National Civil Police details that, between July 23, 2003 and July 8, 2005, the police 
captured 30,934 gang members (Aguilar and Miranda 2006). Although the majority of 
these arrests represent multiple captures of the same person (gang members were 
arrested, freed after forty-eight hours and then arrested again), the figure reflects the 
volume of gang-related police activity that took place in a relatively short period of time. 
The former resulted in prison overcrowding and a significant rise in homicides. 
The abuse of authority and prison overpopulation multiplied. Human rights organizations 
denounced an increase in the cases of police mistreatment and a sensible deterioration in 
the conditions at the prison facilities (Amnesty International 2003b). By the middle of the 
decade, there were over 10 thousand gang members in jails across northern Central 
America. The riots and massacres –in some cases perpetrated by the guards themselves– 
became frequent in the Honduran, Salvadoran and Guatemalan prisons (Thale and 
Falkenburger 2006). As I have explained elsewhere (Cruz 2007a; 2010), the gangs, who 
in the early part of the decade were a secondary security issue, took advantage of their 
presence in the prisons to take control of them, increase internal cohesion, establish links 
to organized crime, and create large extortion networks. Then, and as a result of the hard 
line policies, the Salvatrucha and the 18 (Eighteenth Street) gangs had not disappeared; 
on the contrary, they had become powerful mafias with the capacity to extort large 
sectors of the population as we saw in Chapter IV. 
In contrast, the Nicaraguan approach was rooted more in a communitarian-based 
deterrence strategy, described by the then-deputy police director, Francisco Bautista, as a 
social accord (“concertación social”) (Bautista 2004). Furthermore, Rocha (2007) 
describes the way the Nicaraguan police pondered over the different approaches taken in 
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American cities in the fight against gangs. According to Rocha (based on a paper written 
by Francisco Bautista in 2003), the Nicaraguan police paid attention to the fact that 
whereas “zero-tolerant” New York reduced crime to the same extent as “community-
oriented” San Diego, the latter managed to do that with significantly fewer arrests and 
even reduced the number of complaints against the police for human rights abuses.  In 
other words, Nicaraguan law-enforcement institution paid particular attention to the 
human rights consequences of following one approach and not the other. Therefore,  
 authorities refused to follow the zero tolerance approach in favor of a preventive one 
(USAID 2006). This can be explained because the transitions contributed to a Nicaraguan 
police, which has developed an institutional culture based more on community needs, has 
emphasized anti-crime preventive approaches and has stressed the need for investigation 
and criminal intelligence at the community level (Kliksberg 2007; PNUD 2009; 
Programa Estado de la Región 2008).  
However, in a critical analysis about the Nicaraguan police, Rocha Gómez (2007) 
has stated that police operations on the ground are more violent and repressive than 
usually asserted, and that the image of a professional institution conceals the “political 
economy” of a conflicting police that sometimes has been used by the FSLN. This 
analysis, nonetheless, does not contradict the information that portrays Nicaraguan 
policing as less prone to tolerate excessive violence from within than its peer institutions 
to the north as we will see below. Nor does it preclude the fact that the Nicaraguan police 
have been praised for their reforms and approaches to violence by organizations such as 
the UNDP (PNUD 2009: 187-189) and USAID (2006: 128-130). Analyses of the police 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have also revealed contradictory and profound 
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divisions as not all the members of those institutions are equally enmeshed in 
authoritarian practices (Amaya 2006; Meza 2004; Monterroso Castillo no date). In those 
cases, however, the internal dynamics, burdened with unrestrained brokers from the old 
regimes who rely on the support of incumbent politicians and powerful elites, have ended 
up driving the institutions more toward militarized and repressive means than in 
Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, some politicians and incumbents have also favored repressive 
approaches to the problems of security, but they have been unable to influence the 
policies implemented by the police on the ground as the Salvadoran or Honduran 
politicians have.  
In sum, the severity of the programs in northern Central America, deployed by 
institutions that were not subjected to accountability mechanisms, created the conditions 
for the exacerbation of the levels of violence, and the deterioration in the conditions of 
public security. Central American governments sought legitimacy by declaring "total 
war" against crime, gangs and delinquency. In so doing, not only did they justify the 
state's excessive use of violence and ignored fundamental liberties and human rights; they 
also created the conditions in which criminal bands legitimized their own retaliatory 
actions. I will come back to this point below.  
 
Extralegal violence and the perpetuation of illegal operations 
Although El Salvador and Honduras formally extended the limits of legal violence with 
the enactment of the mano dura laws, legitimizing the use of state force to the point of 
endangering the physical integrity of citizens, there is another type of violence, exerted 
by agents of the state, which clearly exceeds any legal framework, even those established 
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as extraordinary measures during the crusades against crime. This extralegal violence 
takes place in different ways, but the most significant can be summed up in three types of 
activities. First of all, extrajudicial executions committed by state agents. Second, the 
activities carried out by social cleansing groups or death squads composed of police and 
active duty military personnel. And third, the active but covert promotion of vigilante and 
militia groups composed of individuals with no formal link to official institutions. In 
practice, these kinds of actions overlap. The police that systematically execute suspects, 
often participate in illegal social cleansing groups, or foster their formation. 
In northern Central America, the prevalence of these types of groups and 
activities has been extensively documented. For example, a research project conducted by 
Harvard University International Human Rights Clinic (2007) found that cleansing 
groups comprised by police officers and civilians were responsible for the killing of 
many gang members in El Salvador. The existence of these groups within the new 
civilian police goes back to the very early years of the post-transition and the 
reconstitution of the illegal armed groups that were investigated by the Joint Group, and 
that I reviewed in the previous chapter. According to human rights organizations, these 
groups have remained operational throughout the 1990s and the 2000s (IDHUCA 1997; 
Tutela Legal del Arzobispado 2007; 2008). 
 A review of one death squad case, called the Black Shadow (Sombra Negra) 
provides an excellent window to view how these groups continued operating using state 
institutions. I present this case because during the course of my search of documents on 
the activities of death squads in El Salvador, I obtained a copy of the affidavit of the main 
witness in the case against some alleged members of the Black Shadow squad. This 
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affidavit is the only public document that extensively depicts the activities of this kind of 
group. The Black Shadow was a death squad that operated in the second half of the 1990s 
in some slums and shantytowns of the city of San Miguel in El Salvador. 
 
The affidavit details the process through which the witness, a former sergeant of the police, came 
across the death squad. According to the document, when the witness was assigned to a new post, 
representatives of the group came to meet her and ask for support in their activities as a previous 
officer did. The document reveals that the Black Shadow was a death squad acting with the 
financial support of high government officials and businessmen in the city and the department of 
San Miguel. It was comprised by former military and policemen, civilians, and active members of 
the new police. It also had the logistic support of local high ranking police officials. For instance, 
the witness describes how before an operation of the death squad, one of the police commanders 
of the city used to stop police patrolling so the squad could operate freely in the area. The squad 
targeted criminals, gangs, and political activists that were considered a threat for the members of 
the group. The document also depicts how, as the witness became aware of the activities of the 
squad and as she refused to participate, she became herself a target of the squad while at the same 
time she was subjected to a disciplinary investigation within the police. After discovering that all 
the local chain of command of the police was aware of the activities of Black Shadow, the witness 
went to the specialized investigations unit (División de Investigación Criminal-DIC) in San 
Salvador. The DIC, then, starts an investigation of the case. Shortly afterward, the witness receives 
a reprimand from the deputy police director for her report that other high ranking police officials 
were also involved in a high-profiled death squad. After several attempts and with the sponsorship 
of the DIC, she finally reaches the police director in San Salvador in order to ask him for 
protection. The director suggests her to take a long leave as he expresses his own frustration about 
his inability to grant her effective protection!  
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The document is rich in details of the case that, for reasons of space, I cannot 
reproduce here. However, the document makes clear that the Black Shadow squad 
operated with the participation of police officers and the acquiescence of local police 
commanders. Furthermore, the document shows how mechanisms of transparency and 
accountability were thrashed by different police commanders at the highest levels in 
order to protect the image of the institution and some politicians involved in the case. The 
case went to court and some members of the squad, police officers, and sponsors were 
indicted. However, they were later cleared of charges by a higher court of appeals and 
released from prison. Some of the accused remained in the police and nowadays occupy 
high posts within it. Other person accused to be a sponsor of the group has served as a 
city mayor for more than nine years at the time of this writing. The witness fled the 
country. 
 In a similar case in Honduras, the chief of the Police Internal Affairs Unit 
exposed the existence of death squads within the police in 2002 and pointed at their 
involvement in many extrajudicial killings of children and youth. After that, the officer 
was removed from her post (Ungar 2009).  According to several human rights reports, 
since 1998, cleansing groups associated to the police have murdered hundreds of street 
children and suspected gang members in Honduras (Amnesty International 2003a; Casa 
Alianza Honduras 2006; U.S. Department of State 2008). In Guatemala, no less than 80 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances perpetrated by the National Civilian Police were 
reported to the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman between 2004 and 2005 
(Samayoa 2007) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly 
reported the involvement of state agents in extrajudicial killings (UNHRC 2009).  
 185
 Conversely, in Nicaragua, sources within human rights organizations do not 
report the existence of death squads or cleansing groups entrenched in state institutions. 
Although there were eight murders perpetrated by state officials between 2005 and 2008, 
according to a human rights consortium report, all of them were attributed to the 
excessive use of force by the police and military. In all cases, the individuals involved 
were identified and in most cases taken to court (Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos 
Humanos et al. 2008).  The report praises the absence of an institutional culture of abuse 
and torture in the Nicaraguan police, but it shows concern about some cases of 
“disproportional use of police force when apprehending suspects” (Centro Nicaraguense 
de Derechos Humanos et al. 2008: 29). This same appraisal of the Nicaraguan police can 
be found in other independent reports (UNODC 2007; USAID 2006). Although these 
reports acknowledge the existence of problems in the Nicaraguan police, the reports also 
point to a lesser authoritarian character of the Nicaraguan institution in comparison with 
its northern neighbors. 
 A review of the Amnesty International (AI) reports comparing the four countries 
can best illustrate the differences between Nicaragua and the rest of the countries 
(Amnesty International 1991-2009). For every country, Table 6.1 shows the percentage 
of yearly reports that point at the occurrence of extrajudicial killings, killings by state 
forces or by illegal armed groups associated to the state, over the total number of reports 
since the country transition took place. For example, there are nineteen AI annual reports 
since the Nicaraguan election in 1990. Seven out of those nineteen reports state the 
occurrence of extralegal killings in Nicaragua. That represents 37 percent of the AI 
reports on post-transition Nicaragua. In contrast, in Honduras, 64 percent of the AI 
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annual reports since 1998, the year when the security reforms were concluded, denounce 
killings by state forces. It is important to note that in the case of Nicaragua, most 
extrajudicial killings perpetrated by the state or para-state forces occurred during the first 
six years after the defeat of the Sandinistas; whereas in northern Central America it is still 
possible to find reports of extrajudicial killings and activities of death squads for the 
years 2006 to 2009. In other words, although Nicaraguan institutions are plagued with 
problems and excessive use of police force is common, the magnitude of extralegal 
violence by the state and its collaborators has been far lower than in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras.   
 
 Table 6.1.  Percentage of AI Reports on Extralegal Killings in Central America 
Country  
(Number of annual 
reports reviewed) 
Annual reports reviewed (Number) Extrajudicial killings, killings by 
police, death squads or cleansing 
groups associated to the state (%) 
   
Nicaragua  1991-2009 (19) 37 
El Salvador  1993-2009 (17) 59 
Honduras  1999-2009 (11) 64 
Guatemala  1997-2009 (13) 77 
 
Sources: AI Human Rights Annual Reports 1991-2009. 
 
 
Criminal Violence and the Penetration of Organized Crime 
The participation of state institutions and officers in the promotion and concealment of 
extrajudicial violence is, indeed, a criminal activity. However, there is another kind of 
violence perpetrated by agents of the state, whose ultimate objective is not a twisted 
maintenance of order and security, but the development of criminal economies and the 
terrorizing of political and economic rivals. I will refer to those cases as criminal violence 
to differentiate it from other types of violence carried out by the state. In practice, 
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however, evidence suggests that this type of violence is frequently linked to legal and 
illegal structures originally created to combat crime or to fight against threats to the state. 
Groups that started out as special military commandos, crime fighting units and anti drug 
squads, degenerated into organized crime mafias, as violent as the criminal groups they 
combated. A noteworthy example is the “Kaibiles’ in Guatemala (Dudley 2010; Smyth 
2005). These are a group of special forces created by the Guatemalan army to fight the 
insurgency during the years of the war. Intelligence reports indicate that in recent years 
they have become operatives for the Mexican Zetas (Dudley 2010).  
 Notwithstanding, the governmental agents' direct involvement in criminal 
activities goes beyond formally forming organized violent bands. Actually, this 
encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, which go from acts of street corruption to 
managing networks of drug traffickers and hit-men, from the police stations to the 
parliamentary seats. 
A 2004 UNDP briefing on organized crime in Honduras pointed at the infiltration 
of drug-trafficking cartels in security and justice institutions (Caldera and Landaverde 
2004). In 2007, an unidentified high-ranking public official said that 30 percent of the 
country’s police chiefs have decision-making posts in the organized crime networks 
engaged in drug trafficking (Moreno 2007). In 2009 and 2010, Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan top national police chiefs and anti-narcotic deputies have been accused of 
drug-trafficking and covering-up criminal operations (Castillo 2010; Dudley 2010; The 
Economist 2010). Such criminal networks acting within security institutions have 
contributed to the death toll, overall public insecurity, and the increasing levels of distrust 
in state institutions in the region. This is reflected in the results of the 2008 Americas 
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Barometer Democracy surveys in Central America. As shown in Table 6.2, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Honduras currently experience lower levels of citizen confidence in the 
police and the military than in Nicaragua, while at the same time their police institutions 
are seen as more riddled by crime.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2.  Public Opinion about Security Institutions in Post-Transition Central 
       America, 2008 (percentages) 
Country High confidence in the 
army a 
High confidence in the 
police a 
Police involved in 
criminal activity b 
    
Nicaragua 60.1 47.4 25.1 
El Salvador 53.4 41.1 48.8 
Honduras  34.5 30.1 47.2 
Guatemala 36.6 30.3 65.9 
 
Source: Americas Barometer 2008 database. 
a Respondents were asked to answer using a seven-point scale. The figure shows the percentage of people who 
answered from five to seven.  
b Question asked whether the police protected their community from crime or were involved themselves in criminal 
activity.  
 
 
The evidence on linkages between agents of the state and crime in northern 
Central America is so frequent that it is impossible to sum it up here. Furthermore: press 
coverage and denunciations by human rights organizations are so recurrent that it is 
impossible to argue that the problem is restricted to misbehavior of a few people 
embedded in the governmental institutions. Despite the fact that not all countries are 
afflicted by the same level of decomposition and that, even in the most problematic 
countries, not all government officials are corrupt; the evidence suggests that the problem 
is of a structural nature. The institutions in charge of public safety and combating crime 
lack efficient systems of transparency, control and accountability. These shortcomings 
originate at the very moment of the institutions’ creation and are explained by the fact 
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that the people that have to construct these control systems were also involved in 
maintaining impunity in the past. 
As we saw in Chapter V, under the justification that it is necessary to have 
experienced personnel, many police and military operators from former authoritarian 
governments were able to remain in the institutions and to mold them in order to fit their 
old ways of doing things. But these agents accumulated more than experience in the fight 
against crime. They also gained know-how and connections to commit crimes. In 
Guatemala and Honduras, for instance, some of the same military officers that 
participated in the counterinsurgency wars and held top government positions, also  
managed to do businesses with organized crime and drug trafficking (Beltrán 2007; 
Rosenberg 1988; Smyth 2005). When political transitions required the military retreat 
from public security functions, they changed their military fatigues for civil police 
uniforms, and went on with business as usual. 
 
State, violence specialists and post-transition violence 
State institutions and informal actors linked to the state are not the only ones responsible 
for contemporary violence in Central America and Latin America. To be sure, there are 
many other actors behind the post-transition surge.  However, the state, its institutions, 
and even those informal representatives are not ordinary actors in the social dynamics of 
violence (Arias and Goldstein 2010b; Pearce 2010). A murder committed by a common 
citizen is not the same as one perpetrated by a police officer; an extortion ring run by 
gang members is not the same as one composed of a group of attorneys and police 
officers; a drug dealing operation that is covered up by a businessman is not the same as 
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one that is protected by a police chief or a military commander; and a hitman operating 
without police clearance is not the same that one who has the protection and consent of 
authorities. The participation of state agents in criminal activities increases the 
repercussions of crime, makes the institutions accomplices in the violence, reproduces 
impunity, and affects the legitimacy of the regime, particularly if this is democratic. Such 
is the predicament with state-sponsored violence in the post-transition era. 
 In addition, the problem with state-sponsored violence as it manifests in Central 
America—and many other Latin American countries— is that it hinges on the 
participation of informal agents and out-of-control brokers who reproduce more violence 
and insecurity than a legally-constrained institution or, even, than a rogue criminal. 
Furthermore, it reproduces social and political relationships that bargain social power 
using plain violence.  
Central American maras are an illustrative case. The mano dura crackdowns not 
only extended the limits of legal violence from the Central American states, it also 
unleashed violence specialists and illegal armed groups that have been lurking within 
state institutions for years. Under the all-out war against gangs, they took advantage of 
the networks and alliances that covered up their illegal activities. They went onto a 
rampage of gang and youth cleansing that contributed to the escalation in the levels of 
violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (Amnesty International 2003a; Cruz 
and Carranza 2006; International Human Rights Clinic 2007). They went back to the 
practices of former death squads, who kidnapped, tortured, and executed their victims 
attempting to terrorize other gangs and youths. In response, gangs prepared for the all-out 
war and responded in the same terms. Being in prison, they built alliances with other 
 191
armed actors, they obtained resources and they joined the rampage against anybody who 
appeared to be a collaborator of the death squads and the vigilantes.50 
 In contrast with the dynamics of insurgent and counter-insurgent violence of the 
past, when the guerrillas had to gain and keep popular legitimacy, and urban-war tactics 
and terror had to be weighed against the possibility of losing local popular support, the 
contemporary gangs and the new forms of organized crime do not depend on political 
legitimacy to survive; they just need resources, weapons, and the willingness to retaliate 
against state representatives and collaborators. In a striking similarity with the dynamics 
of violence depicted by Alvarenga (1996) and Holden (2004) during the first half of the 
twentieth century in El Salvador, an important share of the dynamics of violence in post-
transition El Salvador hinge upon waves of collective retaliation between informal state 
collaborators, gangs, and organized crime groups. This time, however, the technologies 
of violence and terror are more sophisticated. After all, globalization has made weapons 
and communication tools available for anybody who can pay. The state is no longer, then, 
the only one with the capacity of concentrating the technologies of force.     
Contemporary literature of armed groups has put a lot of weight on the structure 
of opportunities created by resourceful countries such as those in Africa (Collier 2009; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Although this literature has significantly contributed to our 
understanding of civil war and post-transition instability, they have usually overlooked 
the importance of grievances produced by state institutions and state-associated brokers 
because, despite the presence of those grievances, many states have not descended into 
civil war and systematic political conflict again, as is the case in Latin America. The 
                                                 
50 See the press interview with an Eighteenth Street Gang national leader conducted by a couple of 
reporters of the Salvadoran newspaper La Prensa Grafica: Sanz and Castro (2004).   
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Central America cases presented here suggest that countries may not slide back to war, 
despite the existence of grievances, but they do engage in non-political organized 
violence that is turning them even more violent than some war zones.  
Indeed, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and even Nicaragua have serious 
problems with violence generated by common criminals, drug-cartels, and gangs. But the 
fundamental reason why Nicaragua has not descended into the abyss of violence that its 
northern neighbors have inhabited for many years now is that the state has zealously 
concentrated the monopoly of the use of violence.    
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: DEMOCRATIZATION UNDER ASSAULT 
 
Why are some post-transition countries more violent than others? What does 
democratization have to do with the levels of violence? In this project I have tested the 
relationship between political regime, political transitions, and violence. I have showed 
that in order to understand the levels of criminal violence that are affecting some post-
transition countries we have to go beyond the traditional fields of inquiry.  Most 
scholarship attempting to explain post-transition violence focuses on variables that have 
to do with the economy, social capital, and the increasing globalization of organized 
crime. In order words, these are variables that are entrenched in societal conditions. 
Another stream of research has focused on factors that make fragile post-transition 
countries to slip back into civil war, ethnic conflicts, and political turmoil. Both 
approaches have contributed significantly to our understanding of violence in post-
transition countries, whether democratic or not.  
 However, most of such literature leaves out an important variable, namely, the 
state. To be sure, many of the major contributions to our understanding about violence 
take for granted the role of the state. For instance, wealth, economic growth, and 
inequality stem, in part, from state policies. Penetration of organized crime and illegal 
armed groups, on the other hand, is usually seen as an indicator of state corruption and as 
a gauge of state’s capacity to exert effective control over the territory and the population; 
but the existence of armed groups is rarely seen as a product of a state project of control, 
especially under a democratic regime. The state becomes important, however, when we 
 194
enter the field of the politics of conflict; this is, when we have to explain the prevalence 
of civil wars and internal conflict.  
 None of those frameworks are sufficient to explain violence in Latin America. 
With the exception of Colombia, no Latin American country is facing an internal conflict 
of political nature. Strictly speaking not even Colombia would qualify as a clear cut case 
of political conflict. Drug production and traffic have transformed the dynamics of 
conflict in that Andean country. So, the rise of violence in post-transition Latin America 
can hardly be explained using the framework of political conflict, nor can be explained 
only by visiting the economic and cultural variables.  
 Hence, we need to bring back the state in, but in a more overreaching way as it 
has been brought thus far. In many ways, the findings of this research project indicate 
that the state matters in the prevalence of post-transition violence. In the first place, it 
matters because I found solid evidence that the political regime affects the levels of 
violence. This is to say, the type of regime that emerges from a political transition has a 
clear impact on the levels of post-transition violence. Democracy indeed helps to reduce 
the levels of violence, but most of the countries do not emerge from transitions as full-
fledged democracies; some may not reach a satisfactory level of working democracy. 
Many post-transitional countries are just hybrid regimes, that is, electoral democracies 
with poor record in human rights, civil liberties, and the observance of the rule of law. It 
is under this type of regime when common violence tends to grow the most. In other 
words, violence depends upon the way the state relates with the society in the 
management of order and security.  
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Secondly, the state matters in the prevalence of post-transition violence because I 
found that in Central America, the variable that distinguishes those countries suffering 
epidemic levels of violence (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) from the one that 
does not (Nicaragua) is the role of the state in the management of violence; more 
precisely it has to do with the extent to which the state has tolerated, encouraged, 
promoted, and even created parallel armed groups in order to manage security and grant 
social order.  Those groups and their ways of operation were not created recently. They 
are a legacy of authoritarian regimes and, as such, they are a legacy of the way the state 
used to control and submit the population. However, political transition provided the 
opportunity to transform those relationships and how the state established the limits of its 
own use of force. This critical juncture operated distinctively in Nicaragua than in the rest 
of Central America. In the former, it destroyed the systems of civilian collaboration with 
state repression and deactivated the informal violence specialists working from state 
institutions. By doing that, it opened the spaces for the construction of more professional 
and accountable security institutions. In contrast, in northern Central America, the 
networks of civilian collaboration with extralegal state operations continued operating in 
clandestine forms. Although the military were removed from power and institutions were 
reformed, violence specialists continued operating from within state institutions. They 
entrenched their relationships with incumbents and political operators in the countryside 
and the communities, as well as the top levels of state apparatuses. By doing that, they 
closed the opportunities to democratic reforms in state institutions and implanted the 
mechanisms for the perpetuation of impunity from the state.  
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Violence reproduced and expanded during the post-transition era not only because 
economic neoliberal reforms may have weakened welfare state institutions and not only 
because transnational organized crime may have penetrated the state. More importantly, 
violence became predominant because state institutions extended the limits of the use of 
force under democratic rule, they continued encouraging extralegal violence, and 
sponsored and covered-up criminal violence.  
In order to understand how those mechanisms have taken place, we have to move 
beyond the simplistic examination of the performance of law-enforcement institutions, 
and we have to drop the notions that informal institutions and extralegal violence only 
erupt as a social response to state vacuum and institutional incapacity. As the evidence 
presented here suggests, when assessing the role of the state we have to examine the 
relationships of collaboration established by politicians, civil society, violence specialists, 
and security institutions in the management of order and the use of force. These 
relationships are conditioned by networks of clientelism and patronage historically built 
in each country. They are conditioned by the way people interact in order to access and 
influence political and economic power.  
Under authoritarian Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, violence was a 
fundamental ingredient of those patronage networks. Hence they are not the legacies of 
political transitions, but of authoritarian regimes. However, political transitions 
transformed those relationships in the Central American countries. In most of them, they 
did not eradicate such political relationships but transformed them in order to fit the new 
rules of electoral politics. Violence specialists continued operating from new institutions 
of security, under the protection of incumbents and politicians, and with the financial and 
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logistic support of local caciques and political bosses. During electoral processes and 
politic campaigns, they were utilized to buy —or force— allegiances, mobilize voters, 
and rally to support politicians. Violence increased because these actors were better 
positioned to hamper the performance of state institutions and to ensure impunity.  
In Nicaragua, however, political transitions radically transformed patronage 
relationships by removing security institutions and violence specialists linked to state 
institutions from the equation of political collaboration and the exercise of violence. The 
key point in Nicaragua is not that patronage and clientelism disappeared. They did not. In 
fact, the FSLN and the major Nicaraguan political parties have excelled at building their 
political machineries upon corruption and clientelist politics. But the critical difference 
between Nicaragua and the rest of Central America is that violence specialists linked to 
state structures were removed from the circuits of patronage. Political transitions cleaned 
up Nicaraguan institutions from potential extralegal operators and deactivated the organic 
links between them and security institutions. When pressures to enact draconian measures 
to fight crime rose in the post-transition, police and military in Nicaragua were readier to 
resist the temptation to slip back to authoritarian responses. They were also better poised 
to control and clean up their security institutions and to concentrate the means of coercion 
in the hands of formal institutions during the post-transition era.  
Hence, political transitions played a major role in determining the likelihood of 
high levels of post-transition violence. Where political transitions demobilized the 
informal violence specialists working from (and for) the state, where transitions 
disarticulated the organic links between violence specialists, incumbent politicians and 
institutions, and where transitions pushed the main negotiating actors to build and 
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strengthen effective systems of oversight and accountability, transitions yield a regime 
better positioned to stop the reproduction of violence from the state and with the capacity 
to tackle common crime from the society. In contrast, in those countries in which political 
transitions left violence operators largely untouched and they managed to maintain their 
political links to political institutions and incumbents, violence has developed to levels of 
internal conflict and war. As I have repeating all along this project: El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras have more homicidal violence than many troubled countries in 
Africa and the Middle-East. 
The key point to understand why some political transitions pushed violence 
specialists out of the equation of post-transition governance is to examine the need of 
survival of some political elites. This is where the role of civil society and international 
actors come to bear. In those countries where political elites from the old regime could 
get away just with shallow reforms in the security apparatuses, violence specialists and 
their links to political elites remained in control, reproducing violence in the long run. In 
those countries were pressure was mounted up to a point where political elites really had 
to transform their security apparatus and disarticulate the links of their informal violence 
specialist from state institutions, violence has remained under control.  
The critical element was, hence, political survival. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua 
removed their violence specialists and successfully reformed their security apparatuses 
because they needed to survive in the post-transition. The strong pressure exerted by the 
United States and the Nicaraguan civil society pushed the Sandinistas to radical 
transformations. In northern Central America, the United States was largely disengaged 
from pushing the old regime elites to reform. All the work was left to the United Nations, 
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which after all was only an arbiter of pacts and negotiations conducted by internal forces. 
In Guatemala and El Salvador the old regime elites retained enough power as to 
negotiate, manipulate, and force the continuity of their authoritarian operators within the 
institutions of security or in power positions. In Honduras, where the military 
“voluntarily” relinquished from the security apparatuses, the organic links between the 
party system and the military provided enough space to the latter as to return as civilians 
in charge of the new institutions of law-enforcement. 
Civil society also was largely disengaged from the processes of reforming the 
security apparatuses in northern Central America. Actually, in Guatemala and El 
Salvador, remnants of the authoritarian networks of civilian collaboration were key 
players in pushing local and national elites to keep the systems of clientelism and 
patronage within the democratic state. They were the electoral base for parties that 
perpetuated the links between informal violence specialists and state institutions. 
Ironically, they provided a good base for organization and mobilization in periods of 
elections. In Nicaragua, to the contrary, the Sandinista regime had encouraged mass 
organization and civilian engagement in politics. When they had to hand over power, 
community associations and grass-root organizations mobilized to push for deepening the 
reforms in the security apparatuses and supported the professionalization and 
institutionalization of the police and the military.   
Table 7.1 exhibits a summary of the factors at play during the transitions, and how 
they yielded the fundamental differences between Nicaragua and the rest of Central 
America.  
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Table 7.1. The Transition Settings and the Levels of Crime  
Factors during the transition Favorable setting Unfavorable setting 
   
Violent specialists from the old 
regime 
Did not survive the transition or 
were deactivated  
Survived the transition and remain 
active 
   
Relationship between former 
violent specialists and new 
governing elites 
Weak ties, new elites control 
security apparatus and have the 
power to restrain former violent 
specialists. 
Clientelist networks with no 
links to violence specialists.   
Strong collaboration ties 
Elites unable or unwilling to 
control some of the violent 
operators acting illegally. 
Clientelist networks with strong 
links to violence specialists.  
   
Civil society/citizen participation  Active pushing for reforms  Passive in general 
Some active groups opposing the 
reforms 
   
Transnational actors Significant leverage in pushing 
transformations. 
Not involved or with little 
influence during the transition.  
   
Results   
   
Institutional Outcomes  Institutions more likely to be 
efficient, and accountable 
Institutions more likely to be 
weak, inefficient, and corrupted.  
   
Public security outcome Low levels of crime High levels of crime 
   
   
Countries Nicaragua El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras 
   
   
 
 These findings challenge the conventional wisdom about transitions in Latin 
America. They show that countries that have seemingly followed the playbook of 
democratic transitions are now burdened by crime and violence (El Salvador), whereas 
the country that have always raised doubts about its democratic credentials (Nicaragua) is 
doing better containing crime and avoiding the collapse produced by the penetration of 
organized crime. By all accounts, El Salvador has remained at the top of the independent 
assessments on democracy, electoral performance, and respect for civil liberties in the 
region, second only to Costa Rica. But this seeming democratic stability has not granted 
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El Salvador with low levels of violence. Quite the opposite: El Salvador accomplished 
almost all the formal criteria for democratic transition. It removed the military from 
power, dismantled the old internal security institutions, created a new civilian police, and 
set an electoral system that has been capable of granting fair and free elections in the last 
fifteen years. Yet, El Salvador occupies the infamous position of being the most violent 
country in the Western Hemisphere.  In contrast, Nicaragua did not dismantle its security 
institutions but reformed them; it did not create a new police but kept the same one, with 
different name and leadership. Clientelist politics and corruption pervade the 
performance and the relationships in most of the political institutions including the 
judiciary. But Nicaragua has managed to be far less violent than El Salvador and almost 
any other Latin American country with the exception of Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and 
Argentina.  
 The difference, hence, rests on those informal spheres created from the same 
state. Despite the political reforms, El Salvador keeps managing order and internal 
security by relying in informal collaborators linked to state institutions and capable to 
resort to private violence.  Nicaragua does not.  
 The findings suggest that the removal of the military and the civilianization of the 
institutions of public security are not sufficient conditions for preventing the reproduction 
of illegal and criminal violence from the state. In order to understand violence in Central 
America, we have to look also to civil society collaboration with the state. The 
fundamental problem dealing with post-transition violence is not whether the military 
were removed from politics, but whether the new regime uses the old violent 
entrepreneurs in order to achieve order and administer the use of force.   
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The focus on the military that has prevailed in the literature of transitions in Latin 
America for years has distracted the study of the relationships between them, the violence 
specialists, the civilian collaborators, and the incumbents. These relationships are at the 
base of the reproduction of violence in Central America, and in most of Latin America as 
well. Those countries more affected by common and criminal violence nowadays are 
precisely countries where state institutions play a major role reproducing violence. Think 
on the Latin American countries more affected by common violence and crime in these 
days. In addition to Central America, they are Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico 
(Avilés 2006; Birbeck and Gabaldón 2009; Davis 2006a; Hinton 2006). In all of them a 
common factor is the significant participation of state institutions in the reproduction of 
violence. Police violence in Brazil is notorious and well documented; despite its 
successful democratic transition, inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo have to deal 
with some of the most corrupted police in the hemisphere: they conduct extralegal 
operations and executions, collaborate with civilians and local bosses to form cleansing 
squads, and integrate criminal rings (Brinks 2006; Caldeira and Holston 1999; Chevigny 
1996). The internal conflict that affects Colombia since the 1950s has its roots in the 
creation of armed groups by political parties in the past and in the formation of vigilante 
organizations from the Colombian state (Tate 2007). They all transited to form guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, and criminal organizations. The drug cartels have, indeed, contributed the 
most to Colombian violence, but it is impossible to understand the high levels of violence 
without considering the contribution of state institutions and their informal collaborators 
in the countryside and within the communities. The same seems to account for Venezuela 
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and Mexico.  In both countries, police institutions are pervaded by corruption and 
clientelist networks linked to criminal organizations (Davis 2006a; Davis 2007).  
The former is to say that the findings of this research project are also applicable to 
other regions beyond Central America. They indeed are useful to understand violence in 
the rest of Latin America, but they can also help to illuminate our understanding of 
criminal violence in some post-transitions countries such as Russia, where Volkov (2002) 
has unveiled the complex mechanisms of collaboration between organized crime and 
post-transition security institutions. 
The implications of this research are critical. They point to the consequences of 
creating illegal or armed groups in order to fight insurgency, terrorism, and organized 
crime. As the painful Salvadoran experience demonstrates, the creation of parallel 
structures within the state and the surrender of legitimate use of force to informal 
violence specialists and armed groups with little or no oversight set the conditions for the 
perpetuation of extralegal violence and organized crime in the future. In doing this, they 
also undermine the capacity of the state to claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force, they weaken its ability to enforce the rule of law and they undercut the systems of 
human rights protection of the citizens. Therefore, new democratic regimes end up 
assaulted from the same state institutions meant to underpin democracies.  
The findings of this project also challenge the idea that transitions are trapped in 
the dilemma of relying on the old-regime security apparatus in the first stages of 
democratization to prevent an upsurge in crime. The survival of old institutions—whether 
formal or informal— has been part of the crime problem. The upsurge of crime that 
followed the transitions in all Central American countries has been far less devastating in 
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Nicaragua, which deactivated and restrained old-regime actors through political 
engagement and accountability mechanisms, than in northern Central America, where old 
human rights abusers and repressors are still very much in control of security.   
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